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ALFORD TIMBER INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellant, v. ROBERT KEITH CAULKINS and ETHEL I. CAULKINS, his wife, MACMILLAN BLOEDEL OF AMERICA, INC., a Florida Corporation, DONALD KING, GLENN L. WARD and JENNIFER A. WARD, his wife, GLENN WARD d/b/a G&M TRUCKING, RYDER TRUCK RENTAL, INC., TRANSPORTATION CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellees.

27 Fla. L. Weekly D331c

Insurance — Automobile liability — Other insurance — In consolidated civil actions relating to an accident involving a tractor-trailer, trial court incorrectly determined two insurance policies, one carried by the driver and owner of the tractor and the other by the owner of the trailer, both provided primary coverage — In light of the respective ownerships of the tractor and trailer, the “other insurance” clauses, found in each of the policies, specifying primary and excess coverage for cases involving trailers connected to motor vehicles with different owners, provide for primary coverage under the driver’s policy and excess coverage under the policy of the owner of the trailer — Although multiple primary coverages are appropriate in some circumstances, the plain wording and meaning of the policies at hand control the resolution of this case

ALFORD TIMBER INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellant, v. ROBERT KEITH CAULKINS and ETHEL I. CAULKINS, his wife, MACMILLAN BLOEDEL OF AMERICA, INC., a Florida Corporation, DONALD KING, GLENN L. WARD and JENNIFER A. WARD, his wife, GLENN WARD d/b/a G&M TRUCKING, RYDER TRUCK RENTAL, INC., TRANSPORTATION CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellees. 1st District. Case Nos. 1D99-2623; 1D99-2802; & 1D99-2819. Opinion filed February 6, 2002. An appeal from Circuit Court for Duval County. W. Gregg McCaulie and Hugh A. Carithers, Jr., Judges. Counsel: Robert B. Guild of Hession & Guild, Jacksonville, for Appellant. Francis J. Carroll of Boehm, Brown, Seacrest & Fischer, P.A., Daytona Beach, for Appellee Transportation Casualty Insurance Company.

(ALLEN, C.J.) In these consolidated cases the appellant challenges three separate orders addressing an issue of liability insurance coverage as between two policies, and by which it was determined that both policies provide primary coverage. We conclude that a proper construction of the policies yields the primary coverage under the appellee Transportation Casualty policy only, with the appellant’s policy providing excess coverage.

Civil actions were filed below in connection with an automobile accident involving a tractor-trailer, with allegations of resulting damage to other vehicles, individuals, and property. The tractor unit was owned and operated by a driver with insurance provided under a policy with Transportation Casualty. The trailer unit was owned by the appellant with insurance under another policy. Each of the policies covered both the tractor and the trailer, and the appellant was entitled to coverage under the Transportation Casualty policy. Each of the policies has an “other insurance” clause specifying that:

For any covered “auto” you own, this Coverage Form provides primary insurance. For any covered “auto” you don’t own, the insurance provided by this Coverage Form is excess over any other collectible insurance. However, while a covered “auto” which is a “trailer” is connected to another vehicle, the Liability Coverage this Coverage Form provides for the “trailer” is:

(1) Excess while it is connected to a motor vehicle you do not own.

(2) Primary while it is connected to a covered “auto” you own.

In light of the respective ownerships of the tractor and trailer, the “other insurance” clauses in the two policies thus provide for primary coverage under the Transportation Casualty policy and excess coverage under the appellant’s policy as to both the tractor and the trailer.

In treating both policies as providing primary coverage, the trial court relied on Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Sentry Insurance, 288 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1974). Although Liberty Mutual would approve of multiple primary coverages in appropriate circumstances, the case did not address coverage under an “other insurance” clause like the one in the present situation. The plain wording and meaning of the policies involved in the present case control the resolution of this case. See Hartford Accident and Indemnity v. Liberty Mutual Insurance, 277 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1973).

The appealed orders are reversed and the cases are remanded. (BOOTH and BENTON, JJ., CONCUR.)

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