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CLOVER FINDLAY, Appellant, v. PFL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and LARRY C. HEATON, Appellees.

27 Fla. L. Weekly D170a

Torts — Fraud — Insurance — Limitation of actions — Plaintiff who purchased policy from defendants alleging she was led to believe that she had purchased a retirement plan, only to learn that retirement plan was merely a life insurance policy with no retirement benefits — Error to dismiss complaint with prejudice on statute of limitations grounds — Statute of limitations could not have begun to run until date plaintiff learned of fraud or date plaintiff stopped paying premiums, whichever was later

CLOVER FINDLAY, Appellant, v. PFL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and LARRY C. HEATON, Appellees. 3rd District. Case No. 3D01-2052. L.T. Case No. 00-13205. Opinion filed January 16, 2002. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Barbara S. Levenson, Judge. Counsel: James, Hoyer, Newcomer & Smiljanich and Terry Smiljanich, for appellant. Isicoff, Ragatz & Koenigsberg and Eric Isicoff and Teresa Ragatz; Bryan Cave and Elizabeth Teutenberg and Robert T. Ebert, Jr., for appellees.

(Before JORGENSON, LEVY and SHEVIN, JJ.)

(PER CURIAM.) Clover Findlay appeals an order dismissing with prejudice her claims against defendants PFL Life Insurance Co. and Larry Heaton based on the statute of limitations. We reverse.

Findlay’s claims arose from the purchase of a policy from PFL; she alleges that she was led to believe that she had purchased a retirement plan. However, she learned in 1998 that the supposed retirement plan was merely a life insurance policy with no retirement benefits. On the authority of Lopez-Infante v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., Nos. 3D00-2776, 3D00-2774 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 16, 2002) [27 Fla. L. Weekly D182], which recites materially indistinguishable facts, we reverse the order and remand for further proceedings. The statute of limitations did not begin to run until Findlay “was no longer suffering `consequent injuries’ through the payment of premiums to [PFL] and, thus, the statute of limitations could not have possibly begun to run until as least 1998, or the year in which [Findlay] stopped paying premiums to [PFL], whichever is later.” Lopez-Infante, slip op. at 6.

Reversed and remanded.

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