1 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 429a
Insurance — Homeowners — Exclusions — Final judgment of dissolution of marriage awarding marital home to wife terminated husband’s insurable interest in home at time judgment was entered and rendered exclusion for any intentional damage caused by named insureds inapplicable to intentional damage caused by husband subsequent to final judgment even though title had not yet passed as matter of record at time of loss
ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Appellant, vs. LILLIAN ZAYAS a/k/a LILLIAN FIGUEREDO, Appellee. 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Appellate Division. Case No. 93-004AP. Opinion filed June 11, 1993. An Appeal from COUNTY COURT for Dade County, Florida, Harvey Goldstein, Judge. Christopher Lynch, for appellant. Robin S. Bucknel, for appellee.
(Before SIDNEY SHAPIRO and GERALD D. HUBBART, JJ.)
(HUBBART, J.) Appellant, Defendant in the court below appeals a partial summary judgment entered on behalf of the Appellee, on the question of liability.
In 1986, Appellee and her then-husband entered into a contract of insurance with Appellant to insure their marital home. The policy contained an exclusion for any intentional damage caused by the named insureds, i.e. Appellee and her then-husband.
On March 23, 1987, a Final Judgment was entered dissolving the marriage of Appellee and her husband. The marital home was awarded to the Appellee and her ex-husband was given thirty days to give a quitclaim deed for the home to Appellee. If he failed to do so, the Final Judgment would act as the conveyance of same. On April 4, 1987, before the thirty day period had elapsed, and before Appellee’s ex-husband had given her a deed, Appellee’s ex-husband entered the home and intentionally caused considerable damage to it. Appellee presented a claim to Appellant which denied coverage, citing the above-mentioned exclusion.
The parties are in agreement as to one point: If the Appellee’s ex-husband had an insurable interest in the home at the time of the loss, then the exclusion would apply and Appellant could not be held liable. Appellant contends that, at the time of the loss, neither the Final Judgment nor the ex-husband had conveyed his interest in the home to Appellee. Therefore, the ex-husband still had an insurable interest in the property. And, since he was an insured by the terms of the policy, the exclusion applies.
The question, then, is whether the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage conveyed title to the property so as to terminate the husband’s insurable interest in the property at the time of the loss and render the exclusion inoperable. We believe that it did. The Final Judgment effectively terminated the ex-husband’s interest in the property at the time the judgment was entered even though title had not yet passed as a matter of record. The case of Johnson v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 472 So.2d 859 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1985) is directly on point. In that case it was held that a final order of Dissolution of Marriage awarding an automobile to the wife terminated the husband’s insurable interest in the case even though he had not transferred title to the wife at the time it was damaged.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the cause remanded for proceedings on damages and all other appropriate matters.
AFFIRMED. (SIDNEY SHAPIRO, J. concurs. ROBBIE BARR, J. recused.)
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