1 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 511a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Uninsured motorist — Where insured filed action for PIP payments against insurer and, while that action was pending, filed second action for UM benefits which included claim for medical expenses and lost wages not paid by PIP; parties litigated issues of reasonableness and necessity of medical expenses and lost wages in UM action with full knowledge of pending PIP action; and judgment was entered and satisfied on those claims, doctrine of merger operated to bar prosecution of claims in pending PIP action — Any of insured’s claims for costs and statutory attorney’s fees as part of PIP claim could and should have been raised and litigated in UM trial and, to the extent they were not, were waived
ARMANDO MONTES DE OCA, Appellant, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE CO., Appellee. 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Appellate Division. Case No. 92-182 AP. Opinion filed August 27, 1993. An appeal from the County Court of Dade County, Florida, Honorable Jack Coe, Judge. Marc L. Goldman, and Carlos Lidsky, co-counsel for appellant. James K. Clark, counsel for appellee.
(Before MELVIA B. GREEN, CELESTE H. MUIR and JUDITH L. KREEGER, JJ.)
(MELVIA B. GREEN, J.) ARMANDO MONTES DE OCA (“DE OCA”) appeals an order denying his motion for summary judgment and granting GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY’S (“GEICO”) cross motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
The undisputed facts are that DE OCA was insured under an automobile policy with GEICO that provided both personal injury protection (“PIP”) coverage and uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage. DE OCA was involved in an automobile accident for which he made a claim for PIP benefits under the policy. GEICO initially made PIP payments to DE OCA pursuant to the policy and requested an independent medical examination. The independent medical examination concluded that future medical treatment was not necessary and GEICO ceased future PIP payments.
DE OCA filed an action for UM benefits for injuries allegedly incurred in the accident. He also made a claim for medical expenses and lost wages in the UM action.
After GEICO ceased to make future PIP payments and during the pendency of his UM action, DE OCA filed an action for medical expenses and lost wages not paid by PIP based on the IME cut-off. These were the same medical expenses and lost wages that were being claimed in the pending UM action.
The UM action proceeded to trial first. During this trial, the parties litigated all of the issues of reasonableness and necessity of DE OCA’s medical expenses and lost wages with full knowledge of the pending PIP action.
The jury returned a verdict in the UM action awarding DE OCA $5,537.00 for medical expenses and $300.00 for lost wages and finding that DE OCA had not sustained a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability. This verdict was reduced by $3,920.79 to reflect PIP payments made to DE OCA prior to the IME cut-off. The resulting verdict of $1916.21 was reduced to judgment and satisfied by GEICO.
We find that when DE OCA elected to litigate his PIP claims as part of his UM suit and a judgment was entered and satisfied on such claims, the doctrine of merger operated to bar the prosecution of the claims in the pending PIP action. The doctrine of merger operates to extinguish a cause of action on which a judgment is based and bars a subsequent action for the same cause. Sunshine Utilities Equipment, Inc. v. Treasure Coast Utilities, Inc., 421 So.2d 1096 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Thus, the debt or cause of action on which an adjudication is predicated is said to be merged into the final judgment. Id. at 1097.
Any claims by DE OCA for his costs and statutory attorney’s fees as part of his PIP claim could and should have been raised and litigated in his earlier trial. To the extent that they were not, we find that he has waived such claims.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below. (CELESTE H. MUIR and JUDITH L. KREEGER, JJ. concur.)
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