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FORETIA EVON BROWN a/k/a LORETTA E. BROWN and SAFEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS, v. INTERAMERICAN CAR RENTAL, INC., APPELLEE.

1 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 202a

Insurance — Automobile liability — Leased vehicles — Automobile lease which shifted primary liability to lessees and their insurance companies also operated to shift liability to a person driving vehicle with approval of lessee — Automobile lease provision shifting primary liability to lessees and their insurance companies was valid as applied to person signing lease as additional renter, even though additional renter’s insurance company was not listed on contract

FORETIA EVON BROWN a/k/a LORETTA E. BROWN and SAFEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS, v. INTERAMERICAN CAR RENTAL, INC., APPELLEE. 11th Judicial Circuit In and For Dade County, Appellate Division. Case No. 92-101 AP. Opinion filed ______. An Appeal from County Court for Dade County, Florida, Raphael Steinhardt, Judge. Parillo, Weiss, & O’Halloran; Brenda Harmer, Esq., Attorney for Appellants. Ferdie and Gouz; Jose I. Valdes, Esq., Attorney for Appellee.

(Before FIERRO, KORNBLUM, DEAN, JJ.)

(FIERRO, J.) On November 19, 1989, Loretta Brown (hereinafter “Brown” or “Appellant”), as an additional renter, entered into a vehicle rental contract with Interamerican Car Rental Inc. (hereinafter “Interamerican” or “Appellee”). Brown was involved in an accident while driving the rented vehicle. Litigation ensued whereby Interamerican, in a third party claim, sued Brown and her insurer, Safeway Insurance Company, for breach of a rental contract by failure to assume primary liability for the accident. The trial court entered two orders finding that Interamerican, by not complying with Florida Statute 627.7263, did not shift liability to Brown’s insurer. After a rehearing, the trial court vacated the prior orders and found that the primary insurance coverage was properly shifted to Brown and her insurer. Appellants Brown and Safeway appeal the Final Judgment in accordance with the order entered after rehearing.

The dispositive issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred in finding that: a) the lessor in its rental contract complied with Fla. Stat. 627.7263 so that the lessees were properly notified of the shift in liability; and b) that primary liability was properly shifted to Safeway Insurance Company. We affirm the trial court’s findings.

Florida Statute 627.7263 provides that a lessor of a motor vehicle will be the primary insurer unless the following appears on the rental contract:

1) Each rental or lease agreement must contain a provision on the face of the contract in bold type informing lessee that liability will be shifted to lessee’s insurer.

2) Each rental or lease agreement shall provide a space for the name of lessee’s insurance company if lessor’s insurer is not be primary.

Fla. Stat. 627.7263(1) and (2) (1992).

The rental contract in this cause complied with the requirement of bold type and provided as follows:

In accordance with the exception to Florida Statute 627.7263 you are hereby notified that this rental agreement provides that the valid and collectible liability and personal injury insurance of the renter, or any other person operating this motor vehicle with the renter’s consent, shall be primary. Renter is contracting that their insurance is to be primary in accordance with said statute and in accordance with the limits of liability as recognized by Florida Statute 324.021(7).

(R. p. 5).

Following the above paragraph, there was a line for “My Insurance Co. is ________ ; Policy No. ________.” This is followed by a line for renter’s signature and under that is a line for the signature of additional renter. Loretta Brown is listed at the beginning of the contract as an “additional renter” and has signed the contract as “additional renter”. The line for the insurance company listed two insurance companies separated by a slash. Although the names of the insurance companies were illegible, it has been acknowledged that Safeway Insurance was not listed.

Appellant alleges that since there was no separate line for her insurer, the contract was not in compliance with Fla. Stat. 627.7263. The trial court found that the bold print accurately notified the lessees that their insurance would be primary. The court further found that the failure to list the insurer’s name does not preclude the shifting of liability.

Appellant further alleges that she intended to be an additional driver and not a renter of the vehicle. The reverse side of the contract states that a “renter” is defined as “the party renting the vehicle and any other person approved by Lessor to drive the vehicle.” Further, on the front of the contract in bold print, the shift in primary liability clearly runs both to the insurer of the “renter, or any other person operating this motor vehicle with the renter’s consent.” (R., p. 5). See generally, International Bankers Insurance Co. v. Snappy Car Rental, supra.

In upholding a rental contract, the Fifth District found the intent of the legislature was that to properly shift the primary insurance burden from the lessor to the lessee, the lessee must be notified and informed in bold type of this shift in burden. International Bankers Insurance Company v. Snappy Car Rental, 553 So.2d 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). The same court upheld a contract with similar language to the Interamerican rental agreement in the present case. State Farm v. Lindo’s Rent-a-Car, 588 So.2d 36 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). Even though Lindo did not write the renter’s name on the contract, nor did it list the name of the renter’s insurer, the contract was found valid to shift the burden of liability. In addition, there was a space for an additional renter on the Lindo contract, and the contract supplied only one line for the name of the insurance company. Id.

A contract was found not to comply with the statute where the type was not in bold letters and where the statute was incorrectly stated. Geumes v. Biscayne Auto Rentals, Inc., 414 So.2d 216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). That court required that the agreement comply with the bold type and accurately state the law, but noted the following:

We do not find that the statute imposes the additional prerequisite that the lessee’s name be filled in. The statute only requires a blank space to provide for the lessee’s name. Consequently, we find that this provision is informational in that it benefits the lessor in the event that a claim is presented against it. Failure to fill in the lessee’s name, standing alone, does not preclude the lessor from shifting responsibility.

Id., at 218 (f.n. 5).

The trial court correctly found that the bold type sufficiently notified Ms. Brown of her insurance liability while she was driving the vehicle. The fact that the insurer’s name was not listed on the contract was not noncompliance with the statute.

Because the contract was in substantial compliance with Fla. Stat. 627.7263 and the parties were sufficiently noticed of the intent to shift primary insurance liability, the lessee’s insurer is primarily liable under the contract. International Bankers, supra.

We find that there was substantial competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings in this cause.

AFFIRMED.

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