10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 840b
Insurance — Attorney’s fees — Where insurer’s motion for relief from order determining amount of attorney’s fees, contending that interest on fee award should run from time amount is determined rather than date entitlement to fees is fixed, was totally devoid of merit, and no reasonable inquiry was made into current state of law prior to filing motion, motion is improper contest of plaintiff’s entitlement to prejudgment attorney’s fees — Plaintiff is awarded attorney’s fees for time spent responding to motion
JODY KLINE LEVINSON, Plaintiff, vs. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County. Case No. COCE 99-012244 (50). August 22, 2003. Peter B. Skolnik, Judge. Counsel: Andrew J. Weinstein, Weinsten & Associates, P.A., Coral Springs, for Plaintiff. James T. Sparkman, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SANCTION STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
THIS CAUSE came before this Court on June 17, 2003 on Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Order on Defendant’s Motion for Relief From Order Determining Amount of Attorney Fees and Costs and Clarification and Plaintiff’s Motion to Sanction State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Upon review of the Court file, the evidence presented, argument from counsel, as well as cited Florida case law and Statutes, and the being otherwise duly advised in the premises, makes the following findings of fact:
1. This case was tried before a jury and on September 6, 2002, a Final Judgment was entered in favor of the Plaintiff.
2. On April 15, 2003, this Court entered its Order Determining Amount of Attorney Fees and Costs that were awarded to the Plaintiff.
3. On April 23, 2003, the Defendant filed its Motion for Relief From Order Determining Amount of Attorney Fees and Costs and Clarification. Said Motion states in pertinent part: “Defendant feels that the interest should run from the moment the amount is determined, not from August 15, 2002”.
4. Concurrent with filing its Motion for Relief From Order, the Defendant submitted a proposed Order granting said motion which was entered by the Court on April 28, 2003. Neither the Motion, nor the proposed Order were provided to Plaintiff’s counsel prior to their submission to the Court.
5. Prior to the entry of the Court’s Order of April 28, 2003, Plaintiff’s counsel submitted to Defendant’s counsel, a copy of the Florida Supreme Court case Quality Engineer Installation, Inc. v. Highly South, Inc., 670 So.2d 929 (Fla. 1996). In that case, the Supreme Court held that, “Interest accrues from the date the entitlement to attorney fees is fixed through agreement, arbitration award or court determination even though the award has not been determined”.
6. Defendant’s Motion for Relief Form Order Determining Amount of Attorney Fees and Costs and Clarification was totally devoid of merit. Prior to filing this motion the Defendant should have made reasonable inquiry as to the current state of the law. Defense counsel’s argument that the Defendant agreed to vacate the Court’s April 28, 2003 Order after being provided with relevant case law further underscores the fact that no reasonable inquiry was made into the current state of the law prior to filing the Motion for Relief. Plaintiff’s counsel stated that he spent two (2) hours responding to the Defendant’s Motion and this Court finds that he should be compensated for that time at the rate of $250.00 per hour.
7. This Court views the Defendant’s Motion for Relief as an improper contest of Plaintiff’s entitlement to prejudgment attorney fees and therefore awards the aforementioned additional attorney fees pursuant to its inherent equitable power and Florida Statute 627.428.
It is therefore
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff recover from the Defendant attorney fees in the amount of $500.00 for which let execution issue and that said sum shall bear interest at the statutory rate from the date of this Order until paid in full.
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