10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1042b
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Claim forms — Countersignature — Section 627.736(5)(a) does not require insured to countersign HICF form as condition precedent to insurer paying PIP benefits to medical provider who has provided notice to insurer of acceptance of valid assignment of rights and benefits from insured
KAM HABIBI, D.C., P.A. (Christopher Shirley), Plaintiff, v. UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County. Case No. 03-11467 COCE (54), General Civil Division. October 21, 2003. Lisa Trachman, Judge. Counsel: Robert G. Nichols, Nichols, Williams & Julian, Fort Lauderdale, for Plaintiff. Kishasha B. Sharp, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF BENEFITS, AS TO DEFENDANT’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE DEALING WITH THE “COUNTERSIGNATURES” OF HICF’S, AND AS TO THE LEGAL VALIDITY OF THE NOTICE/HICF’S SUBMITTED TO DEFENDANT
THIS CAUSE, coming on to be heard upon the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and the Court having reviewed the motion and heard argument of counsel for the parties, it is, therefore,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED as follows:Factual Summary
Plaintiff is a medical provider who filed suit to recover PIP benefits from the Defendant, United Automobile Insurance Company, (hereinafter, “United”) for medical treatment rendered to the insured, Christopher Shirley. Defendant filed an Affirmative Defense claiming that Plaintiff violated F.S.627.736(5)(a) by submitting HICF’s that were not countersigned by the insured/patient, and that therefore United did not receive legally valid notice of a covered loss under the PIP statute. Plaintiff filed this Motion for Partial Summary Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which addresses the validity of the Assignment of Benefits, whether the attached HICF’s require the countersignature of the patient/insured, and whether the balance of the HICF’s constitute legal notice under the statute. The motion included an affidavit of the medical provider stating that the attached Assignment of Benefits was provided to United along with a copy of the first bill, as well as the fact that the attached HICF’s all indicated that an assignment of benefits had been accepted. The Court makes a finding of fact that the attached assignment is legally valid, and that it is not necessary for the Plaintiff to provide further proof that the signature of the patient/insured on the assignment of benefits is authentic, absent some evidence to the contrary by United.Rule of Law
Florida Statute 627.736(5)(a) does not require an insured to countersign a HICF form as a condition precedent to an insurance company paying PIP benefits to a medical provider who has provided notice to the insurance company of the acceptance of an assignment of rights and benefits from the insured. It has long been held that an unqualified assignment transfers to the assignee all the interest of the assignor under the assigned contract, whereby the assignor has no right to make any claim on the contract once the assignment is complete, unless authorized to do so by the assignee. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Ray, 556 So.2d 811 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Thus, because the assignee “stands in the shoes of the insured”, the assignee has already assumed all rights to receive all benefit payments, and no further permission is necessary. “Only the insured or the medical provider owns the cause of action against the insurer at any one time.” Oglesby v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 781 So.2d 469 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). Thus, because the insured has already assign away his rights, he has no authority left to direct payments by the insurance company.
The wording of the statute is consistent with this holding. Florida Statute 627.736(5)(a) states that:
“. . .the insurer providing such coverage may pay for such charges directly to such person or institution lawfully rendering such treatment, if the insured receiving such treatment or his or her guardian has countersigned the invoice, bill, or claim form approved by the Department of Insurance upon which such charges are to be paid for as having actually been rendered, to the best knowledge of the insured or his or her guardian. . .” (emphasis added)
The subsection uses the permissive, rather than mandatory, term “may” relative to the insurer’s making of direct payments to the provider in the absence of an assignment, according the insurer the option of paying benefits either to the provider or the insured. That option is foreclosed, however, when an assignment has been accepted. Thus, requiring a countersignature in addition to an assignment of benefits would impermissibly expand the parameters of F.S. 627.736(5)(a), and would be contrary to the vast body of case law with respect to the effect of an irrevocable assignment of benefits.
Finally, requiring a countersignature in Box 13 of a HICF, regardless of whether an assignment has been accepted, is contrary to the language of the HICF itself in that Box 27 of the HICF provides a specific space for the medical provider to indicate that an assignment of benefits has been accepted. Ergo, if the legislature intended a countersignature in Box 13 to constitute the only method of executing an assignment of benefits, then Box 27 would be completely meaningless. “This Court traditionally has avoided readings that would render part of a statute meaningless. Underlying that caution is our assumption that legislatures do not enact purposeless and therefore useless, legislation.” Beach v. Great Western Bank, 692 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1997).
Relevant case law is also consistent with this ruling. The 4th DCA recently declined to accept jurisdiction over a certified question dealing with the countersignature issue because “circuit courts . . .have uniformly interpreted the countersignature requirement in section 627.736(5)(a) as a permitted, not mandatory, mechanism that does not require the insured’s signature on the reimbursement form where the insured has assigned benefits to the medical provider.” Star Casualty v. USA Diagnostics, Inc., 2003 WL 22239659 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 1, 2003) [28 Fla. L. Weekly D2274a]. The Court notes similar rulings by numerous courts within this jurisdiction, including: USA Diagnostics v. Star Casualty, 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 410b (17th Jud. Cir., Jg. William Herring, 2001); Dr. Jason Marucci (Johanna Poveda) v. United Auto Ins. Co., 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 871b (17th Jud. Cir., Jg. Kathleen Ireland, 2002); Ron Wechesel, D.C. (Dal Huynh) v. United Auto Ins. Co., 10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 133b (17th Jud. Cir., Jg. Martin Dishowitz, 2002); Dr. Steven Brown (Jerome Johnson) v. Progressive Ins. Co., 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 567a (17th Jud. Cir., Jg. Zebedee Wright, 2002).
Therefore, this Court rules that Florida Statute 627.736(5)(a) does not require an insured to countersign a HICF form as a condition precedent to an insurance company paying PIP benefits to a medical provider who has provided notice to the insurance company of the acceptance of an assignment of rights and benefits from the insured. Because a valid assignment of benefits was provided to United in this case, the court finds that the attached HICF’s constitute legally valid notice of a covered loss under the PIP statute.
The Court reserves jurisdiction as the issue of attorney’s fees and costs related to this motion.
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