10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 135a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Medical expenses — Statutes — Effective date — Where bill indicates generally that subsections establishing allowable amounts for treatment and services shall apply to treatments and services after October 1, 2001, and subparagraph regarding allowable amounts for MRIs states that it is effective upon becoming law, the effective date of MRI allowable amounts is date the bill was signed into law by the Governor — Constitutional law — Statute with effective date before October 1, 2001, is not unconstitutional interference with existing contracts where new provisions change only the amount to be charged for services and would not affect substantive rights under existing contracts
MID-FLORIDA IMAGING CENTERS, L.C., as assignee of MANUEL GOMEZ, Plaintiff, vs. PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 18th Judicial Circuit in and for Seminole County. Case No. 02-CC-105-20-F. November 15, 2002. Mark E. Herr, Judge. Counsel: Mark Nation, Longwood. Chandra L. Miller, Thompson Goodis Thompson Groseclose & Richardson, P.A., St. Petersburg.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE came on for hearing September 25, 2002 on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Having viewed the evidence presented and the court file, and having heard argument and thoroughly researched this matter, the Court makes the following findings and rulings:
1. The most recent changes to F.S. 627.736 added subparagraph (5)(b)5 and others as completely new provisions, the effective date of which is the subject of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
2. Section 627.736 (5)(b)5 contains specific language introducing the subparagraph which clearly states that this subsection is: “Effective upon this act becoming law and before November 1, 2001, allowable amounts that may be charged . . . for magnetic resonance imaging services shall not exceed . . .” This introductory clause clearly is not present in similar, newly added subsections(5)(b)2, (5)(b)3 and (5)(b)4, which address allowable limits for other medical services including thermograms, ultrasounds, fluoroscopy, nerve conduction testing, et al.
3. It is axiomatic that when the Governor signs and approves a bill it does become a law. The latest bill before the Legislature as sent to the Governor was in the form of Laws 2001, Ch. 2001-279, specifically subsection (11) which provides,
“Paragraphs (4)(b), (5)(b) and (c) and subsection (6) of section 627.736, Florida Statutes, as amended by this act and subsection (11) of section 627.736, Florida Statutes, shall apply to treatment and services occurring on or after October 1, 2001, except that subsection (11) of section 627.736 Florida Statutes, shall apply to actions filed on or after the effective date of this act with regard to a claim or amended claim or judgment for interest only which was not paid or was incorrectly calculated.” (Underlined emphasis added)
However, this bill was signed and approved by the Governor on June 19, 2001; and it did become a law on that date.
4. The Legislative intent as to the “effective date” of the statute must be reviewed in toto. On the one hand, the intent of the bill indicates generally that paragraphs (4)(b), (5)(b), (5)(c) and subsection (6) “shall apply to treatment and services occurring after October 1, 2001.” On the other hand, in the final language and analysis of the specific subparagraph (5)(b)5 it states that it is “effective upon becoming a law . . .” and is specifically and intentionally drafted differently from the two other subparagraphs under subsection (5)(b). Based on the clearly and specifically stated difference within (5)(b) 5, the more specific intention must control as the true legislative intent appearing to be the latest and final expression of the will of the Legislature, See: Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 86-176 (1986). As such, the effective date of this specific subsection must be interpreted to be June 19, 2001. when the bill was signed and approved by the Governor as a law.
5. Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that the new provision(s) of the statute with any earlier effective date than October 1, 2001 is unconstitutional by interfering with rights under existing contracts is without merit. The new provisions change only the amount to be charged for medical services provided. The effective date of the specific statute would not affect the substantive rights under the existing contracts.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
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