10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 914b

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Insured’s action to recover additional benefits after exhaustion of policy limits on theory that incident in which insured’s vehicle was struck and, in turn, struck another vehicle was two accidents — Where insured’s vehicle was struck by another vehicle, and impact caused insured’s vehicle to rotate and strike third vehicle such that no time or distance separated impacts, insured was involved in multiple impacts as a result of single accident — Summary judgment granted in favor of insurer

MONICA GRABLE, Plaintiff, vs. PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 6th Judicial Circuit for Pasco County. Case No. 51-2000-SC-2058-WS. Division W. April 30, 2003. William G. Sestak, Judge. Counsel: Amy Cohen. Chandra Miller, Thompson Goodis Thompson Groseclose & Richardson, P.A., Saint Petersburg.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE coming before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment; and the Court having considered the affidavit of EDWARD J. HULSEY, JR.; the policy of insurance; and the accident report; and the Court having considered argument of Counsel; the Court finds that the undisputed material facts are, as follows:

1. On December 18, 1998, Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident in Hillsborough County, Florida.

2. According to the accident report, a vehicle driven by a person named SEARS attempted to “beat the caution light” resulting in the SEARS vehicle striking Plaintiff’s vehicle as she was attempting to make a left turn. Further, the impact of the SEARS vehicle caused Plaintiff’s vehicle to rotate counter-clockwise and strike a vehicle driven by a person named ROBBINS, who also was trying to “beat the caution light”.

3. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was insured by Defendant and had in force and effect a policy of insurance which included personal injury protection benefits (PIP). A copy of the policy of insurance is attached to HULSEY’s affidavit.

4. As a result of the accident, Plaintiff sought medical treatment and made application for PIP benefits.

5. The Parties agree that Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant in Pinellas County, Florida to recover her PIP benefits.

6. After appearing at a Small Claims Pre-Trial Conference in the Pinellas County case, the Parties agreed to settle the matter for the outstanding medical bills up to the policy limits. Plaintiff, subsequently, filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of the Pinellas County case on December 8, 1999.

7. Pursuant to the affidavit of HULSEY which is uncontradicted, the benefits available under Plaintiff’s PIP policy were exhausted on December 17, 1999.

8. On October 25, 2000, Plaintiff initiated this cause of action seeking PIP benefits from the December 18, 1998 accident. Plaintiff’s theory is that there were two (2) separate accidents on December 18, 1998 and that Plaintiff would be entitled to a second $10,000.00 of PIP coverage.

9. The policy of insurance issued by Defendant provides in PART II(A) — PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE — a section entitled LIMIT OF LIABILITY. It provides:

The Limit of Liability shown on the Declarations Page is the most we will pay for each insured person injured in any one (1) accident, regardless of the number of:

1. Claims made;. . . . .

4. Lawsuits brought; . . . . . . . .

5. Vehicles involved in an accident. . . . . . . . .

“Accident” is defined in the General Definitions section of the policy of insurance as A SUDDEN, UNEXPECTED AND UNINTENDED OCCURRENCE (emphasis added).

Based on the foregoing, the Court funds that:

A. The undisputed material facts are that the SEARS vehicle caused Plaintiff’s vehicle to rotate and strike the ROBBINS vehicle. The separate impacts occurred within seconds of each other. While admittedly separate impacts occurred to Plaintiff’s vehicle, reasonable and common sense concludes that the impacts were as the result of one (1) accident.

B. Although the Court is unaware of any bright-line test for a required time and distance between impacts from multiple vehicles as to cause them to be considered separate accidents, based on the undisputed material facts presented in the case at bar, no time and distance separation occurred here for the event on December 18, 1998 to be considered as more than one (1) accident.

C. Based on the language in the policy of insurance at issue and the mechanics of the event on December 18, 1998, Plaintiff was involved in multiple impacts as the result of one (1) accident.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff, MONICA GRABLE, shall take nothing by this action; and the Defendant, PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE COMPANY, shall go hence without day. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this Court shall retain jurisdiction to determine entitlement to attorney’s fees, if any; and court costs.

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