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SOUTH FLORIDA MRI, INC. a/a/o Halil Hawkeye, Plaintiff, vs. PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE CO., Defendant.

10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 726a

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Unregistered medical providers — Where clinic had mailed registration form to Department of Health at time of rendering services to insured, but registration had not yet been issued, services were unlawful and noncompensable

SOUTH FLORIDA MRI, INC. a/a/o Halil Hawkeye, Plaintiff, vs. PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE CO., Defendant. County Court, 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Civil Division. Case No. 02-4268 SP26. Section No. 04. July 10, 2003. Richard J. Suarez, Judge. Counsel: Stuart Koenigsberg, for Plaintiff. Javier Delgado, Vernis & Bowling of Miami, P.A., North Miami, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER came before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and the Court having heard argument of counsel and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law:Statement of Facts

1. On January 1, 2002 Halil Hawkeye sustained bodily injury in an automobile accident.

2. Halil Hawkeye was insured under a policy of automobile insurance with PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE COMPANY.

3. Halil Hawkeye was referred by Etna Castellanos, M.D. to SOUTH FLORIDA OPEN MRI, INC., for a magnetic imaging (MRI) scan.

4. Halil Hawkeye assigned his right to reimbursement for such services to SOUTH FLORIDA MRI, INC.

5. At the time of rendering services to the insured, Plaintiff had not been registered with the Department of Health.

6. Plaintiff mailed its registration form on January 11, 2002, six days before rendering services to the insured (January 17, 2002). Plaintiff’s registration was issued on January 31, 2002, two weeks after the date services were rendered.

7. In March, 2002 Plaintiff filed a claim form in the amount of $1,425.00 for services rendered which was not paid by the Defendant.

8. On May 17, 2002 Plaintiff filed its complaint for payment in the amount of $1,140.00.

9. Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on January 21, 2003 which was heard on June 2, 2003 claiming that, as a matter of law, Defendant is entitled to a summary judgment as the Defendant was not required to pay the Plaintiff for the treatment rendered as the Plaintiff was not licensed as a clinic at the time of treatment.

10. For the following reasons, the Court grants the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.Conclusions of Law

11. It is not disputed that the Defendant was not registered with the Department of Health at the time of treatment. The issue is whether Defendant was required to be registered pursuant to Fla. Stat. §456.0375 (2001) at the time of treatment.

12. Fla. Stat. §456.0375 (2001) requires registration of clinics and defines a “clinic” as follows:

. . .business operating in a single structure facility, or in a group of adjacent structures or facilities operating under the same business name or management, which health care services are provided to individuals and which tender charges for reimbursement for such services.1

13. The statute goes on to require clinics to register with the Department of Health within sixty days, effective October 1, 2001, or prior to the inception of operation.2

14. If a clinic which is required to be registered fails to so register, all charges or reimbursement claims made by or on behalf of it are unlawful charges and, therefore, non compensable and unenforceable.3

15. At the time of rendering services to the insured, Plaintiff had not yet been issued its registration. Plaintiff mailed its registration form on January 11, 2002, six days before rendering services to the insured but the registration was not issued until January 31, 2002, two weeks after the date the services were rendered. As Plaintiff did not register as a clinic during the sixty-day period following the statute’s enactment, the services rendered by the Plaintiff from the expiration of the sixty-day period were, statutorily, unlawful and, therefore, non compensable.

Therefore, this Court grants the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

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1Fla.Stat. §456.0375(1)(a) (2001)

2Fla.Stat. §456.0375(2)(b)(1) (2001)

3Fla.Stat. §456.0375(4)(a) (2001)

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