10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 910a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Standing — Assignment — Collection agency — Where medical provider received assignment of benefits from insured, and in turn, assigned benefits to collection agency, collection agency may pursue claim against insurer for breach of contract but does not have standing to maintain PIP action — Debt collection agency is excluded from the list of entities which may recover under section 627.736 by clear and express terms of statute — Summary judgment granted in favor of insurer
RECOVERY SPECIALISTS, INC. (as assignee of Jacksonville Emergency Consultants) (Halida Halilovic), Plaintiff, vs. PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 4th Judicial Circuit in and for Duval County. Case No. 16-2003-CC-2847-XXXX-MA. Division N. July 1, 2003. Gary P. Flower, Judge. Counsel: Kevin J. Loftus, Harrell & Johnson, P.A., Jacksonville, for Plaintiff. James C. Rinaman, III, McConnaughhay, Duffy, Coonrod, Pope & Weaver, P.A., Jacksonville, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This cause having come to be heard before this Court May 13, 2003 on the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and this Court, having heard argument of counsel, having fully considered the record, and being otherwise fully advised, finds it appropriate to grant the Motion for the reasons which follow.
1. Plaintiff is the assignee of Jacksonville Emergency Consultants, an entity that rendered medical services to Halida Halilovic on March 20, 2000, presumably in Duval County. Halilovic allegedly suffered injuries as a result of a motor vehicle accident. Halilovic assigned her interests to Jacksonville Emergency Consultants, which in turn assigned its interests to a collection agency, the Plaintiff at bar.
2. Defendant argues that Plaintiff is a bill collection agency, and not a “physician, hospital, clinic, or other person or institution lawfully rendering treatment to an injured person for bodily injury,” within the meaning of section 627.736(5), Florida Statues [2000]. Plaintiff argues that the statute can be construed to include bill collectors.
3. Section 627.736, Florida Statutes (2000), in relevant part provides:
(5) CHARGES FOR TREATMENT OF INJURED PERSONS. —
(a) Any physician, hospital, clinic, or other person or institution lawfully rendering treatment to an injured person for a bodily injury covered by personal injury protection insurance may charge only a reasonable amount for the products, services, and accommodation rendered, and the insurer providing such coverage may pay for such charges directly to such person or institution lawfully rendering such treatment, if the insured receiving such treatment or his or her guardian has countersigned the invoice, bill, or claim form approved by the Department of Insurance upon which such charges are to be paid for as having actually been rendered, to the best knowledge of the insured or his or her guardian . . . .
(Emphasis added.) Nothing in this statute allows, much less requires, payment by an insurer to a collection agency; a collection agency is not an “institution lawfully rendering treatment to an injured person.” § 627.736, Fla. Stat.; see also New Hampshire Indem. Co. v. Equinox Bus. Credit Corp., No. 48-2002-CA-008118-0, 10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 172a, 172a (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. Dec. 17, 2002) (“A billing or factoring company is not a health care provider, physician, hospital, clinic, or other person or institution lawfully rendering treatment pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 627.736.”) (granting insurance company’s motion for summary judgment, thereby denying PIP benefits to a collection agency); Healthcare Fin. Serv. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 44a (Fla. Hillsborough County Ct. Oct. 18, 2000) (granting insurer’s motion for summary judgment against collection agency); cf. Med. Mgmt. Group of Orlando, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 811 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (“We do not find that providing referral and billing services constitutes medical services under the PIP provisions [of section 627.736].”) (affirming the denial of PIP benefits to a company providing magnetic resonance imaging services); Federated Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Physicians Charter Serv., 788 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (“There is no provision in Florida’s personal injury protection statutes for the payment of policy benefits to a third party who has not performed medical services.”) (reversing the award of PIP benefits to a corporation providing magnetic resonance imaging services), review denied, 807 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 2002).
4. The Florida Supreme Court moreover holds:
[W]hen the language of [a] statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. . . . [C]ourts of this state are
without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power.
Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (citation omitted) (original emphasis omitted) (new emphasis added) (holding same).
5. Plaintiff nevertheless argues that a valid assignment requires the payment of PIP benefits to a collection agency. Plaintiff relies on Medifin, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 00-6031-SC, 8 Fla. L. Weekly [Supp.] 316a (Fla. Hillsborough County Ct. Nov. 22, 2000) (denying insurer’s motion to dismiss). The Medifin county court, relying on the common law to “fill in the inevitable statutory gaps,” held that an assignee “is entitled to all of the rights and remedies available to [an injured party] under § 627.736.” Id. at 316a. The court reasoned that the purpose of section 627.736 was to provide “assurance that persons injured in vehicular accidents would receive some economic aid in meeting medical expense and the like, in order not to drive them into dire financial circumstances with the possibility of swelling the public relief rolls.” Id. The court reasoned that because “the right of an assignee to sue for breach of contract to enforce assigned rights predated the Florida Constitution,” and because allowing “the financial arm of the health care provider who renders medical service to recover as an assignee of the insured will serve to further this [legislative] intent,” therefore the collection agency should be permitted to recover under the assignment.
6. There however are several flaws in the Medifin court’s reasoning: an assignee is free to recover under contract law and so need not recover under section 627.736; the court makes no connection between debt collection and the noted legislative intent of section 627.736 — preventing persons injured in auto accidents from dire financial circumstances; and foremost among the flaws in the county court’s reasoning — the statute clearly and expressly limits the entities which may recover under section 627.736 to a “physician, hospital, clinic, or other person or institution lawfully rendering treatment.” § 627.736, Fla. Stat. A debt collection agency is excluded from the clear and express terms of the statute. The Florida Supreme Court holds that courts lack power to “construe” a clear and express statute. Holly v. Auld. Courts are without power to fill in “gaps” where none exist; Plaintiff’s invitation to arrogate legislative power thus must be declined. Id.
7. A summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c). “To establish entitlement to a summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate conclusively that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, even after all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment.” Johnson v. Circle K Corp., 734 So. 2d 536, 536-37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), citing Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1985). This Court concludes that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In view of the above, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.
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