10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1001b
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Denial — Unregistered clinic — Mobile diagnostic testing facility which travels to doctors’ offices to perform range of motion testing and maintains office used exclusively to prepare reports, maintain records, and perform billing operations does not fall under statutory definition of clinic required to register with Department of Health
ROM DIAGNOSTICS, INC., as assignee of MADCENE MORISMA, Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY, Defendant. Circuit Court, 9th Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County. Case No. 48-2002-SC-005645-O. October 3, 2003. C. Jeffery Arnold, Judge. Counsel: Mark A. Cornelius, Bogin, Munns & Munns, Orlando. Virgil W. Wright, III, and Bradley R. Killinger, Ocala.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and Defendant’s motion for final summary judgment, and the Court, having reviewed the court file, considered arguments of counsel and being otherwise duly advised, finds as follows:
On November 26, 2001, Madcene Morisma sustained personal injuries as a result of an automobile accident. Ms. Morisma subsequently sought medical treatment at Parkway Chiropractic, under the care of Dr. David Shaw. On January 3, 2002, pursuant to Dr. Shaw’s request, ROM Diagnostics, Inc., (“Plaintiff”) performed range of motion diagnostic testing on Ms. Morisma at Parkway Chiropractic. Ms. Morisma executed an assignment of benefits to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff submitted its bill for payment to Allstate Indemnity Company (“Defendant”). Defendant concluded that Plaintiff’s charges were unreasonable and denied Plaintiff’s claim in part.
On May 17, 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant’s failure to pay for the medical services rendered under the personal injury protection provisions of Ms. Morisma’s insurance policy violates section 627.736, Florida Statutes. Defendant alleges that it ascertained, during its discovery in this case, that Plaintiff was never registered with the Florida Department of Health pursuant to section 456.0375, Florida Statutes.
Under section 456.0375, “[e]very clinic, as defined in paragraph (1)(a), must register, and must at all times maintain a valid registration, with the Department of Health.” § 456.0375(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003). Paragraph (1)(a) defines ‘clinic’ as “a business operating in a single structure or facility, or in a group of adjacent structures or facilities operating under the same business name or management, at which health care services are provided to individuals and which tender charges for reimbursement for such services.” § 456.0375(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003).
Plaintiff is a mobile diagnostic company which travels to various doctor’s offices to perform range of motion tests as prescribed by the patients’ treating physicians. According to Raymond Sarmiento, Plaintiff’s owner and operator during Ms. Morisma’s January 3, 2002, date of service, Plaintiff maintains an office at 824 Paul Street, Orlando, Florida 32808. However, the office is “used exclusively to prepare reports that are submitted to the prescribing physicians, to maintain the company’s records, and perform billing operations.”1 (Sarmiento Aff. ¶ 5) (emphasis added). Furthermore, Plaintiff has “no building, group of buildings, structure, or facility out of which it performed the tests on the patients,” and “[n]o patients were ever provided diagnostic testing, or other medical services, at 824 Paul Street.” (Id. ¶¶3, 5.)
Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment arguing that it is not required to register because it does not fit within the definition of a “clinic” under paragraph (1)(a). Plaintiff argues that although it provides diagnostic testing at several locations, it has no single structure or building or group of adjacent structures, buildings or facilities out of which it provides these tests.
Defendant, on the other hand, moves for final summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff is required to register under section 456.0375. Defendant argues that “because the legislature did not expressly exclude mobile health care facilities from application of [section] 456.0375(1)(a), that the legislature intended for the statute to apply to Plaintiff.” (Def’s Mot. Summ. J. at 6.) Section 456.0375(1)(b) specifically excludes a long list of entities from the term “clinic.”2 Thus, any entity that qualifies as a clinic, and isnot excluded under the statute, must register.
Defendant further argues that because Plaintiff is not registered, its charges are unlawful and therefore unenforceable pursuant to section 456.0375(4)(a).3 Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s charges are unenforceable because Defendant is only required to pay for treatment lawfully rendered pursuant to section 627.736(5)(a), Florida Statutes. Thus, since Plaintiff is not registered, Defendant argues Plaintiff is not lawfully rendering medical treatment and, therefore, Defendant is not legally obligated to pay Plaintiff’s charges.4
Section 456.0375(1)(a) clearly defines “clinic” and provides for certain exemptions for specific types of “clinics.” Wise Diagnostic Solutions v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 720c (Fla. Duval County Ct. July 2, 2003) (holding that the plaintiff was not required to register because plaintiff’s business, a fully mobile diagnostic testing company, did not fall under the statutory definition of clinic). When the language of a statute “is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Id. (citing A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931)).
The statutory language in subsection (2)(b)(3) provides that a clinic must “display the registration certificate in a conspicuous location within the clinic readily visible to all patients.” § 456.0375(2)(b)(3), Fla. Stat. (2003). Furthermore, under subsection (3)(b)(1), the director of a clinic must “[h]ave signs identifying the medical director or clinical director posted in a conspicuous location within the clinic readily visible to all patients.” § 456.0375(3)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. (2003).
Thus, courts have determined that the legislature did not intend the statute to apply to mobile diagnostic testing companies but, rather, to “medical providers which provide medical services out of businesses operating in physical structures or facilities to which patients would go to obtain those medical services.” Wise Diagnostic Solutions, 10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 721 (stating “[o]therwise, it would be rather absurd to require the posting of the signs and registration certificates at the Plaintiff’s physical address where no patients would ever go”); Diagnostic Serv. of South Florida v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 855a (Fla. Miami-Dade County Ct. Oct. 28, 2002) (stating that mobile diagnostic providers “fall into the class of medical provider not included in the already broad definition of ‘clinic’ provided by the legislature,” and “[i]f the legislature intended to include these providers, it could have defined ‘clinics’ as any and all medical providers which treat automobile accident patients with an intent to bill for said services”).
Other courts, however, have determined that the legislature did intend the statute to apply to mobile diagnostic testing companies because “the legislature did not expressly exclude mobile health care facilities” from application of the statute. Diagnostic Serv. of South Florida, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 858a (Fla. Miami-Dade County Ct. Oct. 11, 2002); Diagnostic Serv. of South Florida v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 862a (Fla. Miami-Dade County Court Oct. 29, 2002).
The county court in both of the Diagnostic Services of South Florida cases held that the mobile diagnostic testing company fell within the definition of “clinic” because it determined the company was “clearly a business that operates in a single structure or facility.” Id. However, the “single structure or facility” the court referred to in making its determination was the Abdon Medical Center, the facility in which the patient sought treatment from a physician to resolve her personal injuries, not the physical location of the diagnostic testing company itself (which was the company president’s home).
The county court also based its determination on the Department of Health’s interpretation of the statute. The Florida Department of Health issued a Final Order on July 7, 2003, in which it concluded that “mobile medical facilities meet the statute’s definition of a clinic” and “accordingly, they are required to register with the Department as a health care clinic.” (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 2 ¶¶ 18, 20.)
The Department’s interpretation, however, has been rejected by other courts and is hereby rejected by this Court. See Wise Diagnostic Solutions v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 10Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 720c (Fla. Duval County Ct. July 2, 2003) (stating “such mandated regulation should come only from the Legislature which is the branch of government to whom it is given the power to legislate”); Diagnostic Serv. of South Florida v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 9Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 855a (Fla. Miami-Dade County Ct. Oct. 28, 2002) (stating that the defendant’s “argument that the Florida Department of Health has interpreted the statute and concluded that mobile diagnostic providers identical to the [plaintiff] must register is unavailing,” and holding that the Department’s interpretation “appears to be in direct conflict with the plain meaning of the statute” and “is simply an attempt by the agency to group all the providers under the requirements of [section] 456.0375, although the Legislature appears to have no such intent”).
In applying the language of the statute, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s business, under the facts presented, does not fall under the statutory definition of “clinic” and, thus, Plaintiff is not required to register. Therefore, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Defendant’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment is DENIED.
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1According to Raymond Sarmiento, the building located at 824 Paul Street “was previously a house that had been converted for commercial use.” (Sarmiento Aff. ¶ 4.)
2The list of excluded entities includes entities already licensed or registered by the state pursuant to chapters 390, 394, 395, 397, 400, 463, 465, 466, 478, 480, and 484. § 456.0375(1)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). Other excluded entities are group practices, partnerships, or corporations that provide health care services by licensed health care practitioners pursuant to chapters 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 466, 467, 484, 486, 490, 491. § 456.0375(1)(b)(3).
3Section 456.0375(4)(a) provides: “All charges or reimbursement claims made by or on behalf of a clinic that is required to be registered under this section, but that is not so registered, are unlawful charges and therefore are noncompensable and unenforceable.” § 456.0375(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003).
4Section 627.736(5)(a) provides that any clinic “lawfully rendering treatment” to an injured person covered by personal injury protection insurance “may charge only a reasonable amount for the services . . . rendered, and the insurer providing such coverage may pay for such charges directly to such person or institution lawfully rendering such treatment . . . .” § 627.736(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003).
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