10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1017a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Workers’ compensation — Insurer’s action against employer of insured for reimbursement of PIP benefits paid to employee injured in automobile accident while driving employer’s vehicle in the course of employment — Workers’ compensation coverage does not immunize employer against statutory liability under section 627.7405 for reimbursement of PIP benefits paid to employee — Section 627.7405 does not violate employer’s constitutional rights by allowing insurer to recover from employer PIP benefits paid to employee without regard to fault of employer — Insurer did not fail to state cause of action by failing to attach copy of PIP policy to complaint where action is not based on provisions of policy but on statute allowing reimbursement for benefits paid under policy — Judgment entered in favor of insurer — Questions certified
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. TUCKER TRANSPORTATION CO. INC., Defendant. County Court, 1st Judicial Circuit in and for Escambia County. Case No. 2002-CC-5505. October 27, 2003. G.J. Roark, III, Judge. Counsel: Patricia Haight, for Plaintiff. Scott Traweek, for Defendant.
[Affirmed at 29 Fla. L. Weekly D2165b.]
FINAL JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE
THIS CAUSE having come before the Court for a Final Hearing wherein both parties appeared and the Court having taken testimony and received evidence and being otherwise fully advised, this Court finds and adjudges as follows:
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff’s insured, Antione McPherson, was an employee of Defendant who was injured in an automobile accident while driving one of Defendant’s vehicles in the scope of his employment. McPherson subsequently recovered PIP benefits from the Plaintiff pursuant to a private policy insuring his mother.
2. Plaintiff paid $9,999.80 in benefits to McPherson under the private policy. There was no evidence of any amounts paid by Defendant pursuant to Section 440.10, the workers’ compensation statute. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant had valid workers’ compensation coverage.
3. Plaintiff did not attach a copy of the insurance policy to its complaint.
CONSIDERATION OF AND FINDINGS OF LAW
4. Defendant first relies on Florida Statute 440.11 for the proposition that it has immunity from any action for damages filed by an employee or his or her legal representatives for injuries received within the scope of employment. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that Florida Statute 627.7405 gives an insurer in State Farm’s position a right of reimbursement against the Defendant not withstanding the provisions of Section 440.11.
5. Defendant further asserts that allowing State Farm to recover damages without proving some degree of fault on the part of Defendant in causing its employee’s injuries would be unconstitutional as a violation of Defendant’s due process and equal protection rights.
6. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action by not attaching a copy of the insurance policy to the complaint.
7. Florida Statute 627.7405 provides as follows:
“Notwithstanding any other provisions of ss. 627.730-627.7405, any insurer providing personal injury protection benefits on a private passenger motor vehicle shall have, to the extent of any personal injury protection benefits paid to any person as a benefit arising out of such private passenger motor vehicle insurance, a right of reimbursement against the owner or the insurer of the owner of a commercial motor vehicle, if the benefits paid result from such person having been struck by the commercial motor vehicle while not an occupant of any self-propelled vehicle.”
8. When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court must follow that language in construing the statute even if the results do not appear to be what the legislature intended. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1982). On the other hand, statutes must be construed to avoid unreasonable consequences, Lloyd Citrus Trucking, Inc. v. State Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 572 So.2d 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), and any inconsistencies within a statute must be reconciled. Jordan v. Food Lion, Inc., 670 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). The bottom line is that the plain meaning of statutory language is assumed to be the correct interpretation of legislative intent. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust, supra.
9. In this case the language of the statute seems fairly clear. Any insurer providing PIP benefits such as Plaintiff did in this case, shall have a right of reimbursement against the vehicle’s commercial owner. While this statute was declared unconstitutional in 1984 by the Third DCA, Florida Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Tropicana Products, Inc., 456 So.2d 549 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), there appears to be no other district court following that holding, and in fact two other district courts have supported Plaintiff’s position on this issue. See, Dealers Insurance Company, Inc. v. Jon Hall Chevrolet Company, Inc., 547 So.2d 325 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); American Freight System, Inc. v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, 453 So.2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). The Tropicana case simply held the statute to be unconstitutional and upheld the trial court’s finding that there were no allegations supporting a subrogation claim. That case did not address how Section 627.7405 interacted with workers’ compensation statutes. Five years later, the Fifth DCA held the statute to be constitutional, finding that the legislature acted within its purview in differentiating between commercial and private vehicle owners. This conflict has yet to be resolved by the Florida Supreme Court.
10. This Court will accept and apply the reasoning and holding set out in American Freight System, supra. In this case the insured was injured while operating a vehicle in the course of his employment and received PIP benefits under a private policy. In upholding the trial court’s granting of the insurer’s motion for summary judgment, the Court held that workers’ compensation coverage only immunizes the employer against tort liability; liability arising from contract or some other obligation incurred by the employer is not covered. It appears that statutory liability in the case before this Court falls into the latter category.
11. On the issue of Defendant’s claim that its constitutional rights would be violated in allowing Plaintiff to recover without regard to Defendant’s fault, the Court finds no basis for such a defense. Florida Statute 627.7405 does not violate a commercial vehicle owner’s constitutional rights by allowing a personal insurer to recover PIP benefits paid out from the owner without regard to fault. Dealers Insurance Company, Inc. v. Jon Hall Chevrolet Company, Inc., supra.
12. Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff is required to plead Defendant’s non-entitlement to immunity in its complaint. It seems to the Court that immunity might be an affirmative defense and the Court is aware of no requirement that a Plaintiff negate affirmative defenses in its original complaint.
13. In considering Defendant’s argument that the copy of the policy must be attached to the complaint filed in this action, the Court must determine whether the action is based on the policy or on something else. Rule 1.130(a) states that all . . . contracts, . . , or documents upon which action may be brought . . . shall be incorporated or attached . . . . A review of the complaint indicates that this is not an action on the provisions of a particular insurance policy but on the statute purportedly allowing reimbursement for benefits paid under the policy. The Defendant cites Safeco Insurance Company of America v. Ware, 401 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) in support of its position, but the Court is unable to determine what the facts in that case were; it appears that it is an insured, suing, among others, his own insurer but that is not clear from the case.
PROCEDURAL STATUS
14. The Court finds that Defendant timely filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, and Memorandum of Law in Support, prior to the Final Hearing of this matter. Likewise, Plaintiff timely filed a Response, with Memorandum of Law, in opposition to Defendant’s Motion. With the parties’ agreement and in the interests of the efficient use of the Court’s resources, the Court allowed the arguments for and against Defendant’s Motions to be subsumed into the Final Hearing proceedings. During the Final Hearing, Defendant timely made Motions for Directed Verdicts on which the Court reserved rulings.
ORDERS AND FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
15. Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
16. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
17. Defendant’s Motions for Directed Verdict are DENIED.
18. Defendant, TUCKER TRANSPORTATION CO. INC., a commercial entity, is held to be liable for reimbursement to Plaintiff for personal injury protection benefits paid for the benefit of its insured pursuant to a private policy of insurance.
19. Plaintiff, STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, 7401 Cypress Gardens Drive, Winter Haven, Florida, 33888, shall recover from Defendant $9,999.80 in damages, and $118.50 in court costs for a total of $10,118.30, to be taxed at 6% interest per annum, for which let execution issue.
CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE
20. This Court finds that certain legal issues addressed herein may well have statewide application and affect the uniform administration of justice. The Court further recognizes that a conflict exists between the District Courts of Appeal on these issues. Therefore, under 9.030(b)(4) and 9.160, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court certifies the following as questions of great public importance:
A. IS AN EMPLOYER IMMUNE UNDER SECTION 440.11, FLORIDA STATUTES FROM SUIT BROUGHT BY AN INSURER UNDER SECTION 627.7405 FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION BENEFITS PAID TO AN EMPLOYEE OF THE EMPLOYER?
B. IS SECTION 627.7405 UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO THE EXTENT IT ALLOWS AN INSURER REIMBURSEMENT FROM AN EMPLOYER FOR PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION BENEFITS PAID TO AN EMPLOYEE OF THE EMPOYER WITHOUT REGARD TO FAULT OF THE EMPLOYER?
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