10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 717b
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Unregistered medical provider — Fully mobile medical provider which solely conducts diagnostic testing does not meet statutory definition of clinic required to register with Department of Health
WISE DIAGNOSTIC SOLUTIONS, (an assignee of Susan Lokietek), Plaintiff, vs. PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 4th Judicial Circuit in and for Duval County. Case No. 02-5032-CC. Division N. July 15, 2003. Gary P. Flower, Judge. Counsel: Kevin J. Loftus, Jacksonville, for Plaintiff. James C. Rinaman, III, Jacksonville, for Defendant.
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (due to scrivener’s error)
This cause having come to be heard on Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and this Court having heard arguments of counsel, having considered the record, and otherwise being advised in the premises, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
1. On April 23, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, alleging Defendant failed to pay for medical services rendered under the personal injury protection (“PIP”) provisions of the insurance policy.
2. On January 6, 2003, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, arguing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the issue of whether a fully mobile medical provider which solely conducts diagnostic testing must register with the Florida Department of Health. Plaintiff argues that it is not required to register with the Florida Department of Health, as it does not meet the statutory definition of “clinic” pursuant to section 456.0375, Florida Statutes (2002).
3. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. See Southeastern Fisheries Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t of Natural Resources, 453 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1984). Where the legislature defines a statutory term in clear and unambiguous language, the court is not free to theorize as to its meaning or place a different construction upon it. See Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fla. 1952). Another rule of statutory construction is expressio unius est exclusio alterius,meaning “where one thing is expressed and others are not, the legislature is presumed to have intended to omit the items not expressed.” See Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976). The Florida Supreme Court has held that a business activity may not be put under mandate of a revenue license it if is inseparable from a scheme of activity outside the licensing municipality’s jurisdictional limits. See Isern v. City of West Miami, 244 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1971); Duffin v. Tucker, 153 So. 298 (Fla. 1934); Sandstrom v. City of Ft. Lauderdale,133 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961); see also City of Pompano Beach v. Berry, 168 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1964), affirming Berry v. City of Dania, 24 Fla. Supp. 152 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1963).
4. Based on the above case law, this Court finds that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff was not required to register with the Florida Department of Health, pursuant to section 456.0375, Florida Statutes (2002). Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment.
In view of the above, it is:
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.
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