11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 705b
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Standing — Assignment — Validity — Trial court’s decision that provider lacks standing is affirmed where document that refers to itself as assignment in insignificant way, lacks definitive language of conveyance, suggests by allowance that provider may initiate complaint to insurance commissioner that it intends to exclude other actions such as lawsuits by provider on insured’s behalf, contemplates need for insured’s signature on claims, and indicates through provision for payment of attorney’s fees by insured that provider contemplated enforcement of agreement by action against insured rather than insurer is not assignment
HEALTH CARE CENTER OF TAMPA, INC. (a/a/o Rajendra Savani), Appellant, vs. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. Circuit Court, 13th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Hillsborough County. Case No. 03-5567, Division X. L.C. Case No. 02-28320-SC-I. January 30, 2004. Robert J. Simms, Judge. Review of a final order of the County Ct., Hillsborough County. Counsel: The Law Office of William C. Rocker, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant. Phil S. Yurecka, St. Petersburg, for Appellee.
Appellant appeals a final judgment against it on the ground that it lacked standing to sue because of an ineffective assignment of benefits. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(1)(A). The standard of review on summary judgment is de novo. Based upon our review, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
The document in question states as follows:
The undersigned hereby authorizes the release of any information relating to any claims for benefits on behalf of myself. I further agree and acknowledge that my signature on this authorization authorizes Saqib B. Khan, M.D., to submit claims for benefits for services rendered without obtaining my signature on each and every claim to be submitted for myself and that I will be bound by this signature as though the undersigned had personally signed the particular claim. Even if Saqib B. Khan M.D., is a provider of my insurance company, the filing of my insurance claim is not a guarantee of payment. In the even my claim is not paid by my insurance, I am personally responsible for payment in full for services rendered. In the event that payment is not made within ninety (90) days of the initial billing, interest will be added on the unpaid balance at the rate of fifteen (15%) percent per annum until payment is pain (sic) in full. If it becomes necessary to place this account with a collection agency, I will be responsible for all costs of collection. If a lawsuit is necessary to collect the debt, the undersigned agrees to pay reasonable attorney fees and court costs plus interest.
I understand that I am responsible for all deductibles, co-insurance and co-payments.
A photocopy of this assignment shall be considered as effective and valid as the original.
I also authorize the release of any information pertinent to my case to any insurance company, adjuster, or attorney involved in this case.
I authorize the doctor to initiate a complaint to the insurance commissioner for any reason on my behalf.
If my current policy prohibits direct payment to the doctor, I hereby also instruct and direct you to make out the check to and mail as follows:
Saquib B. Khan, M.D.
The trial court determined that the foregoing was not an assignment. The record does not contain a transcript that would provide this Court insight as to the reasoning behind her decision. Because this Court’s review is de novo and pertains to a question of law, the transcript is not essential to its review. Pape v. Pape, 444 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
We can conceive of several reasons for the trial court’s decision. The document refers to itself as an assignment in an insignificant manner, and lacks the definitive language of conveyance one expects from an assignment. Indeed, that it allows the healthcare provider to initiate a complaint to the insurance commissioner specifically, suggests that it intends to exclude other actions on the insured’s behalf — such as lawsuits — by the healthcare provider. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies to contracts as well as statutes. See U.S. v. First Nat. Bank of Crestview, 513 So.2d 179, 181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
Additionally, the document allows the healthcare provider to “submit claims for benefits for services rendered without obtaining my signature on each and every claim . . . .” A true assignment would not contemplate the need to obtain a signature for each claim because all rights would be conveyed to the assignee. Thus, this suggests an intent to authorize direct payment pursuant to section 627.736(5)(a), rather than to assign benefits pursuant to section 627.736(5)(d)1.
Finally, the language that “[i]f a lawsuit is necessary to collect the debt, the undersigned agrees to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs plus interest” is typical in agreements where one party to the agreement, in this case, the healthcare provider, contemplates an action against the second party, here, the insured. It would be unusual for the insured to pay the attorney’s fees of the of the healthcare provider to sue the insurance company. Thus, this indicates that the healthcare provider contemplated enforcement against the insured rather than the insurer, giving rise to another basis to construe the document as a direct payment authorization.
The only reference to the document as an assignment states “[a] photocopy of this assignment shall be considered as effective and valid as the original. This Court has previously held that a mere reference to a document as an assignment does not make it a true assignment without the necessary language of conveyance. Physician’s Injury Center v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 9 FLA. L. WEEKLY SUPP. 169 (Fla. 13th Jud. Cir. 2002); Joseph Ciccarello, D.C., P.A., v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 9 FLA. L. WEEKLY SUPP. 748 (Fla. 13th Jud. Cir. 2002), citing Ward v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 9 FLA. L. WEEKLY SUPP. 365a (Fla. 13th Jud. Cir. 2002). In fact, the document in Physician’s Injury Center v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., cited above, contained the identical assignment reference in its document as the one in the instant case. And, as in the instant case, it was the only reference to assignment in the document. It was determined by this Court, acting in its appellate capacity, not to be an assignment.
In light of this Court’s decision, Appellant’s remaining argument need not be considered.
It is therefore ORDERED that the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED. It is further ordered that Appellee’s Motion for [Appellate] Costs is GRANTED. This cause is remanded to the trial court for determination as to the amount thereof. (Maye and Baumann, JJ., concur.)
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1We recognize that this is the subsection that provided for arbitration. Its significance is that it specifically uses the term “assignment,” which distinguishes it from the direct payment provision in subsection (5)(a). Direct payment authorizations historically did not give rise to an arbitration requirement. While arbitrations are no longer required by this section, the distinction between direct payment authorization and assignment remains.
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