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NATIONWIDE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC HEALTH CENTER, INC. (a/a/o Ruth Morningred), Appellee.

11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 203b

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Preferred providers — Section 627.736(10) does not prohibit insurer from making payment for healthcare services covered by PIP benefits at reduced preferred provider organization rates to healthcare provider who has entered into valid and enforceable contract to accept payment at PPO rates

NATIONWIDE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC HEALTH CENTER, INC. (a/a/o Ruth Morningred), Appellee. Circuit Court, 13th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Hillsborough County. Case No. 03-4825, Division X. L.C. Case No. 01-27252-SC. December 1, 2003. Ralph Stoddard, Presiding Judge. Review of a final order of the County Ct., Hillsborough County. Counsel: Charles Tyler Cone, Fowler White Boggs Banker, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant. David W. Lipscomb, Tampa, for Appellee.

Appellant, an insurer under the no-fault statute, seeks review of a trial court determination that section 627.736(10), Florida Statutes (hereinafter “subsection 10”), prohibits it from making payment for healthcare services covered by personal injury protection (PIP) at reduced preferred provider organization (PPO) rates to the appellee healthcare provider. The facts of this case are substantially similar to the recently decided Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Jewell & Hudson/Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Davis, 2D01-5714 (Fla. 2d DCA Nov. l4, 2003) [28 Fla. L. Weekly D2605a]. We note the conflict between Jewell & Hudson, and the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Central Florida Psychiatrists, P.A., 28 Fla. L. Weekly D1511 (Fla. 5th DCA June 27, 2003); however, we are bound by the decision of the Second District. Based on the Hudson & Jewell decision, we reverse the decision of the trial court with respect to its interpretation of subsection (10), and remand this cause for proceedings consistent herewith.

It is therefore ORDERED that this cause is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings. (Little and May, JJ., concur.)

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