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NATIONWIDE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. LASSWELL CHIROPRACTIC CENTER (as assignee of Laurence Brindley), Appellee.

11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 203a

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Preferred providers — Section 627.736(10) does not prohibit insurer from making payment for healthcare services covered by PIP benefits at reduced preferred provider organization rates to healthcare provider who has entered into valid and enforceable contract to accept payment at PPO rates

NATIONWIDE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. LASSWELL CHIROPRACTIC CENTER (as assignee of Laurence Brindley), Appellee. Circuit Court, 13th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Hillsborough County. Case No. 03-3092, Division X. L.C. Case No. 01-9528-SC. December 9, 2003. James D. Arnold, Judge. Review of a final order of the County Ct., Hillsborough County. Counsel: Charles Tyler Cone, Fowler White Boggs Banker, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant. Bradley Souders, Tampa, for Appellee.

Appellant, an insurer under the no-fault statute, seeks review of a trial court determination that section 627.736(10), Florida Statutes (hereinafter “subsection 10”), prohibits it from making payment for healthcare services covered by personal injury protection (PIP) at reduced preferred provider organization (PPO) rates to the appellee healthcare provider. The facts of this case are substantially similar to the recently decided Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Jewell & Hudson/Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Davis, 2D01-5714 (Fla. 2d DCA Nov. 14, 2003) [28 Fla. L. Weekly D2605a]. Based on the foregoing authority, we reverse the decision of the trial court with respect to its interpretation of subsection (10). However, because the trial court did not address issues relating to the scope and validity of the provider agreements and the payor contracts which are the subject of this dispute, we remand this cause to the trial court for the purpose of addressing those issues.

It is therefore ORDERED that this cause is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings. (Simms and Pendino, JJ., concur.)

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