12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 688a

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Exhaustion of policy limits — Subsequent claim for unpaid portion of bills — No error in granting summary judgment in favor of insurer where fact of exhaustion of policy limits was not in dispute — Reasonableness of insurer’s reduction of medical bills, while a genuine issue of material fact at time of reduction, was no longer material after benefits were exhausted — Medical provider’s suggestions that insurer should have held money in escrow until statute of limitations expired, issued joint checks, or filed interpleader action do not comport with purpose of no-fault statutory scheme to provide swift and virtually automatic payment

HEARTLAND REHABILITATION SERVICES, Appellant, vs. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. Circuit Court, 4th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Clay County. Case No. 2004-54l-CA, Division B. April 6, 2005. Appeal from the County Court, in and for Clay County, Division B. Counsel: Michelle Muir. Hinda Klein.

OPINION

(FREDERIC A. BUTTNER, J.) This cause is before this Court upon direct appeal from the Order of the Clay County Court granting Appellee’s Second Motion for Final Summary Judgment. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(1)(A). This Court has considered the record in this cause, the brief filed, and authorities cited therein.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

Jamie Rothman, Appellee’s insured, sustained personal injuries as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred September 12, 2001. On October 31, 2001, Rothman assigned benefits under her policy of insurance to Appellant. Appellee paid medical bills on behalf of Rothman to Appellant, as well as to other claimants. In two instances, on February 20, 2002 and February 22, 2002, Appellee reduced Appellant’s bills, paying an amount less than what was billed. On March 18, 2002, Appellee paid bills from other medical providers which exhausted the personal injury protection benefits and medical payment benefits of Rothman’s policy. Appellant filed its Complaint January 10, 2003, alleging that Appellee failed to pay no-fault insurance benefits in accordance with law. By the Order under review, the trial court granted Appellee’s Second Motion for Final Summary Judgment.

II. Standard of Review

The standard of review governing a summary judgment is de novo. Floyd v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 855 So. 2d 204, 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

III. Application of Standard of Review to Appellant’s Claim

Appellant argues that the Order under review must be reversed because a genuine issue of fact existed: whether “the policy benefits were properly exhausted at any time relevant.” (Initial Br. at 17.) However, the fact of exhaustion of the benefits on March 18, 2002 is not in dispute; it is the legal effect of that exhaustion on Appellant’s claim which was disputed below. Put in Appellant’s terms, the propriety of the exhaustion of benefits is an issue of law. This Court finds no genuine issue of material fact, and that Appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

This case does not involve competing claimants to a single fund, each alleging mutually-exclusive rights, see, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Shuster, 373 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1979) (a contest between two claiming to be the rightful beneficiary of a life insurance policy), and see, e.g., Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 512 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (a case of competing claims between a hospital and the insured), but claimants on par with one another, each one an assignee of the same insured, so that their rights derive from a common source. The law holds assignees’ rights to be no greater than assignors’, and that Appellee had an obligation to pay claims in the order in which they were presented. See Taylor v. Safeco Ins. Co., 361 So. 2d 743, 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); see also Boulevard Nat’l Bank of Miami v. Air Metal Indus., Inc., 176 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1965). However, Appellee’s obligation to pay medical benefits extended only to eighty percent of those expenses which were reasonable and were for medically necessary services. § 627.736(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). The statute contemplates that medical provider’s bills may not be paid in full; therefore, payment of part of a claim, in the order submitted, is not tantamount to omitting payment of an earlier-submitted claim in favor of a later-submitted claim, and does not violate the law governing priority of assignees’ claims, as Appellant argues. See Neuro-Imaging Assocs., P. A. v. Nationwide Ins. Co. of Fla., 10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 738a (Fla. Palm Beach Cty. Ct. Jan. 7, 2002).

While Appellant may be correct in asserting that the statute imposes on it no express requirement to contest the reasonableness of a reduction of its bill (and this Court need make no finding on whether or not Appellant had such an obligation), as a practical matter, by not protesting the reduction of its bill until after benefits were exhausted, there simply was no more money with which Appellee was liable to pay the contested amount. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Horkheimer, 814 So. 2d 1069, 1071 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). When Appellee paid out the limits of its liability, it discharged its obligation to its insured and, because the insured’s assignees have no greater rights than the insured, Appellee discharged its obligation to them as well. For that reason, the reasonableness vel non ofAppellee’s reduction of Appellant’s bill, while a genuine issue of fact at the time of the reduction in payment, was simply no longer material after benefits were exhausted. The trial court therefore correctly granted Appellee’s Second Motion for Final Summary Judgment. See Neuro-Imaging Assocs., 10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 739; see also Francisco Gomez, M.D., P.A. v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 121b (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Oct. 20, 2004); see also MTM Diagnostic, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 581e (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Nov. 20, 2000); see also Heartland Rehab. Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 826a (Fla. Clay Cty. Ct. June 24, 2004); see also Wise Diagnostic Solutions v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 440c (Fla. Duval Cty. Ct. Mar. 17, 2004); see also Advanced Pain Clinic, P.A. v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 237a (Fla. Orange Cty. Ct. Dec. 21, 2004); see also Isomed Diagnostics Corp. v. Mercury Ins. Co. of Fla., 12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 231b (Fla. Pinellas Cty. Ct. Dec. 8, 2004); see also Found Chiropractic Clinic, P.A. v. Nationwide Gen. Ins Co., 11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1014a (Fla. Palm Beach Cty. Ct. Aug. 16, 2004); see also Siegried K. Holz, M.D., P.A. v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1072a (Fla. Polk Cty. Ct. Aug. 11, 2004); see also Fla. Joint Repl. Ctr. v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 730b (Fla. Pasco Cty. Ct. May 10, 2004); see also Premier Open MRI, LLC v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 653b (Fla. Hillsborough Cty. Ct. Apr. 27, 2004); see also Bruneau v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 585a (Fla. Brevard Cty. Ct. Mar. 19, 2004); see also Simon v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 470a (Fla. Palm Beach Cty. Ct. Jan. 30, 2004); see also Genesis Diagnostics v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 546c (Fla. Hillsborough Cty. Ct. Apr. 17, 2003); see also Images of the Bay, Inc. v. Allstate Indem. Co., 10 Fla.L. Weekly Supp. 120a (Fla. Hillsborough Cty. Ct. Dec. 9. 2002); see also David W. Darrow, D.C., P.A. v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 117a (Fla. Seminole Cty. Ct. Nov. 14, 2001).

This result comports with the purpose of the no-fault statutory scheme: “to ‘provide swift and virtually automatic payment so that the injured insured may get on with his life without undue financial interruption.’ ” Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So. 2d 679, 683-84 (Fla. 2000) (citation omitted). The payment was virtually automatic; the fact that it was not in the full amount billed was relevant only until benefits were exhausted; it had ceased to be relevant before Appellant filed suit.

This Court is not persuaded by Appellant’s authorities to the contrary. See Celpha Clinic, Inc. v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 113a (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Dec. 18, 2003); see also Johnson-Fleming v. Allstate Ins. Co., 11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1a (Fla. 5th Cir. Ct. Sept. 26, 2003); see also Physicians First Choice Interpretation, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., Inc., 10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 675c (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. July 15, 2003); see also Seminole Cas. Ins. Co. v. Philip D. Schtupak, D.C., P.A., 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 529a (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct.); see also Physicians Diagnostics & Re-hab, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Case No. 97-2591(12) (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. July 8, 1998); see also Pinnacle Med., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 663a (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 1998); see also Occupational & Rehab. Ctr. v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 75b (Fla. Duval Cty. Ct. Nov. 2, 2004); see also Bartosek Chiropractic Ctr., P.A. v. Nationwide Gen. Ins., 10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 199a (Fla. Palm Beach Cty. Ct. Jan. 21, 2003); see also A.J.P. Servs., Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 258a (Fla. Broward Cty. Ct. Aug. 14, 2003); see also Northwest Broward Orthopaedics v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 124b (Fla. Broward Cty. Ct. Dec. 6, 2002); see also Chiro-Plus of Deerfield Beach v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 934a (Fla. Palm Beach Cty. Ct. Sept. 22, 2003). Appellant’s suggestions, that Appellee should have held money in escrow until the statute of limitations expired, or issued joint checks, or filed an interpleader action, do not comport with the purpose of the no-fault statutory scheme.

In view of the above, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Order Granting Defendant’s Second Motion for Final Summary Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

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