12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 494b
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Medical providers — Failure of medical provider to obtain occupational license does not operate as bar to recovery of PIP benefits — Medical treatment is “lawfully rendered” despite lack of occupational license since county occupational license law is not law related to provision of medical services and treatment
KAM HABIBI, D.C., P.A. (a/a/o Marie Doresca), Plaintiff, vs. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County. Case No. 03-14688 COCE 53. February 23, 2005. Robert W. Lee, Judge. Counsel: Nichole S. Pacella, Fort Lauderdale, for Plaintiff. Brian S. Tenzer, Fort Lauderdale, for Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S AMENDED MOTION FOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on February 22, 2005 for hearing of the Defendant’s Amended Motion for Final Summary Judgment, and the Plaintiff’s Response Thereto, and the Court’s having reviewed the Motions and entire Court file; heard argument; reviewed the relevant legal authorities; and been sufficiently advised in the premises, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant’s Amended Motion for Final Summary Judgment is DENIED. The Court finds no reason to recede from Judge Herring’s decision previously entered in this case which provided that the failure of a provider to obtain a county occupational license does not operate as a bar to recovery. [11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1112a] The Court recognizes that subsequent to Judge Herring’s decision, the Eleventh Circuit Court, sitting in its appellate capacity, issued its decision in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. West Dixie Rehabilitation & Medical Center, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 788 (11th Cir. Ct. 2004) which holds otherwise. The Court initially notes that the West Dixie decision is not binding in this circuit as it has been issued by the Circuit Court of another circuit. See Fieselman v. State, 566 So.2d 768, 770 (Fla. 1990). More importantly, however, is the decision’s failure to address the statutory definition of “lawfully” as used in the PIP statute. The West Dixie decision hinged on whether the medical treatment was “lawfully rendered” as required by Fla. Stat. §627.736(5)(a).
The word “lawfully” as used in the PIP statute “means in substantial compliance with all relevant applicable criminal, civil, and administrative requirements of state and federal law related to the provision of medical services or treatment.” Id. §627.732(11) (emphasis added). It is clear that the Broward County Occupational License law is not a “law related to the provision of medical services or treatment.” Rather, almost any occupation is required to have the license, whether or not medical services or treatment is involved. As a result, this Court declines to recede from the decision of Judge Herring, the undersigned’s predecessor in this division.
As a result, the Court need not address the Plaintiff’s contentions that the Defendant’s Amended Motion is unauthorized and untimely.
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