12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 115b

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Claims — Signature by medical provider — Error to enter summary judgment in favor of insurer based on medical provider’s failure to sign box 31 of HCFA form where statute does not expressly require signature and there is no evidence that lack of signature caused confusion regarding amount of claim or hindered insurer’s investigation of claim or that provider intentionally provided false, misleading, incomplete and patently deceptive HCFA form — Statute does not require that technically deficient notice constitutes no notice at all

MIAMI MEDICAL GROUP a/a/o, ARNULFO CASTILLO, Appellant, v. PROGRESSIVE SOUTHEASTERN INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 04-071 AP. L.T. Case No. 02-3693 SP 26. November 30, 2004. On appeal from a final summary judgment and entered by the Honorable Ellen Sue Venzer, County Court Judge, Miami-Dade County. Counsel: Stuart B. Yanofsky, for Appellant. Douglas H. Stein and J. Keith Ramsey, Anania, Bandklayder, Blackwell, Baumgarten, Torricella & Stein, for Appellee.

[Lower court opinion published at 11 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 246a.]

(Before Bertila Soto, Jorge Perez and Israel Reyes, JJ.)

(Per Curiam.) This is an appeal arising out of an insurance claim under Florida’s personal injury protection law. The claimant, Miami Medical Group, appeals from an order of final summary judgment entered by the trial court below. The trial court’s decision rested upon the fact that the HCFA 1500 insurance claim form was unsigned.

The standard of review for a summary judgment order is de novo and requires viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sierra v. Shevin, 767 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). Judgment may only be granted if the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, admissions and affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c). If the slightest doubt exists, summary judgment must be reversed. Sierra, 767 So. 2d at 525, citing Hancock v. Dept of Corrections, 585 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

In the present instance, the court is charged with applying § 627.736, Fla. Stat. to the pertinent facts. We apply § 627.736, as it stood in 2001. As stated in Metropolitan Dade County v. Chase Federal Housing Corp., 737 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1999):

Two interrelated inquiries arise when determining whether statutes should be retroactively applied. The first inquiry is one of statutory construction: whether there is clear evidence of legislative intent to apply the statute retrospectively. If the legislation clearly expresses an intent that it apply retroactively, then the second inquiry is whether retroactive application is constitutionally permissible.

Id. at 499.

Looking to § 627.736 (2003) there is nothing to suggest that the legislature intended its changes to apply retrospectively. The plain language of the law being silent on that issue, there is no basis to conclude the statute may be applied retrospectively.

Turning to the application of § 627.736 (2001), the court bears in mind the intent and purpose of Florida’s no-fault statutory scheme. We note “the purpose of the no-fault statutory scheme is to ‘provide swift and virtually automatic payment so that the injured insured may get on with his life without undue financial interruption.’ ” Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co. 774 So. 2d 679, 683-684 (Fla. 2000), quoting Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 512 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (in turn citing Comeau v. Safeco Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d 790 (Fla.1978)).

With the foregoing in mind, we observe § 627.736 (2001) contains no express requirement that Box 31 of HCFA form 1500 be signed. Likewise, we observe that Progressive made no argument to the trial court — nor argues to this court — that the failure to sign Box 31 of HCFA form 1500 caused any confusion as to the amount of loss, coverage or medical bills due. Further, no reading of the record suggests that the Miami Medical’s failure to sign box 31 hindered Progressive’s investigation in any way. Thus, the record contains only conclusory argument — and no evidence — that the HCFA form 1500 submitted failed to provide“all relevant information”as to“all material provisions.” § 627.736(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003) (emphasis added).¹

Finally, there is neither evidence nor argument that Miami Medical’s failure to sign the disputed form is part of a pattern of practice to avoid complying with § 627.736.² Nor is their evidence or argument that Miami Medical “knowingly and intentionally providing a false, misleading, incomplete and patently deceptive” HCFA form 1500 to Progressive. Cf. Motion X-Ray v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 10Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 346a (Fla. Orange Cty. Ct. 2003) (Provider’s form was knowingly and intentional misleading.)

Based upon the foregoing, we reject the notion that § 627.736 requires or that the legislature intended a technically deficient notice to constitute no notice at all. Accordingly, the trial court’s final summary judgment is REVERSED. Miami Medical’s motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED on the condition that it ultimately prevails in this action. (Bertila Soto, Jorge Perez and Israel Reyes, JJ., Concur.)

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¹Because the argument and record do not establish Miami Medical failed to properly complete HCFA form 1500 “as to all material provisions [and] with all relevant information,” this court would reach the same conclusion whether applying § 627.736(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2001) or § 627.736(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003).

²Progressive mentions in passing that the signature constitutes an attestation of the truthfulness of the information contained in submitted form. Toward that end, we observe that it is unlawful to submit a deceptive insurance claim whether or not such claim is signed. § 817.234, Fla. Stat.

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