12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 636a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Settlement agreement — Motion to set aside — Unilateral mistake — No abuse of discretion in refusing to set aside mediated settlement agreement and order ratifying agreement where failure to ascertain correct amount of damages with information readily available and time to accurately determine them is not mistake going to substance of agreement, and medical provider sets forth no facts to support claim that mistake caused by provider’s oversight was excusable
PHYSICAL MEDICINE CENTER, INC., a/a/o Darlene Coram, Appellant, vs. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., Appellee. Circuit Court, 13th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Hillsborough County. Case No. 04-131, Division X. L.C. Case No. 02-25354-SC. April 13, 2005. Review of a final order of the County Ct., Hillsborough County. Counsel: Timothy A. Patrick, Tampa, for Appellant. Robert P. Kelly, Law Office of Glenn G. Gomer, Tampa, for Appellee.
(HERBERT BAUMANN, JR., J.) Appellant appeals a final judgment the trial court entered in Appellant’s favor pursuant to a mediated settlement agreement. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the final judgment, which, Appellant argues, was for an incorrect amount as the result of a mistake. We disagree and affirm the decision of the trial court.
On October 9, 2002, Appellant filed the underlying suit for PIP benefits alleging an amount not more than $2500.00. On December 4, 2002, the trial court referred the parties to mediation, and the Mediation and Diversion Office provided both parties with notice of the mediation conference. On August 4, 2003, eight months after the initial referral order, the parties attended a mediation. At mediation, Appellee offered to settle the case for the sum of $2,584.21 in satisfaction of the Appellant’s claim for outstanding PIP benefits and $750.00 in satisfaction of the Appellant’s right to statutory interest pursuant to Section 627.736, Florida Statutes. The parties reduced the agreement to writing; both attorneys signed the agreement, and the mediator submitted the stipulation to the trial court. The trial court then entered an order ratifying the stipulation. Subsequently, Appellant discovered that it had made a mistake and moved to set aside the settlement agreement and the order ratifying the settlement agreement. The trial court denied relief; this appeal followed.
Appellant contends that the lower court erred when it denied Appellant’s motion to set aside the settlement agreement on the ground of unilateral mistake. In support of its contention that the trial court erred by not setting aside the agreement on the ground of unilateral mistake, Appellant cites Maryland Casualty Co. v. Krasnek, 174 So.2d 541 (Fla. 1965). Cf. Feldman v. Kritch, 824 So.2d 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (relief from a written contract is not available if the alleged mistake is a unilateral mistake); Limehouse v. Smith, 797 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (a party’s performance under a contract is not excused on the basis of a unilateral mistake when the mistake is the result of the party’s own negligence and lack of foresight). Our review of this case, and a number of others, suggests that what is meant by a mistake as to the “substance of an agreement” is a substantive legal issue such as liability, as in Maryland Casualty, coverage, or identity. See e.g. Pennsylvania National Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 445 So.2d 612 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (mistake as to identity of insured vehicle a would relieve insurer of settlement obligation). The mere failure to ascertain the correct amount of damages with information readily available, as well as the time in which to accurately determine them, is not a mistake which goes to the substance of the agreement. As for Appellant’s contention that the mistake was excusable, Appellant sets forth no facts to support this claim. We note that at the outset, Appellant’s claim settled for an amount that was slightly more than the amount Appellant sought in its complaint. We conclude that Maryland Casualty does not support reversal in this case.
Further, since the judgment is based upon a mediated settlement agreement, the standard of review is a heightened abuse of discretion standard. The Court in Sponga v. Warro, 698 So.2d 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) said:
[W]e think that cases settled in mediation are especially unsuited for the liberal application of a rule allowing rescission of a settlement agreement based on unilateral mistake. Mediation, like arbitration, is an alternative dispute resolution device. It is not to be engaged in casually or carelessly. The decision to engage in mediation and to settle at mediation means that remedies and options otherwise available through the judicial system are foregone. The finality of it once the parties have set down their agreement in writing is critical. A party who makes the decision to settle with a plaintiff like Ms. Warro is entitled to rely on the finality of the mediation agreement. The burden of ascertaining the true facts concerning the cause of a plaintiff’s injury prior to electing to settle a case in mediation has to be on the plaintiff.
This notion is not new. In Smiles v. Young, 271 So.2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), the Court said:
[T]he principles of law to be applied in an action to set aside a contract for unilateral mistake or fraud are more stringent than the standards that have so far been established for the setting aside of a judgment pursuant to Rule 1.540 RCP, 31 F.S.A., when the judgment entered pursuant to Rule 1.540 is not based upon a settlement.
As indicated above, Appellant does not allege that the opposing party concealed the truth, an important element in Smiles. It was simply oversight on Appellant’s part. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant did not overcome the heavy burden necessary to obtain a reversal of the trial court’s decision. It is therefore
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED. (Barton and Little, JJ., concur.)
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