12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1072b
Attorney’s fees — Insurance — Personal injury protection — Where case was settled six months or more before medical provider moved for attorney’s fees, fees were not sought within reasonable time
ROBERT CHUONG, D.M.D., M.D., P.A., (assignor: MONTEFORTE, Lauren), Plaintiff, vs. PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 6th Judicial Circuit for Pinellas County, Civil Division. Case No. 522003CC006421XXCOCO, REF: 03006421CO. August 10, 2005. Henry J. Andringa, Judge. Counsel: Susan Lawson, Tampa, for Plaintiff. Randall A. Wainoris, Haas, Dutton, Blackburn, Lewis & Longley, P.A., Tampa, for Defendant.
AFFIRMED in part at14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 211a
ORDER DENYING ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS
THIS CASE came on to be heard on July 25, 2005, on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs and Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs. A history of the events is in order and ensues:
1. Defendant’s insured was injured in an automobile accident on or about February 18, 2002.
2. Insured treated with Plaintiff over a period of months in July-October, 2002. Bills were submitted to Defendant as a result of the treatment.
3. Plaintiff filed this suit on July 30, 2003.
4. Several trees gave their lives during the discovery process.
5. On June 15, 2004, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs was filed with the Court. The erroneous recitation of the date of filing notwithstanding, Plaintiff’s Motion indicates that the case was previously settled. Subsequent filings show that the case was settled on November 12, 2003, and a draft was forwarded to the Plaintiff on December 3, 2003.
6. Plaintiff’s Motion is noteworthy for it’s citation of Wollard v. Lloyd’s and Companies of Lloyd’s, 439 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1983) for the proposition that, “. . .the payment of the claim is, indeed, the functional equivalent of a confession of judgment or a verdict in favor of the insured.”.
7. Defendant responded in Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, stating Plaintiff’s Motion was time barred by the operation of Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.525. Defendant cites Wollard, as well.
8. During the time this Motion was pending, Plaintiff has filed Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and Motion for Entry of Final Judgment Pursuant to Settlement Agreement/Confession of Judgment and Motion for Order Setting Evidentiary Hearing on amount of Attorney’s Fees and Costs to be awarded to Plaintiff.
9. Plaintiff has filed another Motion entitled Plaintiff’s Motion (Pending Court’s Ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Final Judgment and Motion for Order Setting Evidentiary Hearing on Amount of Attorney’s Fees and Costs to be Awarded to Plaintiff) to Tax Attorney’s Fees and Costs.
10. The Court rules as follows:
A. The case was settled in November/December, 2003.
B. Plaintiff did not move for fees until June 15, 2004.
C. The fees were not sought within a reasonable time.
D. The Court makes no finding as to whether the fees are time barred by Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.525.
WHEREFORE, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees be and the same is herewith denied.
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