12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 216a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Transportation expenses — PIP statute does not provide for automobile transportation expenses incurred while driving to and from medical appointments
TOTAL REHAB AND MEDICAL CENTERS, as assignee of Liliana Londono, Appellant, vs. PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. Circuit Court, 17th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Broward County. Case No. 02-18140 (25). November 12, 2004. Robert A. Rosenberg, Judge.
[County court order published at 10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 59b.]
ORDER AND OPINION
THIS CAUSE is before the court on appeal from a final judgment rendered in the Broward County Court. The court having considered same, having reviewed the briefs submitted by the parties, and being otherwise duly advised in premises, finds and decides as follows:
The appellant raises one issue in this appeal. The appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the grounds that the plaintiff did not meet all of the elements set forth in Florida Statute 627.736(1). In particular, the appellant argues that under the Personal Injury Protection (PIP) statute, they should be reimbursed for reasonable transportation expenses that were incurred while driving to and from medical appointments. Whether the lower court correctly interpreted the Personal Injury Protection statute is a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc. v. Delco Oil, Inc., 721 So.2d 376 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
The trial court, which was bound to follow precedent, did not consider whether the PIP statute included automobile transportation expenses. This court recognizes that the lower court did not have the benefit of the recent Fourth District Court of Appeals decision in, Malu v. Security Nat’l Ins. Co., 848 So.2d 373 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). In Malu, the court held that automobile transportation expenses, such as those in this case, are not provided for by the PIP statute. The Fourth District based its reasoning on the fact that the statute specifically included transportation by ambulance, but did not mention any other type of transportation. While neither side argued this theory at trial, this court is still under a duty to affirm the lower court’s finding if an alternative theory would support affirmance. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 1979). Therefore, as in Malu, the remedy sought in this case is not provided for by Florida Statute 637.736(1).
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the trial court’s final judgment in favor of Appellee, Progressive Express Insurance Company, is AFFIRMED.
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