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CHIROPRACTIC & REHAB ASSOCIATES, INC., on assignment by Dorothy Palmer, Plaintiff, vs. PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

13 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 169b

Attorney’s fees — Insurance — Personal injury protection — Hourly rate — $175 per hour, rather than requested $250 per hour, is reasonable rate for simple PIP case in county court — Hours expended — Reasonable amount of time expended on case is reduced from requested 55.7 hours to 17 hours after elimination of time not compensable as attorney time and time not reasonable and necessary

CHIROPRACTIC & REHAB ASSOCIATES, INC., on assignment by Dorothy Palmer, Plaintiff, vs. PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 12th Judicial Circuit in and for Manatee County. Case No. 03 CC 2672. George K. Brown, Judge. Counsel: William Saron, Law Offices of Saron & Associates, St. Petersburg. Scott W. Dutton, Haas, Dutton, Blackburn, Lewis & Longley, P.A. Tampa.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Fees and Costs, filed on January 31, 2005, pursuant to § 627.428, Fla Stat. The Court conducted a hearing on the matter on August 26, 2005. The Court has reviewed the motion and the court file, and is otherwise duly advised in the premises.

This case was brought by the Plaintiff to recover an amount of $299.00. The case was commenced by the Plaintiff’s Complaint on June 18, 2003, and was settled in September, 2004. The Plaintiff has now moved to recover attorney’s fees in the amount of $13,925.00, and in support thereof attached a time sheet which was entered into evidence as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1.

“[A]ttorney’s fees may be awarded by a court only when authorized by statute or by agreement of the parties.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830, 832 (Fla. 1993). The statute under which the Plaintiff moves provides that:

[u]pon the rendition of a judgment or a decree by any of the courts of this state against an insurer and in favor of any named or omnibus insured or the named beneficiary under a policy or contract executed by the insurer, the trial court . . . shall adjudge or decree against the insurer and in favor of the insured or beneficiary a reasonable sum as fees or compensation for the insured’s or beneficiary’s attorney prosecuting the suit in which the recovery is had.

§ 627.428, Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added). “The purpose of section 627.428 is to discourage insurance companies from contesting valid PIP claims and to reimburse successful insureds for their attorney’s fees when they are compelled to sue to enforce their insurance contracts.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barnes Family Chiropractic, 875 So. 2d 14, 16 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Thus, “[u]pon [a] suit [in which an insured seeks to enforce his/her insurance contract against the insurer] being filed, the relief sought is both the policy proceeds and attorney’s fees, and so long as the insurer fails to voluntarily pay any part of the relief sought, it continues to contest the policy, and thus even though the claim at that point is limited to the recovery of attorney’s fees, it is nonetheless a claim under the policy.” Sonara v. Star Cas. Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 661, 663 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1992).

Florida has adopted the “lodestar” method for determining attorneys’ fees, and the “lodestar” amount is obtained by multiplying the hours reasonably spent on the case by a reasonable hourly rate of compensation for each lawyer. See Standard Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 55 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990). The term “reasonable” is key in determining the “lodestar” amount, and reasonableness should be based on a totality of the circumstances. See § 627.428(1), Fla. Stat. (2005) (“the trial court . . . shall adjudge . . . a reasonable sum as fees or compensation”).

In determining what is “reasonable,” a trial court must look to the following factors: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the question involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (5) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (6) the amount involved and the results obtained; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (8) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer(s) performing the services; (10) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (11) the “undesirability” of the case; and (12) awards in similar cases. See Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1150 (Fla. 1985), as modified by Standard Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 834 (Fla. 1990). See also R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5(b), In awarding the attorney’s fees, the Court must “support [its] award of attorney’s fees with specific findings as to the reasonable hourly rate and the hours reasonably expended litigating the issues.” Pridgen v. Agoado, 901 So. 2d 961, 962 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Nevertheless,

‘[r]easonably expended’ means the time that ordinarily would be spent by lawyers in the community to resolve this particular type of dispute. It is not necessarily the number of hours actually expended by counsel in the case. Rather the court must consider the number of hours that should reasonably have been expended in that particular case . . . In this respect, the magnitude of the case should be a consideration.

General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Laesser, 791 So. 2d 517, 519 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

In this case, the Plaintiff’s attorney, William Saron, is seeking attorney’s fees totaling $13,925.00. Saron is an attorney in St. Petersburg who has handled many PIP claims, and in fact has been doing them for approximately ten years. His hourly rate in this case was $250.00.

During the evidentiary hearing on Plaintiff’s motion, the Court heard from experts for both the Plaintiff and Defendant. The Plaintiff’s expert, Bruce Denson, is an attorney in St. Petersburg who testified that although he has participated in PIP litigation ten to fifteen times, he has never tried a PIP case and is not an expert in PIP litigation. Denson testified that Saron’s request for attorney’s fees of $13,925.00, based on 55.7 hours of work at the hourly rate of $250.00, was reasonable. Denson came to this conclusion by looking at orders for attorney’s fees in this locale.

The parties stipulated that the Defendant’s expert, David Kampf, is an expert in PIP litigation. Kampf has been involved in PIP litigation for the past ten years, and in fact has worked as defense counsel against Saron in the past. Kampf testified that a reasonable rate for a plaintiff’s attorney handling PIP litigation in Manatee County is $175.00 per hour. He also concluded that a reasonable number of hours to work on a case such as this one should have been under twenty hours because, inter alia,this type of PIP litigation is form-driven, Saron has extensive experience doing these types of cases, and much of the discovery in this case was identical to discovery in PIP cases in which Kampf was defense counsel.

On the face of it, asking for almost $14,000 in fees for this kind of case, with the result obtained, is hard for this Court to accept as reasonable. The Court is in agreement with the Defendant that there are numerous entries on the time sheet that cannot be considered as compensable for attorney time — faxing documents and drafting notices of deposition, as two examples. The Court also makes note of the time requested that was not reasonable and necessary — the “Civil Remedy Notice” entries and 3.6-hour entry for preparation for the hearing on the motion for continuance, for example. Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Court rejects the request for an attorney’s fee rate of $250 per hour, as this was a simple PIP case in County Court. The Court finds that $175.00 per hour is a reasonable hourly rate for this type of work in this county. Furthermore, after careful review of all the pertinent information and factors, the Court finds that a reasonable amount of time to spend on this case would be no more than 17 hours. Saron is therefore awarded a total of $2,975.00 in attorney’s fees.

It is, therefore,

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

Plaintiff’s attorney, William Saron, shall have and recover from the Defendant, Progressive American Insurance Company, the sum of $2,975.00 as attorney’s fees and the sum of $477.40 for costs, for a total of $3,452.40 (Three Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Two Dollars and Forty Cents), that shall bear interest at the rate of 8% (eight percent) per year.

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