13 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1204a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Discovery — Depositions — Treating physician — Insurer has right to question treating physician who is sole shareholder and clinical director of medical provider regarding any matter within scope of discovery under rule 1.280(b), including role and responsibilities as clinical director and corporate matters known to physician — Physician may be questioned about treatment specifically provided by physician and treatment provided by medical provider, even where questions require physician to review medical file
FIRST COAST MEDICAL CENTER, INC., (as assignee of Barbara Kirce), Plaintiff, v. PROGRESSIVE AUTO PRO INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 4th Judicial Circuit in and for Duval County. Case No. 16-2005-SC-008735, Division P. September 5, 2006. Angela M. Cox, Judge. Counsel: Vincent P. Gallagher, for Plaintiff. Glenn S. Banner, James C. Rinaman, III & Associates, Jacksonville, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL TESTIMONY OF GRADY CARTER, D.C.
THIS CAUSE, having come before the Court on August 23, 2006, on Defendant’s Motion to Compel Testimony of Grady Carter, D.C., and the Court having heard arguments of counsel, reviewed the pleadings, motions and papers filed with the court, and being otherwise advised in the premises, it is,
ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Testimony of Grady Carter, D.C., is hereby granted.
2. This suit is a dispute over unpaid No-Fault benefits for medical and chiropractic services Plaintiff, First Coast Medical Center, Inc., provided to the insured and assignor Barbara Kirce.
3. On or about July 27, 2006, the Defendant, deposed Grady Carter, D.C. (“Dr. Carter”). Dr. Carter, is the sole shareholder and serves as the Clinical Director and is one of the treating physicians at First Coast Medical Center, Inc. The Defendant prepared for and intended to question Dr. Carter about medical services provided to the insured and regarding the duties of the Clinical Director. There was no protective order limiting the scope of examination.
4. Plaintiff Objected to questions regarding Dr. Carter’s duties as Clinical Director. Plaintiff’s counsel, stating that Dr. Carter was not the designated corporate spokesperson, unilaterally suspended the deposition apparently under the authority of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 1.310(d). Plaintiff also objected to questions that required Dr. Carter to review previously provided medical records which both Dr. Carter and Defendant possessed at the deposition. At no time was Dr. Carter advised to not answer a question.
5. The Plaintiff argues that questions regarding the Clinic Director’s duties and other corporate matters, are governed by FRCP 1.310(b)(6) and that Defendant must designate with reasonable particularity the matters on which corporate information is sought, and then Plaintiff will supply the correct corporate spokesperson to be deposed. Plaintiff further argues that a non-party treating physician should not have to answer questions regarding the corporate organization including the Clinical Director duties. In support of this argument, Plaintiff cited to Chiquita International Limited vs. Fresh Del Monte Produce, 705 So.2d 112, (3rd DCA 1998) which is unpersuasive to this court.
6. Plaintiff further objected to Dr. Carter being compelled to review medical notes, without compensation, which were equally available to the Defendant. Prior to the deposition, the medical records had been produced pursuant to a properly issued subpoena. Prior to the Plaintiff’s suspension of the deposition, Defendant asked Dr. Carter to state the insured’s first date of treatment. As Dr. Carter claimed no independent recollection of that date, Dr. Carter informed the Defendant that, the information was in the medical records which Defendant possessed. Dr. Carter refused to consult the at hand medical records. The date of first treatment information was in the medical records. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Carter is a “non-party” treating physician and cannot be compelled to review medical records in order to answer questions. Defendant was not paying for Dr. Carter’s time spent at the deposition. Plaintiff claims the right to suspend the deposition and obtain a protective order pursuant to FRCP 1.280(c). This court disagrees with Plaintiff’s argument.
7. The Defendant’s position is that Dr. Carter was noticed for a deposition and absent a protective order. Defendant has the right to question Dr. Carter regarding any matter that is within the scope of discovery as provided by FRCP 1.280(b). This court agrees. Defendant does not have to follow the provisions of FRCP 1.310(b)(6), as Defendant knew the identity of the individual that Defendant chose to depose and further, that FRCP 1.310(b)(6) specifically states that, “This subdivision does not preclude taking a deposition by any other procedure authorized in these rules.”
8. The Court rules that the Defendant may question Dr. Carter with regards to any matter within the scope of rule 1.280(b). Such matters include, but are not limited to, Dr. Carter’s role and responsibilities as Clinical Director of Plaintiff corporation, questions about corporate matters that are known to Dr. Carter, treatment provided by the Plaintiff corporation (which may require Dr. Carter to review the medical file), and treatment specifically rendered by Dr. Carter.
9. The court further rules that the Plaintiff shall pay for Defendant’s cost to transcribe the July 27, 2006 suspended deposition of Dr. Carter.
* * *
