13 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 578b
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Non-owned vehicle — Where coverage while operating non-owned vehicle excluded vehicle owned by relative, policy clearly and unambiguously did not provide coverage for truck owned by insureds’ son — Liability of parent for minor driver — Parents’ PIP policy should not be extended to require coverage of claims against parents based on liability for son’s negligence or willful misconduct which parents assumed by signing son’s driver’s license application where such coverage was not contemplated in policy — Insurer’s motion for summary judgment granted
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. MIGUEL MARTINEZ, ROSA MARTINEZ, DAVID MARTINEZ and REINALDO CASTANEDA, Respondents. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 05-10688, Division CA 11. February 27, 2006. Robert N. Scola, Jr., Judge. Counsel: Joel E. Bernstein, Bernstein, Chackman & Liss, Hollywood. Herman Klemick. Ralph G. Patino.
ORDER ON PETITIONER STATE FARM’S MOTION FOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS MATTER was heard by the court on February 14, 2006. After considering the written submissions of the parties and argument of counsel, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:Findings of Fact
Respondent David Martinez, a minor, owned a 2001 Ford F-150 truck which was involved in an accident with Respondent Reinaldo Castaneda. At the time of the accident, David lived at home with his parents, Respondents Miguel and Rosa Martinez. Prior to and at the time of the accident Miguel and Rosa Martinez’ vehicles were insured by Petitioner State Farm. David’s truck was not listed on the declarations page of his parents’ policy with State Farm but, instead, was insured in a separate PIP policy with United Auto. Castaneda has brought a separate claim against all three Martinezes based upon the accident. In this declaratory action, State Farm seeks an order from the court that they are not required to insure the Martinezes for damages resulting from David’s accident with Castaneda.
The State Farm policy at issue provides
“[State Farm] will:
1. pay damages which an insured becomes legally liable to pay because of:
a. bodily injury to others, and
b. damage to or destruction of property including loss of its use
caused by accident resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of your car . . .”
On the Defined Words page, “your car” is defined as “the car or the vehicle described on the declarations page.” David Martinez’s truck was not listed on the Declarations page. In addition, the policy extends coverage to “the use, by an insured, of a newly acquired car, a temporary substitute car or a non-owned car.” Under a section entitled “Who Is an Insured,” the policy states that
“When we refer to your car, a newly acquired car, or a temporary substitute car, insured means:
1. you;
2. your spouse;
3. the relatives of the first person named in the declarations;
4. any other person while using such a car if its use is within the scope of consent of you or your spouse; and
5. any other person or organization liable for the use of such a car by one of the above insureds.”
The policy also explains that
“When we refer to a non-owned car, insured means:
1. the first person named in the declarations;
2. his or her spouse;
3. their relatives; and
4. any person or organization which does not own or hire the car but is liable for its use by one of the above persons.”
Relative is defined as “a person related to you or your spouse by blood or marriage or adoption who resides primarily with you.” As already mentioned David is the son of Miguel and Rosa Martinez and resided with them at the time of the incident. Resultantly, David qualifies as a relative. Because he is a relative, David qualifies as an insured while driving a car listed on the declarations page, a newly acquired car, a temporary substitute car, or a non-owned car.
Finally, the policy contains a definition for non-owned cars. Under this definition a non-owned car
“means a car not owned, registered or lease by;
1. you, your spouse;
2. any relative unless the car meets the requirements described below;
3. any other person residing in the same household as you, your spouse or any relative; or
4. an employer of you, your spouse, or any relative.
That section goes on to read
A car owned, registered or leased by a relative is considered a non-owned car if, at the time of the accident or loss, the car has been insured for liability coverage within the last 30 days and is driven by an insured who does not own or lease the car.
There is also a section which explains that
“Non-owned car does not include a:
1. rented car while it is used in connection with the insured’s employment or business; or
2. car which has been operated or rented by or in the possession of an insured during any part of each of the last 21 or more consecutive days. If the insured is an insured under one or more other car policies issued by us, the 21 day limit is increased by an additional 21 days for each such additional policy.
Also pertinent to this case is §322.09, Florida Statutes. This statute requires the parent(s) or guardian of a minor to sign the minor’s application for a Florida driver’s license, thereby agreeing that
Any negligence or willful misconduct of a minor under the Age 18 years when driving a motor vehicle upon a highway shall be imputed to the person who has signed the application of such a minor for a permit or license, which person shall be jointly and severally liable with such a minor for any damages caused by such negligence or willful misconduct.
It is not disputed that one of, or both of, David’s parents signed his application for his driver’s license.Analysis and Conclusions of Law
A trial court should grant a motion for summary judgment only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c); Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 So. 2d 29, 30 (Fla. 1977); Duarte v. Wetzel, 682 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). It is well established that the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the moving party and until that burden is met, the opposing party is under no obligation to show that any issue exists to be tried. See, e.g., Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40, 43 (Fla.1966). The movant has the burden of conclusively proving the non-existence of a genuine issue of material fact and that proof must overcome all reasonable inferences which may be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See, e.g., Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000); Dade County Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 643 (Fla. 1999); Lawrence v. Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack, Inc., 842 So.2d 303, 304-305 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court may neither adjudge the credibility of the witnesses nor weigh the evidence. See Hernandez v. United Auto. Ins. Co., Inc., 730 So.2d 344, 345-46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), where a claim such as this one is filed, and after full discovery there are no genuine issues of material fact, summary judgment should be granted. A party should not be put to the expense of going through a trial, where the only possible result will be a directed verdict. See, e.g., Lake Gateway Motor Inn, Inc. v. Matt’s Sunshine Gift Shops, Inc., 361 So.2d 769 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (reversing jury verdict for entry of directed verdict because there was no unjustified interference) and American Medical Intern., Inc. v. Scheller, 462 So.2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Martin Petroleum Corp. v. Amerada Hess Corp. 769 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
There were two main issues presented to the Court. First, whether the State Farm policy issued to Miguel and Rosa Martinez was so ambiguous that it should be read to cover David Martinez in the accident in the underlying case. Secondly, this court must decide whether an insurance provider should be required to insure a policyholder when the policyholder is being sued pursuant to Fla. Stat. §322.09. For the following reasons, this Court finds that State Farm is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
The policy at issue purports to provide coverage in various circumstances. It will provide coverage for Miguel Martinez, Rosa Martinez, and David Martinez while operating either a car listed in the Declarations section, a newly acquired car, or a temporary substitute car. In addition, it will cover Miguel Martinez, Rosa Martinez, and David Martinez while operating a non-owned car. The policy is clear that non-owned car is one that is not owned, registered or leased by the policyholder, his or her spouse, any relative, or any other person residing in the same household as the policyholder, the policyholder’s spouse, or any relative of the policyholder. Because David Martinez owned the truck involved in the accident it does not qualify as a non-owned car. Resultantly, the policy does not include coverage for David while operating his truck. The policy is clear and unambiguous, and should not be extended to provide coverage in the case at hand.
Florida Statute §322.09 requires that the parent of a minor driver must sign that child’s driver’s license application, thereby submitting himself or herself to liability for the minor driver’s negligence or willful misconduct. The case of State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Swetokos, 566 So.2d 901 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) addressed similar situation. There, a father had signed his minor son’s driver’s license application. The son was later in an accident while driving his grandfather’s truck. At the time he was not living with his father. After settling with the grandfather, the injured motorist filed suit against the father pursuant to §322.09. The trial court found that the father could be held liable. However, on appeal the 5th DCA held that policy required the son to have been residing with the father in order for him to have been insured while driving the “non-owned” vehicle. In reversing the trial courts decision, the appellate court noted “[s]ince [the son] failed to qualify as an insured, the policy in no way contemplated coverage to extend to his acts.
In light of Swetokos it is apparent that the policy should not be extended to require coverage of the parents against claims stemming from § 322.09 when such coverage was not contemplated in the agreement. While it listed a number of situations in which David Martinez would have been covered, this accident was not one of them. Nor was it contemplated that the parents would be covered for their child’s negligence as a result of §322.09. While the case of Brown v. Champeau, 537 So.2d 1120 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) cited by the Respondents did find liability pursuant to §322.09, that case involved a policy that was much more broad than one presently before this Court.
Because the policy was not ambiguous and did not contemplate coverage for Miguel, Rosa, and David Martinez in the instant situation, State Farm is not required to insure them in the present action.
The Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
