14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 352a

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Declaratory judgment — Insurer’s obligation to provide policy, declarations page and/or PIP log on presuit request from assignee/medical provider — Section 627.736(6)(d), which entitles insured to all information obtained by insurer from medical providers or employers, also entitles assignee/provider to such information — Information that may be obtained under statute includes PIP log to extent it contains information obtained from medical providers or employers — Section 627.4137, which requires production of policy to any claimant by any insurer who does or may provide liability coverage to pay any claim, requires insurer to provide copy of policy and declarations page — No merit to argument that statute is not applicable to PIP insurer where insured’s policy provides for liability coverage for bodily injury in addition to PIP coverage — No merit to argument that statute’s discovery obligation only applies to third-party claims — Section 627.7401 merely requires that insurer send insured form notice of rights under No-Fault Act within 21 days of PIP claim and does not provide any basis for obtaining presuit discovery — No merit to argument that insurer need not comply with presuit discovery obligations where requesting provider has knowledge of, or alternative methods of obtaining, requested information

AMERICAN VEHICLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. FLORIDA EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS KANG & ASSOCIATES, P.A., as assignee of Stephenie Carrico, Appellee. Circuit Court, 9th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Orange County. Case No. CVA1 05-17. L.C. Case No. 2004-SC-4586-O. January 26, 2007. Appeal from the County Court for Orange County, Jerry L. Brewer, Judge. Counsel: Sean McDonough, Bussey, White, McDonough & Freeman, Orlando, for Appellant. Kevin B. Weiss, Weiss Legal Group, Maitland, for Appellee.

(Before WHITE, MUNYON, and COHEN, JJ.)

ORDER AFFIRMING THE JUNE 1, 2005, FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT

(PER CURIAM.) This is an appeal by American Vehicle Insurance Company (“Appellant” or “AVIC”), of the trial court’s Final Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Florida Emergency Physicians Kang & Associates, P.A. (“Appellee” or “Kang”.) This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(1)(A). The issue in this appeal is whether a PIP¹ carrier must provide pre-suit discovery to a medical provider who is an assignee of the carrier’s insured. This issue has been a source of much contention in the county courts of this circuit and throughout the state but has never been directly addressed by this Court sitting in its appellate capacity. The county court held that a PIP carrier “upon proper request, is required to furnish, pre-suit, a copy of the patient’s declaration page, policy and/or PIP log in accordance with Florida Statutes 627.4137, 677.736(6)(d) and 627.7401.” (R. 86.) We affirm.

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Stephenie Carrico (“Carrico”) was involved in an automobile accident on October 9, 2003, and received medical treatment from Kang for her injuries. At the time of the accident, AVIC insured Carrico and her policy included PIP coverage. After the accident, Carrico executed an assignment of her PIP benefits to Kang. Kang submitted Carrico’s medical bills to AVIC, which failed to pay the bill and failed to respond to this claim within thirty days. AVIC’s agent, Superior Adjusting, responded to Kang’s request for payment on November 20, 2003, in a letter stating that Kang’s medical bill was applied to Carrico’s deductible.

On April 13, 2004, Kang, through an attorney, sent a letter to AVIC demanding payment of PIP benefits it claimed were owed to it and unpaid. The demand letter notified AVIC that if it failed to pay the bill, litigation would result. The letter also requested, pursuant to sections 627.4137 and 627.736(6)(d) of the Florida Statutes, that AVIC provide Kang with the name of the insurer; the name of each insured; the limits of the liability coverage, including PIP and Med Pay coverage; a statement of any policy or coverage defense; and a copy of the policy. In addition, the letter requested a copy of the insured’s PIP payout sheet and any explanations of benefits generated concerning the bill.

On April 21, 2004, AVIC responded to the demand letter and asserted that Kang’s medical bill of $234.00 was applied to Carrico’s deductible.

In a letter to AVIC dated April 27, 2004, Kang again requested a copy of the insurance policy, the declarations page, and a PIP payout ledger/log.² AVIC did not respond to the letter. On May 26, 2004, Kang filed suit against AVIC seeking several forms of relief including a declaration of PIP coverage, a judgment for PIP benefits, “full disclosure of all documents and . . . a complete copy of the written material in the possession of [AVIC] that would shed light on the issues involved herein” as well as counsel fees and costs of suit. Kang moved for summary judgment, asserting that no genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether AVIC was required to produce the items sought in the demand letters and as to whether AVIC failed to produce such items. AVIC also moved for summary judgment, principally contending that there was no statutory basis for requiring it to give Kang the requested information. After holding hearings on these motions, the trial court entered an order granting Kang’s motion for summary judgment.

In granting summary judgment to Kang, the trial court relied upon several county court decisions and concluded that a PIP carrier is required to furnish, pre-suit, a copy of the patient’s declarations page, policy, and PIP log. The trial court further found that section 627.4137, which references “liability carriers,” relates to the nature of the claim being presented, as opposed to the type of coverage sought, and obligates a PIP carrier to comply therewith.

The court below denied AVIC’s motion for reconsideration of its order granting Kang final summary judgment and on June 1, 2005, entered a Final Judgment in favor of Kang from which AVIC now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a summary judgment is de novo. Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000).

III. DISCUSSION

Most of AVIC’s arguments relate to statutory interpretation. Accordingly, each of the statutes upon which the court below relied in directing AVIC to provide its policy, the PIP log, and the declarations page will be examined.

When construing the meaning of a statute, courts must first examine the plain language of the statute. Montgomery v. State, 897 So. 2d 1282, 1285 (Fla. 2005). “When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Id. (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)). Furthermore, “[o]ne of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.” Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992) (citing Se. Fisheries Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 453 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1984). “If necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.” Id. (citing Gardner v. Johnson, 451 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1984)). Moreover, “whenever possible courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.” Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Plaza Materials Co., 908 So. 2d 360, 368 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Unruh v. State, 669 So. 2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1996)).

The county court held that a PIP carrier is required to make pre-suit discovery pursuant to three different enactments — sections 627.4137, 627.736(6)(d), and 627.7401 of the Florida Statutes. We agree that sections 627.4137 and 677.736(6)(d) require such disclosure, but find that section 627.7401 does not. We address these three statutory provisions seriatim.

1. Section 627.736(6)(d), Florida Statutes

Section 627.736(6)(d), Florida Statutes is part of the no-fault auto insurance scheme and provides that “[t]he injured person shall be furnished, upon request, a copy of all information obtained by the insurer under the provisions of this section, and shall pay a reasonable charge, if required by the insurer.” The title of subsection 6 of section 627.736 is “Discovery of facts about an injured person.” This subsection permits the carrier to informally obtain information about a claimant, § 627.736(6)(a),(b), Fla. Stat. (2005), and if this is not successful, to bring an action to compel production of the information sought. § 627.736(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005).³ The scope of discovery permitted by section 627.736(6)(c), is coextensive with the parameters of discovery under the civil rules. See Kaminester v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 775 So. 2d 981, 985 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Subsection (d) permits the insured to obtain whatever information the insurer has compiled through this informal discovery procedure. The process contemplated by the text of the statute begins with an informal production of documents and information by the provider upon simple request of the PIP insurer. Id. at 986. Apparently, the situation which has arisen here was not envisioned where, in addition to having to supply information to the PIP carrier, the health care provider, in its capacity as an assignee of benefits, would also seek to obtain information from the insurer.

An insured may assign his right to benefits under a contract of insurance. Schuster v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 843 So. 2d 909, 911-12 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). An assignee may enforce payment or performance of an obligation due under the contract. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Ray, 556 So. 2d 811, 813 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Once an assignment is made, the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor. Price v. RLI Ins. Co., 914 So. 2d 1010, 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). As a result, the assignee succeeds to both the contractual rights of the assignee and the statutory rights and duties which arise from the contract. For example, an assignee who sues to recover PIP benefits is entitled to recover statutory attorneys fees. Superior Ins. Co. v. Libert, 776 So. 2d 360, 365 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

Therefore, this statute which is designed to enable the carrier to obtain information from providers at times operates in exactly the opposite manner by virtue of its provision entitling the insured to all information obtained by the carrier where the insured has made an assignment to the provider.

The question next arises as to the nature of the information which a provider may obtain from a PIP carrier under section 627.736(6). AVIC repeatedly notes that section 627.736(6)(d) does not specifically refer to a PIP log or to other information requested by Kang. That is correct, but not the end of the analysis.

While section 627.736(6)(d) does not contain the words “PIP log,” it is equally true that this same statutory provision also does not refer to leases. Still, in Kaminester v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., supra, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed an order requiring a medical facility to provide a PIP carrier with a copy of its lease of an MRI machine. The Kaminester panel had little trouble deciding that the lease was within the meaning of the statutory language permitting discovery relating to the costs of treatment. Id. at 985. In so doing, it specifically rejected the argument by the PIP claimant that the documents available to the carrier are limited to those specifically mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) of the statute. Id. at 984.

As AVIC would have it, therefore, the information available to a carrier pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) should be broadly construed, under Kaminester, but the information available from the carrier under section (d) should be limited. This is not supported by the plain language of subsection (d) which entitles an insured (and, logically, an insured’s assignee) to discover the same information obtained by the carrier under subsections (a) and (b). AVIC contends that requiring it to produce its PIP log and other information requested by Kang would amount to judicial amendment of an unambiguous statute. We reject this argument. Requiring a PIP carrier to produce its log does not “add to” or rewrite the statutory language any more than the Kaminester court did when it permitted a carrier to obtain a lease, another term not mentioned in the statute.

Thus, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that a PIP carrier’s only obligation under Section 627.736(6)(d) is to provide the injured person with information specifically mentioned in subsections (a) and (b). To the contrary, AVIC is bound by this statute to provide Kang with any information it obtains from providers and employers which is responsive to Kang’s pre-suit request. If a PIP carrier is able to obtain a copy of an equipment lease as being related to the cost of an insured’s treatment, as in Kaminester, it seems that a PIP log or PIP ledger should also be discoverable, at least to the extent it contains information obtained from a medical provider or employer.

2. Section 627.4137, Florida Statutes

Another enactment upon which the county court relied in ordering AVIC to provide insurance information is Section 627.4137, Florida Statutes (2005), which states:

(1) Each insurer which does or may provide liability insurance coverage to pay all or a portion of any claim which might be made shall provide, within 30 days of the written request of the claimant, a statement, under oath, of a corporate officer or the insurer’s claims manager or superintendent setting forth the following information with regard to each known policy of insurance, including excess or umbrella insurance:

(a) The name of the insurer.

(b) The name of each insured.

(c) The limits of the liability coverage.

(d) A statement of any policy or coverage defense which such insurer reasonably believes is available to such insurer at the time of filing such statement.

(e) A copy of the policy.

§ 627.4137, Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added).

AVIC argues that section 627.4137 “is applicable only to the request for the declarations page and insurance policy.” (Initial Br. 16.) Further, AVIC contends that the term “liability insurer” does “not mean personal injury protection insurers and uninsured motorist insurers” and therefore section 627.4137 does not apply to it in this case. (Id. at 21.) The trial court found that “the liability portion of Florida Statute 627.4137 goes to the nature of the carrier not the nature of the claim.” (R. 87.)

This finding is supported by both the statutory language and caselaw. The obligation to furnish information, including a copy of the applicable policy, is imposed by section 627.4137 upon any “insurer who does or may provide liability insurance coverage to pay all or a portion of any claim which might be made . . . .” § 627.4137, Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added). The class upon which a duty is imposed by this language is not defined in terms of the type of claim actually made or the coverage actually provided, but rather the type of coverage which the carrier “may provide” with respect to “any claim.” Id. Although we are here involved with personal injury protection coverage, it appears from Ms. Carrico’s declarations page that AVIC’s policy is one which “may provide,” indeed does provide, liability coverage as that term is used by AVIC. Ms. Carrico’s declarations page indicates that in addition to PIP, her policy provided “bodily injury” coverage of $10/20,000. Also, it is difficult to imagine any request for benefits which does not fall within the parameters of “any claim.” Therefore, since the AVIC policy is one which “may provide liability insurance” which would cover “any claim,” section 627.4137 applies here.

AVIC is correct that some courts, interpreting different statutory provisions, have concluded that PIP does not fall within the rubric “liability insurance.” In support of its argument, AVIC relies upon the case of Union General Insurance Co. v. Lorenzo, 598 So. 2d 161, 162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), which held that section 627.426, Florida Statutes (1991), did not apply to PIP claims because “[t]he clear language of this statute indicates that it only applies to ‘liability insurers.’ The statute does not address first party PIP claims.” Lorenzo concerned an altogether different statutory provision — section 627.426 — which, among other things, requires a “liability insurer” to promptly investigate possible defenses to coverage and notify the “named insured” of its determination and give notice of its reservation of rights to assert defenses to coverage. Id. at 161.

Under section 627.426(2)(a), the carrier waives coverage defenses unless it provides the named insured with a reservation of rights. § 627.426(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). Also, the “liability insurer” must timely advise its named insured of its “refusal to defend”or else retain counsel to defend the claim against the insured. § 627.426(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). The time period for compliance by the insurer is measured from the time of its knowledge of a defense or its “receipt of a summons and complaint naming the insured as a defendant.” § 627.426(2)(a),(b), Fla. Stat. (2005).⁴ This statute, by its terms, does not apply to PIP claims or PIP carriers because a PIP claimant is not seeking a defense but rather payment of medical bills or payment of lost wages. The statute at issue in Lorenzo concerned a liability insurer’s defense obligations to a “named insured” under its policies. See § 627.426(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). It plainly does not apply to PIP claims.

By contrast, the statute at issue here, section 627.4137, is not so limited. Under section 627.4137, a carrier must provide information to any “claimant,” not merely to the “named insured.” § 627.4137(1), Fla. Stat. (2005).

In sum, the language of section 627.4137, upon which the county court relied in granting summary judgment to Kang, is more expansive and requires production of more and different information by a larger category of insurers to a broader class than section 627.426, the so-called “claims administration statute” examined in Lorenzo which merely sets forth duties of insurers to named insureds against whom claims have been made by third parties. Thus, AVIC’s reliance upon Lorenzo is misplaced.

AVIC’s assertion that PIP is not “liability insurance” has not always found judicial favor. In Stuyvesant Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 307 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), the Fourth District Court of Appeal construed a former version of a statute which permitted insurance policies to prohibit duplication of underinsured motorist benefits. Among the sources of benefits which would be set-off against underinsured motorist coverage were “benefits available to an insured under any automobile liability or automobile medical expense coverages.” Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 307 So. 2d at 230-31 (quoting § 627.0851(1), Fla. Stat. (1971.))⁵ The Stuyvesant Insurance Co. court found that “[w]hile strictly speaking, PIP benefits would not qualify as ‘automobile liability coverage’ in the traditional concept of liability insurance, yet it seems to us that such was the legislative intent . . . . We hold that PIP benefits are available to the insured under ‘any automobile liability coverage’. . . .” Id. at 231.

AVIC devotes considerable effort to attempting to distinguish United Auto Insurance Co. v. Rousseau, 682 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In Rousseau, the court of appeal interpreted the statutory provision involved here — section 627.4137(1) — and held that a carrier was required to provide a copy of its policy to its insured who was a UM claimant. Id. at 1230. Thus, Rousseau involved a first-party claim and discovery was ordered pursuant to section 627.4137(1)(e). See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Potter, 729 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (UM coverage claim is first-party claim). AVIC’s attempt to distinguish Rosseau in not convincing. It argues that the issue of an insured’s obligation to furnish pre-suit information to a first-party claimant “was never addressed” in that case. In fact, the Rousseau opinion stated that it was “undisputed” that the carrier had violated section 627.4137 by failing to provide the UM claimant with a copy of the policy. United Auto Ins. Co. v. Rousseau, 682 So. 2d at 1229. AVIC emphasizes that in Rousseau, the claimant was a passenger who was an “omnibus insured.” (Initial Br. 22, 23.) The significance of this fact is not explained by AVIC and the Court finds none. Section 627.4137 imposes a duty on carriers to provide information to “claimants” and does not distinguish between omnibus insureds, named insureds or assignees of either who stand in their place.

In sum, there is no authority to support AVIC’s position that the discovery obligations of section 627.4137 only apply to third-party claims. The authorities relied upon by AVIC construe a different statute which addresses a different topic and are, thus, inapposite. The Court therefore rejects AVIC’s argument that it is not required by section 627.4137 to provide pre-suit insurance information to Kang. Section 627.4137 applies here and requires production of Ms. Carrico’s policy, § 627.4137(e), Fla. Stat. (2005), and declarations page, §627.4137(a),(b),(c).

3. Section 627.7401, Florida Statutes

The final statute pursuant to which the county court found a duty on the part of a PIP carrier to supply pre-suit discovery is section 627.7401, Florida Statutes (2005), which provides:

The [insurance] commission, by rule, shall adopt a form for the notification of insureds of their right to receive personal injury protection benefits under the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law. Such notice shall include a description of the benefits provided by personal injury protection, including, but not limited to, the specific types of services for which medical benefits are paid, disability benefits, death benefits, significant exclusions from and limitations on personal injury protection benefits, when payments are due, how benefits are coordinated with other insurance benefits that the insured may have, penalties and interest that may be imposed on insurers for failure to make timely payments of benefits, and rights of parties regarding disputes as to benefits.

(2) Each insurer issuing a policy in this state providing personal injury protection benefits must mail or deliver the notice as specified in subsection (1) to an insured within 21 days after receiving from the insured notice of an automobile accident or claim involving personal injury to an insured who is covered under the policy. The office may allow an insurer additional time to provide the notice specified in subsection (1) not to exceed 30 days, upon a showing by the insurer that an emergency justifies an extension of time.

(3) The notice required by this section does not alter or modify the terms of the insurance contract or other requirements of this act.

§ 627.7401, Fla. Stat. (2005).

AVIC contends that this section simply requires that, within twenty-one days of a PIP claim, insurers send their insureds a form notice adopted by the insurance commission which advises insureds of their rights under the No-Fault Act. This statute, AVIC urges, does not provide an insured any substantive right to pre-suit discovery. The parties fail to cite any case construing this notification statute. This absence of decisional authority is probably attributable to the fact that the statute is plain on its face. The Court finds that AVIC is correct that section 627.7401 does not provide any basis for an insured (or an insured’s assignee) to request and obtain pre-suit discovery from a PIP carrier.

4. Possession of Requested Information by Agent of the Requesting Party

AVIC also contends that Kang’s motion for summary judgment “regarding the declarations page should have been denied” because Kang already possessed this information. (Initial Br. 29.) Again, AVIC advances an argument but cites no case law to support it. As noted, section 627.4137 provides that an insurance carrier must furnish a claimant certain insurance information prior to a lawsuit being filed.⁶ This duty to make discovery is expressed in mandatory terms by employment of the word “shall” throughout the statute. See § 627.4137, Fla. Stat. (2005). AVIC maintains that it need not comply with these statutory discovery obligations because a PIP claimant such as Kang has several other avenues for acquiring this information including requesting it from the insured or filing a pure bill of discovery. Indeed, in this case, AVIC says that Kang was in possession of the declarations page. AVIC cites no case law to support its contention that it is relieved of its statutory discovery obligations because the requesting party has knowledge of or alternative methods of obtaining the requested information. Our research has disclosed none directly on point. Despite the dearth of caselaw on this point, the Court finds AVIC’s arguments to be misplaced for several reasons.

Dicta in one district court of appeal opinion seems inconsistent with AVIC’s position. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. St. Godard, 936 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), was an action to recover uninsured motorist (UM) benefits. The plaintiffs’ attorney requested insurance information, including a copy of the policy, pursuant to section 627.4137. Id. at 6. The carrier responded and the case was eventually tried to a jury which returned a verdict in excess of the UM policy limits. Id. at 6, 9. The trial court denied the carrier’s post-trial motion for a remittitur to $100,000, the amount of available UM coverage. Id. at 9. On appeal, the insurer again pressed its argument that the verdict should have been capped at the amount of the policy. Id. The insureds, for the first time, contended on appeal that they believed that an excess policy issued by the same insurer provided additional UM coverage and attempted to cast the carrier’s conduct in terms of bad faith. Id. at 10. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the denial of the motion for remittitur and reduced the judgment to the UM policy limits of $100,000. Id. at 11. In so doing, the appellate panel rejected the insured’s claim that they believed additional UM benefits were available. Id. at 10. One of the injured plaintiffs was the named insured and the other was his wife, whom the St. Godard court found had actual knowledge of the limits of their own UM coverage. Id. at 11. Nevertheless, the St. Godard opinion stated that: “If the insureds wanted to confirm what coverage was actually afforded by the umbrella/excess policy they could have made a request to [the carrier] under section 627.4137 for such information and a copy of the policy.” Id. at 10-11. Thus, even though the named insureds were charged with knowledge of their policy’s terms and even though they had actual knowledge of the limits of their coverage and even though their attorney had received an appropriate response to a request for information under section 627.4137, St. Godard teaches that it would have been appropriate for those insureds, despite this abundance of actual and imputed knowledge, to make a second request for insurance information pursuant to section 627.4137.

While St. Godard is not directly on point, it does indicate that claimants can, indeed ought to, liberally avail themselves of their pre-suit discovery rights pursuant to section 627.4137. This statutory provision reflects a legislative recognition of the importance of a claimant’s access to insurance information in making settlement decisions. Cheverie v. Geisser, 783 So. 2d 1115, 1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). AVIC’ s position, if adopted, would frustrate the statute’s salutary purpose of encouraging settlements, without the need for litigation. Instead, carriers could ignore discovery requests thereby spawning litigation, with discovery of its own, aimed at ascertaining the requesting party’s knowledge and the availability to the claimant of alternate ways of learning the facts.

In addition, the relevant statute expresses the discovery duties it creates in the mandatory by use of the word “shall.” See § 627.4137(1),(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). This terminology is inconsistent with the position advanced by AVIC which would permit carriers to take a wait-and-see approach. Under that view a PIP carrier’s duty to provide insurance information would only ripen after investigation indicated that the claimant had no other way to obtain the requested information other than from the insurer. We reject that approach and conclude that the Legislature did not intend to so burden an injured motorist’s access to PIP information.

Further, there is no language in section 627.4137 requiring a demonstration of “good cause” be made as a condition to obtaining discovery. Section 627.736, by contrast, does require a showing of good cause to obtain a court order for discovery of information. Thus, the fact that documents and information obtainable from a PIP carrier can also be acquired from another source is irrelevant to and does not excuse the insurer from the statutory duty to provide that information.

Finally, it is not unusual for a claimant to be able to obtain insurance information from a source other than the carrier. For example, an injured passenger can often secure this information from the driver of the vehicle which he or she occupied as that person will many times be a friend or family member. Further, an attorney for an injured claimant may be able to get PIP information from his or her client. Still, there is no indication that the legislature intended that claimants engage in time consuming and predictably unsuccessful efforts to gather information about their claim from people who have no duty to provide it. The PIP carrier must be available as an injured motorist’s first, not last, resort for insurance information. Requiring a PIP claimant to first attempt to secure insurance information from other available sources runs counter to “the purpose of the no-fault statutory scheme [which] is to provide swift and almost automatic payment so that the injured insured may get on with his life without undue financial interruption.” United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 808 So. 2d 82, 91 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 512 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)).

Therefore, the Court concludes that AVIC is not relieved of its duty to provide the declarations page (or information contained therein) by virtue of Kang’s imputed knowledge of this information.

5. Decisions of Other Courts

The decision of the county court below is in keeping with a long line of county court orders which have consistently held that the insurer is required to provide a PIP log, declarations page, and copy of the insurance policy to the insured or his or her assignee. The Orange County Court provided an accurate assessment of the state of the law in this area when it observed that:

[B]eginning with Judge Herring’s opinion in 2001 in Integra Diagnostics a/a/o Shawn Umstead v. Reliance Nat’l Ins. Co., 8 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 394c (Broward Cty. Ct. March 2001), it is abundantly clear that a [PIP carrier] is obligated to provide a . . . PIP log within 30 days of request, or face the consequences of its failure to do so. PIP carrier’s arguments that neither their policies nor any pertinent statute require the provision of this information have been flatly rejected on numerous occasions.

RMA Ambulance, Inc. v. U.S. Sec. Ins. Co., 12 Fla. L. Weekly 235a (Fla. Orange Cty. Ct., Dec. 16, 2004).

AVIC argues that Kang fails to cite any case law other than county court decisions holding that section 627.736, Florida Statutes, requires a PIP insurer to provide a PIP log or payment ledger upon request by an insured or an insured’s assignee. While AVIC disparages this plethora of county court decisions which reject its position, it does not cite any opinion — from any court, published or unpublished — supporting its own interpretation of section 627.736(6)(d). Further, a circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity, has considered a case strikingly similar to the instant one. In New Hampshire Indemnity Ins. Co. v. RMA Ambulance, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 941a (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct. App. Div. July 18, 2005), the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit reversed the decision of the Seminole County Court and held that a PIP carrier is not obligated to provide a medical provider which is its insured’s assignee with a PIP log, declarations page or a copy of the policy. Upon rehearing, however, the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit reversed itself and held that:

Although a requirement to provide such information may not be expressly stated in section 627.736, Florida Statutes, this Court finds that the provision of such information is essential to [the assignee’s] ability to determine its status as a claimant and makes eminently good common sense. Furthermore, the Court finds that the provision of such information by an insurer to an insured, or its assignee, is consistent with the purpose of the no-fault statutory scheme, to wit: “to ‘provide swift and virtually automatic payment so that the injured insured may get on with his life without undue financial interruption.’ ” See Allstate v. Ivey Ins. Co., 774 So. 2d 679, 683-84 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 512 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)). To hold otherwise would place providers in the untenable position of having to rely solely upon the explanation of the insurer without corresponding proof.

New Hampshire Indem. Ins. Co. v. RMA Ambulance, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 573a (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 18, 2005).⁷

IV. CONCLUSION

We hold that a PIP carrier is required by sections 627.736(6)(d) and 627.4137, Florida Statutes, to provide insurance information to an insured or the assignee of an insured. The duty of pre-suit disclosure created by section 627.736(6)(d) encompasses all information obtained from medical providers including compilations and summaries of such information in the form of a PIP log, PIP ledger or similar document. A PIP carrier may not frustrate or defeat these duties by asserting that the requesting party is already in possession of the information. Finally, we hold that section 627.7401 is not a source of any duty to make pre-suit disclosure of insurance information.

Costs and fees are awarded to Kang as the prevailing party in this appeal. § 627.428(1), Fla. Stat. (2006) (beneficiary under insurance policy that prevails on appeal against insurer entitled to award of attorney’s fees); § 627.736(8), Fla. Stat. (2006) (section 627.428(1) applies to PIP actions involving disputes between the insurer and the insured’s assignee); Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(b).

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1) The trial court’s June 1, 2005, “Final Judgment for Plaintiff” is AFFIRMED;

2) Appellee Kang’s Motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED, the assessment of which is REMANDED to the lower court; and

3) Appellee Kang shall have costs taxed in its favor, if it files a proper motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a) with the lower tribunal within thirty days of the issuance of the mandate in this matter.

__________________

¹“PIP” is an acronym for “personal injury protection.” With limited exception, “each motor vehicle owner or registrant required to be licensed in Florida is required to carry a minimum amount of personal injury protection, or PIP insurance, for the benefit of the owner and other designees.” Warren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 1090, 1094 (Fla. 2005). This coverage includes benefits for accident-related medical expenses, disability (lost wages) and death. § 627.736(1)(a),(b),(c), Fla. Stat. (2005).

²There is no single definition of a “PIP log.” That term “is applied throughout the insurance industry to a wide array of auditing tools ranging from a simple compilation of checks disbursed, to a detailed analysis of all claims made, including date(s) received, amount(s) claimed, amount(s) and date(s) paid, and explanations of benefits for every claim denied, reduced or pending.” Preziosi West/East Orlando Chiropractic Clinic, P.A. v. Mercury Ins. Co. of Fla., 12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 993b (Fla. Seminole Cty. Ct. July 28, 2005).

³Specifically, Section 627.736(6)(a) permits the insurer to obtain a sworn statement of the injured person’s earnings from the period of the personal injury and for a reasonable period before the injury. Section 627.736(6)(b) allows an insurer to acquire medical information related to the injured party’s history, condition, treatment, dates, and costs of such treatment from the medical provider. Under Section 627.736(6)(c) an insurer may seek relief from the courts if a dispute arises as to what information the insurer is entitled to receive from the insured’s employer or medical provider.

⁴These same provisions existed when Lorenzo was decided.

⁵This statutory provision has been renumbered section 627.727.

⁶As discussed supra, section 627.736(6)(d), Florida Statutes, is another statutory source of discovery rights. This enactment does not seem to be implicated by AVIC’s argument that it need not provide pre-suit discovery because Kang already possessed the requested information. AVIC advances this argument only to justify its non-production of the declarations page. Section 627.736 creates a duty of insurers to provide an insured (and logically, as assignee standing in her shoes) with information and documents obtained from providers. This duty is not triggered here with respect to the declarations page as AVIC did not obtain it from a provider. Thus, the statutory duty to provide the declarations page — or equivalent information — is rooted in section 627.4137.

⁷On April 5, 2006, the Fifth District Court of Appeal denied, without opinion, the petition for writ of certiorari of the PIP carrier in that case. See New Hampshire Indem. Ins. Co. v. RMA Ambulance, No. 5D05-4331 (Fla. 5th DCA Apr. 5, 2006).