14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 976b
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Res judicata — Each bill for separate treatment dates is separate claim and cause of action although all result from same accident — Medical provider is not barred from bringing claims for dates of service withdrawn from prior suit when provider discovered that demand letters for those dates of service were prematurely sent
ERIC G. FRIEDMAN, D.C. P.A. a/a/o MARIE PINCHINAT, Plaintiff, vs. UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Florida Corporation, Defendant. County Court, 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Civil Division. Case No. 06-25488-CC-23 (05). July 9, 2007. Don Cohn, Judge. Counsel: Steven M. Singer, Law Offices of Steven M. Singer, Miami, for Plaintiff. Benlliam Y. Soo-Hoo, for Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE AND/OR MOTION FOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1. This is an action for PIP benefits arising from injuries sustained by Marie Pinchinat in an accident that occurred on September 25, 2003 that were subsequently treated by the Plaintiff from December 3, 2003 through January 5, 2004.
2. Plaintiff had previously filed an action for PIP benefits for the same Plaintiff and assignor, under case number 04-20187-CC-23 (02).
3. This Court was informed that two of the four statutory 15-day demand letters, those for the dates of service from December 3, 2003 to January 5, 2004, were sent to the Defendant prematurely; therefore those particular bills were not ripe. The Plaintiff filed a Motion to Abate and to Amend its Complaint to include the corrected demand letters to which the Defendant objected. The Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion. Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Dropping the bills for services from December 3, 2003 to January 5, 2004.
4. After conclusion of the 2004 case Plaintiff resent demand letters for services rendered from December 3, 2003 to January 5, 2004, which the Defendant refused to pay.
5. Defendant has filed an Answer in which it alleges res judicata and splitting causes of action as its third affirmative defense. Defendant argues that Plaintiff violated the rule against splitting a cause of action when it filed this second action after it had already fully litigated the same issues and causes of action in the 2004 case and should therefore be barred from filing the action at issue under the doctrine of Res Judicata.
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice and/or Motion for Final Summary Judgment for Res Judicata and Splitting Causes of Action is hereby DENIED.
Defendant cites Department of Agriculture vs. Mid Florida Growers, Inc., 570 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1990) where it was held that “[the] rule against splitting causes of action makes it incumbent upon plaintiffs to raise all available claims involving the same circumstances in one action. . .” This Court finds that although the treatment dates at issue are a result of the same car accident each bill is a separate claim and cause of action. If the injured returned to treatment at a later date for injuries sustained in her accident of September 25, 2003 there would be yet another cause of action.
As stated in Schimmel v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 506 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 3rd DCA, 1987) the rule against splitting causes of action was created by the courts and “it would not be applied if doing so would frustrate the law or result in injustice.” This Court finds that barring the Plaintiff from bringing the claims for the dates of service from December 3, 2003 to January 5, 2004 would result in injustice as the bills are in no way defective and have already been determined by this Court to be reasonable, related to the accident, and necessary.
