14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 874a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Res judicata — Although final judgment was previously entered in action against insurer for overdue PIP benefits, second action by same medical provider against insurer based on different set of bills is not barred by res judicata
ISOT MEDICAL CENTER CORP, a/a/o RIGBERTO MATA, Plaintiff(s), vs. CLAREDON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant(s). County Court, 11th Judicial Circuit and for Miami-Dade County, Civil Division. Case No. 06-3021 SP 26 (04). July 9, 2007. Gloria Gonzalez-Meyer, Judge. Counsel: Maria E. Corredor and Lina Husseini, Law Offices of Maria E. Corredor, P.A., Miami, for Plaintiff.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGEMENT
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on the 19 day of June, 2007 on Defendant’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment and this Court, having reviewed the file, having heard argument of counsel and being otherwise duly advised in the premises, Defendant’s Motion is hereby Denied.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1. On or about November 8, 2005, the Plaintiff, ISOT, rendered its last medical treatment to Rigoberto Mata for alleged injuries sustained in an automobile accident that occurred on July 29, 2005.
2. On or about March 9, 2006, Plaintiff’s counsel prepared a demand letter for the dates of service August 2, 2005 through September 2, 2005 claiming $5,365.00.
3. On or about March 9, 2006, Plaintiff’s counsel prepared a second demand letter for the dates of service September 6, 2005 through September 29, 2005 claiming $3,620.00.
4. On or about March 9, 2006, Plaintiff’s counsel prepared a third demand letter for the dates of service October 4, 2005 through November 8, 2005 claiming $4,940.00.
5. On or about March 30, 2006, the Plaintiff, ISOT, filed a Complaint against the Defendant, CLAREDON, in Miami-Dade County, Florida (case no. 06-04901 SP 05) for alleged overdue no-fault benefits for injuries the patient Rigoberto Mata allegedly sustained in the automobile accident of July 29, 2005.
6. The Plaintiff, ISOT’s, Complaint stated that the action was for damages that exceeded $100.01 but was less than $500.00 (case no. 06-04901 SP 05).
7. On or about May 9, 2006, the Defendant, CLAREDON, confessed judgment for $500.00 (case no. 06-04901 SP 05).
8. On or about May 10, 2006, Judge Teretha Lundy Thomas entered an Order for Final Judgment (case no. 06-04901 SP 05).
9. On or about June 7, 2006, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Notice of Filing stating that the medical bills at issue were for dates of service August 2, 2005 through September 2, 2005 totaling $5,365.00.
10. On or about June 19, 2006, the Plaintiff, ISOT, filed a second Complaint (the case at bar) against the Defendant, CLAREDON, in Miami-Dade County, Florida (case no. 06-03021 SP 26). Said Complaint was based on the same accident and same parties. The Complaint in the case at bar did differ in the fact that the amount for damages exceeded $2,500.01 but was less than $5,000.00.
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
The central issue of this Motion is the determination of whether this case should be dismissed for Res Judicata since both cases involve the same accident and parties. The Plaintiff argues that the first Complaint (case no. 06-04901 SP 05) pertained to the first set of medical bills for dates of service August 2, through September 2, 2005 and that the case at bar pertained to the second set of medical bills for dates of service September 6, 2005 through September 29, 2005.
It is a well established principle of contract law that each separate breach of contract gives rise to a separate cause of action for the given breach. This notion is also true in PIP law in that each set of bills creates a new breach of contract and thus a separate cause of action. In United Automobile Insurance Company v. South Miami Health Center, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 835b (Fla. Dade Ct. 2005), the Court reversed in part and found that the Plaintiff was only entitled to Summary Judgment asto the first set of bills, where the EUO was scheduled outside the thirty day investigatory period. The provider was not entitled to Summary Judgment as to the second set of bills, because the EUO was timely scheduled. Thus, each set of bills gives rise to a new and distinct breach of contract and a separate cause of action.
The doctrine of Res Judicata only applies when the requirements of “(1) identity in the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality in the person for or against whom the claim is made” are all met simultaneously. Daniel v. Dep’t of Transp., 259 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). In fact, the Third District found that where identical parties had entered into a contract for building repairs and replacement, a lawsuit for damages for breach of contract and failure to tender payment did not bar, under the doctrine of res judicata, subsequent actions for breach of contract because the subsequent action was premised on separate and distinct work to be performed under different price quotes. B&V Ltd. v. All Dade Gen. Constr., 662 So.2d 413 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
Therefore, the case at bar, represents a separate breach and cause of action as it is predicated on a different set of bills. Thus, the requirement for identity of the cause of action is not met.
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied.
