14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 586b
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Exclusions — PIP policy unlawfully broadens statutory exclusion for injury suffered by named insured while occupying vehicle owned by named insured and not insured under policy where policy defines “named insured” as insured and insured’s spouse — Injuries suffered by insured while occupying vehicle owned by wife are covered
ONYX MEDICAL CENTER, INC., A/A/O SECUNDINO SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, vs. GRANADA INSURANCE CO., Defendant. County Court, 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Civil Division. Case No. 04-8304 SP 26 02. March 5, 2007. Bronwyn C. Miller, Judge. Counsel: Maria E. Corredor, Miami. Christina Diaz-Padron, Miami.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE, having come before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on February 28, 2007 and the Court having heard argument of counsel, reviewed the procedural history and relevant legal authority, and having otherwise been fully advised in the premises the Court hereby DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the following grounds:
This is a breach of contract action wherein Plaintiff, ONYX MEDICAL CENTER, INC., has filed suit against Defendant, GRANADA INSURANCE COMPANY, seeking personal injury protection benefits it claims are due and owing pursuant to a commercial insurance policy issued by Defendant to assignor, Secundino Sanchez. Defendant has moved for summary judgment, contending that Mr. Sanchez is subject to the personal injury protection exclusions of the commercial policy.
Mr. Sanchez was injured while occupying a motor vehicle his spouse’s 1994 Saturn. He did not own the Saturn pursuant to Florida law, as his name did not appear on the title of the motor vehicle. Rather, his spouse, Margarita Godals, owned the Saturn.
The policy of insurance contains an exclusion section. Said section reads, in relevant part:
We will not pay Personal Injury Protection benefits for “bodily injury”: 1. sustained by the “named insured” or any family member” while occupying” any “motor vehicle” owned by the “named insured” thatis not a covered “motor vehicle.” (Emphasis added). Policy V(C)(1).
The policy of insurance contains a definitions section that reads as follows:
Who is an insured: 1. The “named insured;” 2. If the “named insured” is an individual, any “family member” . . . (Emphasis added). Policy (B).
It further contains an “Additional Definitions” section which sets forth:
“Named insured” means the person or organization named in the Declarations of the policy and, if an individual, shall include the spouse if a resident of the same household. Policy V(G)(3).
Exclusionary clauses in insurance policies are always strictly construed. Farrer v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 809 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). In the instant case, Defendant argues it is relieved from its obligation to pay benefits to its insured, as Mr. Sanchez was involved in an accident in a motor vehicle owned by his wife.
It is axiomatic that an insurer cannot avoid the express requirements of Florida law by expanding statutorily permissible coverage exclusions in the terms of its policy of insurance. See Christian v. Colonial Penn Insurance Co., 537 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
Section 627.736(1) Florida Statutes states:
Every insurance policy complying with the security requirements of s. 627.733 shall provide personal injury protection to the named insured, relatives residing in the same household, persons operating the insured motor vehicle, passengers in such motor vehicle, and other persons struck by such motor vehicle and suffering bodily injury while not an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle, subject to the provisions of subsection (2) . . . (Emphasis added).
“. . . [R]estrictions on statutorily mandated coverage must be carefully examined because exclusions that are inconsistent with the purpose are invalid.” Vasques v. Mercury Casualty Co., __So. 2d __ (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), 2007 WL 283058 [32 Fla. L. Weekly D363a], citing, Flores v. Allstate Ins. Co., 819 So. 2d 740, 745 (Fla. 2002). Section 627.736 specifies those exclusions that are authorized pursuant to Florida’s no-fault statutory scheme:
2) AUTHORIZED EXCLUSIONS. — Any insurer may exclude benefits:
a. For injury sustained by the named insured and relatives residing in the same household while occupying another motor vehicle owned by the named insured and not insured under the policy. (Emphasis added).
Section 627.732 provides: “Definitions: (4) “Named insured” means a person, usually the owner of a vehicle, identified in a policy by name as the insured under the policy.” (Emphasis added).
Thus, Florida law limits the exclusions an insurer may employ to benefits for a named insured injured while driving a car owned by that named insured not insured under the policy. The exclusion set forth by Defendant in the policy in the instant case seeks to expand the statutory definition of “named insured” from one person to two people. This, in effect, broadens the express exclusion authorized by statute. The net effect would undoubtedly leave the insured with no coverage, as the Saturn’s policy would undoubtedly exclude coverage based on Section 627.736(4)(d)(4)b Florida Statutes:
4. Accidental bodily injury sustained in this state by any other person while occupying the owner’s motor vehicle or, if a resident of this state, while not an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle, if the injury is caused by physical contact with such motor vehicle, provided the injured person is not himself or herself:
a. The owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is required under ss. 627.730-627.7405; or
b. Entitled to personal injury benefits from the insurer of the owner or owners of such a motor vehicle.
“Florida has gone to extreme lengths to assure that personal injury protection benefits follow every licensed vehicle and cover any injured person.” Vasques v. Mercury Casualty Co.,__So. 2d __ (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), 2007 WL 283058 [32 Fla. L. Weekly D363a]. “It makes no sense that this mandated coverage for an injured person could evaporate simply because someone else. . .” defined as an insured under the policy owned the automobile involved in the accident at issue. Id. To permit Defendant this unauthorized exclusion would bar the insured from collecting benefits under either his policy or his spouse’s policy, thus would “. . . violate the well-articulated public policy considerations giving rise to personal injury protection benefits in this state.” Id.
THEREFORE, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.
