14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 175a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Dismissal — Res judicata — Where medical provider filed two virtually identical complaints against insurer for breach of contract by failure to pay PIP benefits for same series of treatments rendered at same facility by same physician to same insured as result of same accident and the only difference in complaints is dates of service at issue; all bills accrued prior to filing first suit; and there was no reason, other than provider’s desire to file multiple lawsuits, to split cause of action into two parts, final judgment issued in first case is conclusive of every justiciable issue that could have been litigated, and bills not claimed therein cannot be recovered — Motion to dismiss second action granted
PHYSICIANS REHAB GROUP INC. a/a/o JULIO MIRABAL PORRAS, Plaintiff, vs. CLARENDON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Civil Division. Case No. 06-7149-SP-05. November 30, 2006. Teretha Lundy Thomas, Judge. Counsel: Fred Viera, Law Offices of Wood Bronstein, Miami. Maria Corredor.
ORDER AND OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND ACTION FOR RES JUDICATA AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
(TERETHA LUNDY THOMAS, J.) This matter having come before this Court on the 23rd day of October, 2006, upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Action for Res Judicata and this Court, having reviewed the file, having heard argument of counsel and being otherwise duly advised in the premises, Defendant’s Motion is hereby Granted.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1. On or about June 28, 2005, Plaintiff had rendered its last date of service of medical treatment to Julio Mirabal Porras for alleged injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 2, 2005.
2. On or about January 12, 2006, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint (case no.: 06-00232 SP 26 (04))against Defendant for breach of contract, wherein Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to pay personal injury protection benefits to Plaintiff for injuries sustained in the motor vehicle accident of April 2, 2005.
3. On or about May 10, 2006, the Plaintiff filed a Second Complaint to initiate the instant action (case no.: 06-7149-SP-05)and said Complaint was based on the same accident and named the same parties.
4. With the exception of the first allegation of both Complaints, which alleges different damage amounts, and the different dates of service and case numbers, both Complaints are otherwise mirror images of each other and are predicated on the same cause of action and the same facts.
5. The bills at issue in both the first and second case are from the same medical provider, the Plaintiff.
6. On September 26, 2006, the Honorable Judge Nuria Saenz entered an Order and Final Judgment in Case No. 06-00232 SP 26.
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
The central issue of this motion is the determination of whether this case should be dismissed for Res Judicata. The Plaintiff filed two virtually identical complaints for the same cause of action that stems from the same facts and involves the same parties. Initially, no bill was attached to either complaint. The only difference between the Plaintiff’s first complaint and the second complaint is the service dates for the corresponding bills. The bills that are the subject of Plaintiff’s first complaint were not filed simultaneously with the first complaint in January 12, 2006. In a hearing regarding the bills at issue in the second case, the Court ordered the Plaintiff to file the bills. The Plaintiff filed the bills in the second case on August 25, 2006. The Plaintiff filed the bills in the first case as well on September 19, 2006. Both sets of bills are for the same series of treatment that was rendered at the same facility and by the same physician as a result of the same accident that occurred on April 2, 2005. Julio Mirabal Porras, the assignor of benefits and patient in this case, began and ended his treatment at the Plaintiff’s facility in the year 2005. All bills at issue in both cases accrued in the year 2005. In 2006, the Plaintiff filed the first complaint. There is absolutely no reason, aside from the Plaintiff’s desire to file multiple lawsuits in this matter, to split this single cause of action into two parts.
The well established notion of Res Judicata is stated in Justice Drew’s Majority Opinion in the Florida Supreme Court case, Valentine W. Mims vs. Howard Reid, 98 So.2d 498 (1957):
The law does not permit the owner of a single or entire cause of action or an entire indivisible demand to divide or split that cause of action so as to make it the subject of several actions, without the consent of the defendant. All damages sustained or accruing to one as a result of a single. . .act must be claimed or recovered in one action or not at all. The law presumes that a single cause of action can be tried and determined in one suit, and will not permit the plaintiff to maintain more than one action against the same party for the same cause. This rule is founded on the plainest and most substantial justice — namely, that litigation should have an end, and that no person should be unnecessarily harassed with a multiplicity of suits. If the first suit is effective and available, and affords ample remedy to the plaintiff, the second suit is unnecessary and consequently vexatious.
This courtispersuaded by the opinion of the 3rd District Court of Appeal of Florida when where the appellate court upheld the traditional notion in the case, Gomez-Ortega vs. Dorten, Inc., 670 So.2d 1107 (1996). In Gomez-Ortega, the court wrote that:
The general principle behind the doctrine of res judicata is that a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction is absolute and puts to rest every justiciable, as well as actually litigated, issue. . . [w]hen the second suit is [based] upon the same cause of action and between the same parties as the first. . . The first judgment is conclusive as to all matters which were or could have been determined.
Furthermore, the Defendant argues that “there must be an end to litigation and piecemeal litigation should not be allowed”, Butler v. Richard Bertram & Co., 281 So.2d 227 (FL 3rd DCA, 1973), and “no person should be unnecessarily harassed with a multiplicity of suits”, Edelman v. Kolker, 194 So.2d 683 (FL 3rd DCA, 1967).
The law, as applied to the facts of the instant case, demands that Plaintiff’s case be dismissed. The Defendant never consented to defending two separate lawsuits for the same case. All of the Plaintiff’s bills should have been claimed, if at all, in the first action. Those that were not claimed cannot be recovered. The Defendant should not be unnecessarily harassed with as many suits as there are bills, which in this case, would subject the Defendant to defend 28 lawsuits.
The final judgment entered in the first case is conclusive and puts to rest every justiciable issue that could have been litigated. The Plaintiff could have submitted all the bills in the first complaint because all bills at issue in either complaint existed before the first complaint was filed. If this court were to hold otherwise, and deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss, it would yield the unjust result of allowing the Plaintiff to split a cause of action into 28 cases because there are 28 bills. This result is exactly the type of piecemeal litigation that the concept of res judicata is meant to deter.
Therefore, Plaintiff is barred from bringing a second action based on the same facts and involving the same parties as the firstaction, which hasbeen adjudicated.
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Action for Res Judicata is hereby Granted.
This case is dismissed.
