14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 757a
NOT FINAL VERSION OF OPINION
Subsequent Changes at 14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 758a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Discovery — Depositions — Where reasonableness of medical provider’s charges is not in dispute, deposition of member of insurer’s steering committee to find out how insurer determined amount it would pay PIP providers seeks irrelevant information, and order compelling deposition departs from essential requirements of law — Even if reasonableness of charges were at issue, provider would still not be entitled to take deposition because reasons and motives underlying insurer’s actions are not relevant to claim for benefits
PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ST. GERMAIN CHIROPRACTIC, as assignee of ERNESTO LOPES, Respondent. Circuit Court, 9th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Orange County. Case No. 2005-CA-11053-O. Writ No. 05-102. February 9, 2007. Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Counsel: Douglas H. Stein, Anania, Bandklayder, Blackwell, Baumgarten, Torricella & Stein, Miami, for Petitioner. Mark A. Cornelius, Bogin, Munns & Munns, Orlando, for Respondent.
(Before KEST, THORPE and MIHOK, JJ.)
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(PER CURIAM.) Petitioner timely challenges the trial court’s order compelling the deposition of Juan Andrade. This Court has jurisdiction to review this interlocutory order pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(2). We dispense with oral argument. Fla. R. App. P. 9.320.
Respondent, St. Germain Chiropractic (hereinafter Respondent), filed a complaint alleging Petitioner, Progressive Express Insurance Company (hereinafter Petitioner), failed to pay $165.60 worth of Personal Injury Protection (hereinafter “PIP”) benefits. As one of its defenses, Petitioner asserted that the “medical services . . . were not reasonable for the geographic area in which” they were provided. (Pet’r App. 7.) During discovery, Respondent sought to depose Juan Andrade, among others, as a member of Petitioner’s PIP Steering Committee in order to find out how Petitioner determined the amount it would pay to PIP providers. Petitioner objected and Respondent filed a Motion to Compel which was heard on November 30, 2005. The trial court granted the Motion to Compel and this Petition followed.
Petitioner challenges the discovery order compelling the deposition of Juan Andrade. A trial court has broad discretion in governing discovery matters. Tanchel v. Shoemaker, 928 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). As such, even an erroneous discovery order will not create certiorari jurisdiction if it is redressable on plenary appeal. Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097, 1100 (Fla. 1987). Rather, a discovery order is reviewable by a petition for certiorari when the order “departs from the essential requirements of law, causing material injury to a petitioner throughout the remainder of the proceedings below and effectively leaving no adequate remedy on appeal.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1995); Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d at 1099.
Respondent argues that the deposition is necessary because a central issue is whether the amounts paid by Petitioner were reasonable. Petitioner contends that this issue is irrelevant to its affirmative defense that Respondent’s charges were unreasonable and furthermore, the reasoning behind the amount Petitioner pays is confidential business information. Although both parties agree that the reasonableness of Respondent’s charges is an issue, there simply is no record evidence to support this belief.
In its Answer and Affirmative defenses, Petitioner raised four affirmative defenses: first, Respondent was paid in full; second, Respondent failed to comply with section 627.736, Florida Statutes, and the insurance policy; third, the medical services were not reasonable; and fourth, the medical services were not medically necessary and were coded improperly. Despite the parties’ assertions, the reasonableness of Respondent’s charges is not in dispute. Furthermore, claiming medical treatment was neither reasonable nor necessary is not the same as claiming the charges were unreasonable. See Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Physical Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 03-1687-CC, 2005 WL 4135756 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Oct. 27, 2005) (both common sense and logic dictate these issues are not the same).
Respondent contends that Petitioner has indicated its intent to argue that its payments were reasonable through its interrogatory answers, Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses, statements of counsel, and Doug Helton’s deposition. Although Petitioner stated that it paid a reasonable amount in response to two interrogatories, this does not seem to unequivocally express its intent to raise the defense of reasonable payment. Furthermore, Respondent failed to identify the statements by Petitioner’s counsel or portions of Doug Helton’s deposition1 that indicated Petitioner’s intent to put the reasonableness of its payments at issue. Respondent has also failed to cite to any binding or persuasive authority indicating that a party can raise a defense or triable issue through an interrogatory answer, a deposition from another case or argument at a hearing.2
The scope of discovery is framed by the issues raised in the pleadings. See Krypton Broad. of Jacksonville, Inc. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 629 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (disapproved on other grounds by Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, supra). It is axiomatic that discovery must be relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d at 93. When a discovery request is not relevant to a pending claim or defense nor leads to the discovery of admissible evidence, it should be denied. Tanchel v. Shoemaker, supra. Similarly, discovery should be denied “when it has been affirmatively established that such discovery is neither relevant nor will lead to the discovery of relevant information.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d at 95.
In the case at bar, the reasonableness of Respondent’s charges is not in dispute; Petitioner has only claimed that the treatment was not medically reasonable or necessary. Thus, the information sought from the deposition is totally irrelevant to any claim or defense. Consequently, allowing Respondent to take the deposition results in the type of carte blanche discovery of irrelevant material that the courts have routinely prohibited when reviewing petitions for certiorari. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, supra (quashing discovery order where it had been affirmatively established that the discovery was irrelevant); Tanchel v. Shoemaker, supra (quashing discovery that was not shown to be relevant or even possibly relevant); Tampa Pipeline Corp. v. CF Indus., Inc., 693 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (quashing discovery order ordering documents be produced which had no bearing on any issues in the case); Suburban Propane v. Estate of Pitcher, 564 So. 2d 1118, 1121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (quashing discovery order allowing depositions that were irrelevant to the only pending claim).
Assuming arguendo that the reasonableness of Petitioner’s payments is an issue, Respondent would still not be entitled to take the deposition. Respondent wants to take the deposition in order to determine the reason underlying the amount Petitioner pays its claimants. This is irrelevant in a dispute over insurance benefits. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. August V. Joseph, M.D., P.A., No. 02-CA-9257 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. March, 3, 2003) [10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 379a] (reasons and motivations underlying an insurer’s actions not relevant in a claim for insurance benefits).
The trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in compelling the deposition of Juan Andrade. Whether Respondent’s charges or Petitioner’s payments were reasonable is simply not an issue in this suit as indicated by the parties’ pleadings. Accordingly, the discovery is irrelevant to any issue pled in this suit. Furthermore, the reason Respondent desires to take the deposition is irrelevant to its claim. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Augustine V. Joseph, M.D., P.A., supra.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is GRANTED and the order granting Respondent’s motion to compel is QUASHED.
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1This deposition was taken in another unrelated case involving Petitioner.
2The parties may be able to try this issue by consent. However, any analysis of this issue before the appropriate motion has been made pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190 is premature.
