14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1101b

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Medical expenses — MRI — Section 627.736(5)(b)(5) requires annual and cumulative calculation of MRI fee schedule adjusted annually on August 1 to account for previous year’s changes ending on June 30 — Statute does not impose penalty for submitting excessive bill, and submitting excessive bill does not bar claim — Medical provider complied with requirement to submit itemized specification of charges by attaching completed CMS Form 1500 to demand letter — No error in awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing provider in declaratory judgment action

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. ONE STOP MEDICAL, INC. (A/A/O TANDY McNEALY), Appellee. Circuit Court, 17th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Broward County. Case Nos. 06-05254 (05), 06-13915 (14). September 20, 2007. Counsel: Hinda Klein, Conroy, Simberg, Ganon, Krevans, Abel, Lurvey, Morrow & Schefer, P.A., Hollywood, for Appellant. Roberts J. Bradford, Jr., The Law Office of R.J. Bradford, Jr., P.C., Johnson City, TN, for Appellee. Michael A. Rosenberg, Roig, Kasperovich, Tutan & Woods, P.A., Deerfield Beach. Kathy Eikosidekas, Marks & Fleischer, P.A., Fort Lauderdale.

ORDER

(RICHARD D. EADE, J.) THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Appellant, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company’s Appeal of the March 8, 2006 Final Declaratory Judgment in favor of Plaintiff, One Stop Medical, Inc., and the August 15, 2006 Final Judgment for Attorney’s Fees and Costs. The Court having reviewed the court file and otherwise being duly advised in the premises, dispenses with oral argument, and finds and decides as follows:

The claimant, Tandy McNealy, sustained injuries in an automobile accident, incurred medical expenses as a result, and subsequently assigned her benefits to Appellee, One Stop Medical, Inc. (hereafter “One Stop”). One Stop then sought a declaratory judgment to determine the fee schedule intended by Fla. Stat. §627.736(5)(b)(5), arguing that the statute required an aggregation of the Consumer Price indices for the prior year’s increases from the year 2001 through August 1st of the year the MRI scan is performed. The trial court agreed with One Stop’s interpretation of Fla. Stat. §627.736(5)(b)(5):

Based on the clear language of the statute, the proper frequency of the CPI [Consumer Price Index] calculation is annually and cumulatively so that the fee schedule amount for the year in question reflects the combined prior year’s increases from 2001 through August 1st of the year in which the MRI scan is performed. . .

(R. at 169). The Appellant, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (hereafter “State Farm”) argues that the trial court incorrectly calculated the fee schedule ‘June to June,’ and instead should have based the calculation on a calendar year. State Farm raises additional arguments not addressed by the March 8, 2006 Final Declaratory Judgment as follows: (1) the trial court erred in denying State Farm’s Motion to Dismiss and for Sanctions and Motion for Summary Judgment because One Stop did not fulfill the pre-suit requirements of Fla. Stat. §627.736(11); and (2) the trial court erred in not determining that One Stop acted in contravention to the statutory requirements by billing an amount in excess of that which State Farm claims is allowed under Fla. Stat. §627.736(5)(b)(5). State Farm also asserts that the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to One Stop.

The standard of review applicable to a final summary judgment encompassing statutory interpretation is de novo. Fitzgerald v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 840 So.2d 460, 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Additionally, although a presumption of correctness applies to the March 8, 2006 Final Declaratory Judgment, if a declaratory judgment rests upon a question of law, a de novo standard of review is to be utilized by this Court. Reform Party v. Black, 885 So.2d 303, 310 (Fla. 2004).

The March 8, 2006 Final Declaratory Judgment addresses only the declaratory relief sought by One Stop in their Amended Complaint, which was an affirmation that Fla. Stat. §627.736(5)(b)(5) requires the Consumer Price Index to be compounded cumulatively and annually. According to Appellant, Fla. Stat. §627.736(5)(b)(5) sets forth two irreconcilable time periods in which the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”) adjustment is to be calculated. Appellee argues that the plain meaning of the statute provides that the adjustments are to be made each August 1st using a twelve (12) month period ending June 30th, a time frame within the Florida legislature’s discretion to choose.¹

Courts are required to apply the plain meaning rule where a statute is unambiguous. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. W. Gables Open MRI Servs., 846 So.2d 538, 540 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2003). This Court agrees with Appellee that Fla. Stat. §627.736(5)(b)(5) unambiguously identifies the CPI adjustment period as a twelve (12) month period ending June 30th and adjusted August lst. Contrary to Appellant’s position, the Court disagrees that the legislature’s use of the term “calendar year,” creates an ambiguity as to the designated time frame. Such an interpretation would go beyond the plain and ordinary meaning, and render Fla. Stat. §627.736(5)(b)(5) meaningless, which this court cannot do. See United States Sec. Ins. Co. v. Cahuasqui, 760 So. 2d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2000). The plain meaning of Fla. Stat. §627.736(5)(b)(5) requires an annual and cumulative calculation adjusted annually on August 1st to account for the previous year’s changes (ending June 30th). The trial court’s calculation was correct.

Appellant argues further that the trial court erred in denying their January 3, 2006 Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Sanctions, and Motion for Summary Judgment, because Appellee wrongly submitted an excessive bill under Fla. Stat §627.736(5)(b)(5) and an improper demand letter as per Fla. Stat. §627.736(11). Once again, the plain meaning rule governs an unambiguous statute. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. W. Gables Open MRI Servs., 846 So.2d 538, 540 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2003). In considering the argument that an excessive bill bars recovery under Fla. Stat. §627.736(5)(b)(5), the Court in United Auto. Ins. Co. v. A-1 Mobile MRI, Inc., 12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 548b, correctly refused to institute a penalty provision into Fla. Stat. §627.736(5)(b)(5), because to do so would contravene the plain meaning rule. Even if Appellee’s bill were deemed excessive, such would not bar their claim. Id. Likewise, interpreting Fla. Stat. §627.736(11) to require anything more precise than an itemized statement of charges, is to read beyond the plain meaning. Appellee complied with Fla. Stat. §627.736(11) (and paragraph 5(d) as required by Fla. Stat. §627.736(11)(b)(3)), simply by attaching the completed CMS Form 1500 to the demand letter. (R. at 108-109).

Appellant also challenges the August 15, 2006 Final Judgment for Attorney’s Fees and Costs. Fla. Stat. §627.428(1) authorizes a court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing insured “[u]pon the rendition of a judgment or decree.” Regardless of whether a dispute results in a monetary or declaratory judgment, Fla. Stat. §627.428 incorporates itself into every Florida issued insurance policy. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Monsees, 188 So.2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966). The trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to One Stop was not restricted because it was a declaratory judgment, and therefore was proper.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the trial court’s Final Declaratory Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff is AFFIRMED.

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¹Pursuant to the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics’ instructions on how to implement a CPI reference period, Appellee points out that the instructions allow a time frame of quarterly, semiannually, or annually. (R. p. 79-93, Exhibit D).