14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1018a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Denial — Independent medical evaluation — Error to find that IME report that discusses lack of need for future medical treatment, therapy, and diagnostic testing did not terminate coverage for future medical evaluations — Court declines to distinguish, as matter of law, between medical evaluation and medical treatment, therapy, and diagnostic testing
UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. MIAMI MEDICAL GROUP, INC. a/a/o CESAR CANEPA, Appellee. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Miami-Dade County. Case Nos. 06-487 AP and 06-613 AP. L.C. Case No. 04-1606 SP 25. August 29, 2007. On appeal from final summary judgment by the County Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit of Miami-Dade County. Counsel: Lara J. Edelstein, United Automobile Insurance Company, for Appellant. Mari Sampedro-Iglesia, Jose R. Iglesia & Associates, Inc., for Appellee.
(Before SCOLA, Jr., BERNSTEIN and GLAZER, JJ.)
(PER CURIAM.) On review before this Court is a final summary judgment entered against insurer United Automobile Insurance Company. The standard of review for a summary judgment order is de novo and requires viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to United Auto as the non-moving party. Sierra v. Shevin, 767 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). Judgment should be affirmed only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that Miami Medical Group, Inc., is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c). If the slightest doubt exists, summary judgment must be reversed. Sierra, 767 So. 2d at 525, citing Hancock v. Department of Corrections, 585 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
United Auto suspended PIP benefits to Cesar Canepa based upon Dr. Kijner’s IME report of May 15, 2003. It was the determination of the trial court that this report did not completely terminate benefits to the insured, Cesar Canepa.
On appeal, Miami Medical Group supports this conclusion by noting that the IME report discusses the lack of need for future medical treatment, therapy and diagnostic testing, but was silent as to the need for future medical evaluation. Therefore, because medical evaluation is not treatment, therapy or diagnostic testing, argues Miami Medical Group, the IME report did not expressly decline coverage of future medical evaluations. We reject this argument.
This Court declines to distinguish, as a matter of law, between medical evaluation and medical treatment, therapy and diagnostic testing. “Treatment,” when not otherwise defined, is “[a] broad term covering all of the steps taken to effect a cure of an injury or disease, including examination and diagnosis. . .” Black’s Law Dictionary, 1346 (5th ed. 1929); Simmons v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 496 So. 2d 243, 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). The IME report supported the cutoff of future benefits whether deemed evaluation, diagnostic testing, therapy, or treatment. It was error for the Trial Court to have found otherwise. Accordingly, we REVERSE. (SCOLA, Jr., BERNSTEIN and GLAZER, JJ., CONCUR.)
