15 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 430a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Notice of loss — Disclosure and acknowledgment form — Trial court erred in applying section 627.736(5)(e)(5) to incorporate section 627.736(4)(b) in toto and find D&A form deficient — Reference to section 627.736(4)(b) only applies to manner of furnishing form, and D&A form furnished by U.S. mail in properly addressed, postpaid envelope was sufficient to meet threshold requirements of statute — Error to fail to consider bills for subsequent treatment based on alleged deficiency in D&A form — Requirement of D&A form applies only to initial date of treatment — Final summary judgment reversed
REESE KING, Appellant, v. UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 07-193 AP. L.C. Case No. 06-04352 CC 23. February 28, 2008. On appeal from final summary judgment from the County Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Miami-Dade County, entered by The Honorable Linda Singer Stein. Counsel: John B. Agnetti and Torrence R. Phillips, Hoffman, Larin, & Agnetti, P.A., for Appellant. Michael J. Neimand, United Automobile Insurance Company, for Appellee.
(Before FRIEDMAN, GERSTEIN and SIEGEL, JJ.)
(Per Curiam.) Reese King was injured in an automobile accident and incurred medical bills as a result. His insurance company, United Automobile Insurance Company, refused to reimburse King under his insurance contract for Personal Injury Protection. King brought suit against United Auto and the matter came before the trial court on United Auto’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court found for United Auto and awarded Final Summary Judgment. More specifically, it was determined that King’s August 26, 2004, “disclosure and acknowledgement form” failed to provide United Auto with written notice as required by Fla. Stat. § 627.736(5)(e)(5) (2007). This appeal followed.
The heart of this case rests on the meaning of § 627.736(5)(e)(5). When reviewing statutory language, the standard of review is de novo. Tillman v. State, 934 So. 2d 1263, 1269 (Fla. 2006).
Section 627.736(5)(e)(5) states in full, “The original completed disclosure and acknowledgement form shall be furnished to the insurer pursuant to paragraph (4)(b) and may not be electronically furnished.” In the absence of law to the contrary, we apply the plain meaning of the law. Furthermore, we hold in mind the intent and purpose of Florida’s no-fault statutory scheme. On that point, “[w]ithout a doubt, the purpose of the no-fault statutory scheme is to ‘provide swift and virtually automatic payment so that the injured insured may get on with his life without undue financial interruption.’ ” Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So.2d 679, 683-684 (Fla. 2000), quoting Govt. Empl. Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 512 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (in turn citing Comeau v. Safeco Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1978)).
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the plain meaning and purpose of § 627.736(5)(e)(5) establishes the manner in which an original completed disclosure and acknowledgement form “shall be furnished to the insurer.” § 627.736(5)(e)(5). It “may not be electronically furnished.” Id. Rather, it must be furnished pursuant to §627.736(4)(b).
Turning to § 627.736(4)(b) Fla. Stat. (2007), it is apparent that the initial language of the statute is wholly ancillary to the manner in which anyforms are to be furnished. Ignoring the manner of furnishment, § 627.736(4)(b) focuses first and foremost on the consequences of an overdue notice. Finally, tacked to the end, the statute states plainly, “payment shall be treated as being made on the date a draft or other valid instrument which is equivalent to payment was placed in the United States mail in a properly addressed, postpaid envelope or, if not so posted on the date of delivery.” Id. (emphasis added). This is the only language in § 627.736(4)(b) which restricts the manner in which a form is to be furnished. Section 627.736(5)(e)(5), by insisting that “[t]he original completed disclosure and acknowledgement form shall be furnished to the insurer pursuant to paragraph (4)(b)” does no more than insist upon the elements set forth in § 627.736(4)(b) for a proper furnishing of the disclosure and acknowledgement form. That is, the disclosure and acknowledgement form must be furnished by “United States mail in a properly addressed, postpaid envelope.”
We reject the contention that § 627.736(5)(e)(5) is intended to incorporate subsection § 627.736 (4)(b) in toto. As set forth above, § 627.736(5)(e)(5) is concerned with furnishmentof the disclosure and acknowledgement form while the essential focus of subsection § 627.736(4)(b) is upon the consequences of an overdue bill. Subsection (4)(b) addresses, in primary part, the consequences of an overdue bill that fails to meet the contractual set standard of notice set forth in subsection § 627.736(4)(a). The only language of possible relevance to the manner of furnishing the disclosure and acknowledgement form is the requirement that payment shall be treated as being furnished once sent via United States mail in a properly addressed, postpaid envelope. In this awkwardly written statute, we find it is this language to which subsection (e)(5) intends to reference. Our application of this language — for the narrow purpose of determining the manner by which to furnish a disclosure and acknowledgement form — in no way requires us to incorporate the whole of subsection (4)(b).
Applying the foregoing to the record before us, we conclude that the disclosure and acknowledgement form furnished to United Auto was sufficient to meet the threshold requirements of § 627.736(5)(e)(5). We recognize its imperfections. Such imperfection led King to declaim at oral argument any right to reimbursement for the $400.00 bill arising out of the initial treatment.1
As to payment of the medical bills submitted after the August 26, 2004, disclosure and acknowledgement form, the trial court erred in refusing to consider payment of bills subsequently submitted. As set forth in § 627.736(5)(e)(9) (Fla. Stat. 2007), the requirements of § 627.736(5)(e) “apply only with respect to the initial treatment or service.” For subsequent bills, providers must maintain a patient log consistent with the services rendered. Id. The record suggests this was done and that United was provided with those bills in a timely manner. Accordingly, while the initial, August 26, 2004, disclosure and acknowledgement form may have been deficient, we see no basis for the trial court’s refusal to consider bills subsequently furnished. To whatever extent the initial disclosure failed to comply with § 627.736, that failure in no way excused the insurer from paying subsequently filed bills.
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the trial court erred in its application of § 627.736(5)(e)(5). The statute was never intended to incorporate subsection § 627.736(4)(b) in toto but refers only to the manner of furnishing the disclosure and acknowledgement form. Compounding its error, the trial court failed to recognize that § 627.736(5)(e)(9) limits the application of § 627.736(5)(e) to the initial treatment or service. Beyond the initial treatment or service, § 627.736(5)(e) had no application to later submitted bills.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the Final Summary Judgment entered by the trial court. In the event KING ultimately prevails, the trial court shall award appellate attorney’s fees to KING pursuant to §627.428 (Fla. Stat. 2008). (FRIEDMAN, GERSTEIN and SIEGEL, JJ., CONCUR.)
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1The bill for the initial treatment was sent separately from the disclosure and acknowledgement form. United Auto received the bills two weeks later on September 8, 2004. Final summary judgment was entered two and one-half years later. After a two week delay, followed by two and one-half years of litigation, United’s boilerplate invocation of fraud and abuse is not sympathetically received.
