15 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 119a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Notice of loss — HCFA form — Statutory amendment creating obligation to include medical provider’s professional license number on HCFA form is substantive change that does not apply retroactively to PIP policy entered into prior to effective date of amendment
UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. KENIA TORRES SUAREZ, Appellee. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 06-432 AP. L.C. Case No. 05-008798 CC 05. November 19, 2007. An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Judge Teretha Lundy Thomas. Counsel: Michael J. Neimand, for Appellant. Marlene S. Reiss, for Appellee.
(Before REEMBERTO DIAZ, VALERIE R. MANNO SCHURR, and ANTONIO MARIN, JJ.)
(VALERIE R. MANNO SCHURR, Judge.) Appellant, United Automobile Insurance Company (“United”), seeks to overturn the judgment entered against them in favor of its insured, Kenia Torres Suarez (“Ms. Suarez”), for payment of medical bills related to an automobile accident. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(1)(A). We affirm.
United and Ms. Suarez entered into a contractual relationship governed by a Personal Injury Protection (PIP) insurance policy which was in effect from July 28, 2003 to July 28, 2004. On March 27, 2004, Ms. Suarez was injured in an automobile accident for which she sought medical treatment and for which she executed an assignment of benefits. Dr. Jose Vasquez, Ms. Suarez’ treating physician, billed United for Ms. Suarez’ medical treatment. The HCFA forms submitted by Dr. Vazquez listed his name but failed to list his medical license number in box 31. United raised as an affirmative defense that it had not received written notice of a covered loss because the treating physician failed to provide his license number in box 31 on the HCFA forms and therefore they were not responsible for payment of the bills. Both United and Ms. Suarez filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the notice defense. The issue before the trial court was whether the 2003 amendment to section 627.736(5)(d), requiring the treating physician’s license number, prevented recovery by United’s insured. On August 31, 2006, the trial court entered a final summary judgment in Ms. Suarez’s favor. United now appeals the summary judgment.
The standard of review governing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment posing a pure question of law is de novo. Shaw v. Tampa Elec. Co., 949 So. 2d 1066, 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). The insurance policy at issue was entered into on July 28, 2003. The statutory amendment to section 627.736(5)(d), Florida Statutes became effective on October 1, 2003. Prior to 2003, the statute did not require medical providers to include their license number on the HCFA forms.1
The 2003 amendment required all providers other than hospitals to include their professional license number on the applicable claim form in the line or space provided for “[s]ignature of physician or supplier, including degrees or credentials.” § 627.736(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003). United argues that the 2003 amendment to section 627.736(5)(d), Florida Statutes, applies retroactively to the insured since it is a procedural change and not a substantive change. Furthermore, United’s interpretation would create a penalty in that a medical provider that did not comply would forfeit its rights to all payments under the policy. This Court disagrees with United.
“It is a well-established rule of construction that in the absence of clear legislative expression to the contrary, a law is presumed to operate prospectively.” State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 1983). Further, the Third District Court has recognized that the statute in effect at the time the insurance contract is executed governs any issues arising under that contract. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Ceballos, 440 So. 2d 612, 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). In some instances though, retroactive application of a statutory requirement is permissible if the requirement is procedural, and not substantive, in nature. Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1358 (Fla. 1994). However, if the statute impairs vested rights, creates new obligations, or imposes new penalties, the court has refused to apply a statute retroactively. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 61 (Fla. 1995).
In the present case, the insurance policy was entered into prior to the effective date of section 627.736(5)(d), Florida Statutes (2003). A review of the 2001 and 2003 versions of the statute illustrate that the 2003 amendment creates new obligations on the insured. The 2003 amendment to section 627.736(5)(d) requiring all providers other than hospitals to include their professional license number on the HCFA Form is a substantive change that imposes new obligations on Ms. Suarez. Therefore, the amendment to the statute does not apply retroactively.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Upon consideration of the prevailing Appellee’s application for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal, we hereby GRANT the Appellee’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, and remand this matter to the trial court to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(b). (DIAZ and MARIN, JJ., concur.)
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1In 2001, the relevant statutory provision required in part:
. . . No statement of medical services may include charges for medical services of a person or entity that performed such services without possessing the valid licenses required to perform such services.
§ 627.736(5), Fla. Stat. (2001).
