16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 702a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 168CONTI
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Reimbursement by insurer of commercial vehicle — Where insured of PIP carrier was injured in accident while driving taxicab which was insured through commercial motor vehicle policy, PIP carrier is entitled to reimbursement of PIP benefits pursuant to section 627.7405, which allows for reimbursement to PIP carriers of private passenger vehicles by insurer of commercial vehicles involved in accident — No merit to argument that taxicab is not commercial motor vehicle — By terms of PIP statute, right of reimbursement remains applicable notwithstanding section 627.733(1)(b), which excludes taxicabs from security requirements of No-Fault Law
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY and JACKSONVILLE TRANSPORTATION GROUP, LLC, Appellants, vs. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. Circuit Court, 4th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Duval County, Case No. 2008-AP-15. L.C. Case No. 2006-CC-18487, Circuit Division FM-F. May 26, 2009. Order on Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing, Clarification and Certification. June 15, 2009. Appeal from Order which granted Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Duval County Court, Division E. Counsel: Anne C. Sullivan, Gaebe, Mullen, Antonelli, Esco & DiMatteo, Coral Gables, for Appellant. David B. Kampf, Ramey & Kampf, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.
[Editor’s note: County court order granting summary judgment published at 15 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 263a]
OPINION
(BRAD STETSON, J.) This cause came before the Court upon the Notice of Appeal filed by the Appellants, Continental Casualty Company and Jacksonville Transportation Group, LLC, on February 8, 2008. Appellants seek review of an Order which granted Appellee’s, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Motion for Summary Judgment, entered on January 9, 2008. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 5(b), Florida Constitution, section 26.012(1), Florida Statutes (2008), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(1)(A).
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
The instant action arises out of an automobile accident which occurred on April 19, 2005. An individual who had personal injury protection (PIP) benefits through Appellee was injured while operating a taxicab owned by Appellant Jacksonville Transportation Group, LLC, and insured by Appellant Continental Casualty Company. The individual received medical treatment and incurred medical bills relating to his injuries, which were paid for by Appellee. Appellee then brought an action against Appellants for reimbursement of the PIP benefits it paid out to its insured.
Appellee claims a right to reimbursement pursuant to section 627.7405 of the Florida Statutes, which is titled “[i]nsurers’ right of reimbursement”, and which is part of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law. Appellants assert that this provision is not applicable to them, because their insurance policy covering the taxicab does not include PIP benefits, and because taxicabs are exempt from the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law.
On January 9, 2008, the trial court entered an Order which granted Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment after finding that Appellants were required to reimburse Appellee pursuant to section 627.7405 of the Florida Statutes. On February 8, 2008, Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal seeking review of the trial court’s decision.
II. Standard of Review
The standard of review for an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 2001).
III. Application of Standard of Review to Appellants’ Claims
Section 627.7405 of the Florida Statutes provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of ss. 627.730-627.7405, any insurer providing personal injury protection benefits on a private passenger motor vehicle shall have, to the extent of any personal injury protection benefits paid to any person as a benefit arising out of such private passenger motor vehicle insurance, a right of reimbursement against the owner or the insurer of the owner of a commercial motor vehicle, if the benefits paid result from such person having been an occupant of the commercial motor vehicle or having been struck by the commercial motor vehicle while not an occupant of any self-propelled vehicle.
§ 627.7405, Fla. Stat. (2008). Upon consideration of this statute, the Court finds that it is applicable to the instant action, and thus the trial court’s decision is affirmed. Section 627.7405 provides a right of reimbursement for Appellee against Appellants here, where Appellee has paid its insured’s medical bills related to the insured’s injuries while being an occupant of a commercial motor vehicle which was owned and insured by Appellants.
Appellants argue that the taxicab involved in the accident here was not a “commercial motor vehicle”. Section 627.732(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes defines a “private passenger motor vehicle” as “any motor vehicle which is a sedan, station wagon, or jeep-type vehicle and, if not used primarily for occupational, professional, or business purposes, a motor vehicle of the pickup, panel, van, camper, or motor home type.” § 627.732(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). Section 627.732(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes defines a “commercial motor vehicle” as “any motor vehicle which is not a private passenger motor vehicle.” § 627.732(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). Section 627.732(3)(b) also indicates that the term “motor vehicle” does not include motor vehicles used in mass transit and designed to transport more than five passengers exclusive of the operator and which is owned by a municipality, transit authority, or a political subdivision of the state. Id. Using these definitions, the Court finds that a taxicab qualifies as a commercial motor vehicle, as it is a motor vehicle which the evidence does not show is owned by a municipality, transit authority, or political subdivision of the state, and it does not meet the definition provided for a private passenger motor vehicle. Thus, Appellants’ argument that its taxicab is not a commercial motor vehicle is without merit.
Appellants also argue that taxicabs have been specifically excluded from the applicability of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law. In support of this assertion, they cite to section 627.733(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes, which provides that owners or registrants of motor vehicles used as taxicabs are not governed by the security requirements set forth in section 627.733(1)(a) (as they are instead governed by section 324.032(1)), and also are not subject to the requirements set forth in section 627.737. § 627.733(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). The Court likewise finds this argument to be without merit, as Appellants rely on the applicability of section 627.733(1)(b) to support their argument, but the express language of section 627.7405 precludes the applicability of section 627.733(1)(b) here, as it states “[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of ss. 627.730-627.7405”. § 627.7405, Fla. Stat. (2008). Therefore, section 627.733(1)(b) cannot be used to prevent the applicability of section 627.7405.
As the Court finds that the situation contemplated by section 627.7405 is present on the facts of this ease, and section 627.7405 remains applicable even in the face of the provisions contained in section 627.733(1)(b), section 627.7405 allows for recovery in this matter and thus Appellee is entitled to reimbursement from Appellants of the PIP benefits it paid out to its insured. As no genuine issue of material fact remained with respect to the applicability of section 627.7405, the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to Appellee was proper.
Based on the above, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1. The County Court Order granting Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
2. Appellants’ Request for Oral Argument is hereby DENIED.
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ORDER ON APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR REHEARING, CLARIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
(BRAD STETSON, J.) This cause came before this Court for consideration of Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing, Clarification, and Certification, filed pursuant to Rule 9.330 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court, having reviewed the Motion, reviewed the relevant legal authorities, and being fully advised in the premises, finds as follows:
1. This Court recognizes that it is not the function of a motion for rehearing to furnish a medium through which a party may advise this Court that he disagreed with its conclusion, to reargue matters already discussed, or to request this Court to change its mind as to a matter which has already received the careful attention of this Court. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(a); Whipple v. State, 431 So.2d 1011, 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); State v. Green, 105 So.2d 817, 818 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958). The purpose of a motion for rehearing is to bring to the attention of this Court some point it overlooked or failed to consider, which renders the final decree inequitable or unjust. Diamond Cab Co. of Miami v. King, 146 So. 2d 889, 891 (Fla. 1962).
2. In the instant case, this Court entered an Opinion on May 26, 2009 which affirmed the lower court’s decision granting summary judgment for the Appellee. The Opinion found that the case was governed by section 627.7405 of the Florida Statutes, and that Appellee was entitled to reimbursement from Appellants of the personal injury protection (PIP) benefits it paid out to its insured.
3. In their Motion for Rehearing, Clarification, and Certification, Appellant Continental Casualty Company argues that it is not an insurer pursuant to the language of the reimbursement statute. However, Appellant cites to no language of the statute which would specifically disqualify it from being considered as an insurer, and the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law contains no provision which specifically defines the term “insurer”. As it is undisputed that Appellant Continental Casualty Company provided a policy of insurance for Appellant Jacksonville Transportation Group, LLC, this Court considers Appellant Continental Casualty Company to be an insurer.
4. Appellant Continental Casualty Company also argues in its Motion that it is being required to reimburse Appellee for PIP benefits, when its policy of insurance with Appellant Jacksonville Transportation Group, LLC did not provide coverage for PIP benefits, and such constitutes a violation of its due process rights. The Court notes that section 627.7405 of the Florida Statutes provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of ss. 627.730-627.7405, any insurer providing personal injury protection benefits on a private passenger motor vehicle shall have, to the extent of any personal injury protection benefits paid to any person as a benefit arising out of such private passenger motor vehicle insurance, a right of reimbursement against the owner or the insurer of the owner of a commercial motor vehicle, if the benefits paid result from such person having been an occupant of the commercial motor vehicle or having been struck by the commercial motor vehicle while not an occupant of any self-propelled vehicle.
§ 627.7405, Fla. Stat. (2008). The language of the statute by its express terms provides Appellee with a right of reimbursement from either J.T.G., or J.T.G’s insurer, Continental, and does not condition that right upon Appellant Continental Casualty Company having provided PIP benefits to Appellant Jacksonville Transportation Group, LLC. If the Florida Legislature intended for such an exception to the right of reimbursement to apply when an insurer does not provide PIP benefits, it could have provided for such in the statutory language. As written, the statute provides a right of reimbursement against the owner or the insurer of the owner of a commercial motor vehicle. Because this language contains no exceptions and describes Appellants, this Court finds that Appellants’ argument in this regard is to no avail.
5. Appellants also ask this Court to certify two questions to the First District Court of Appeal. Even assuming arguendo that this Court agreed that the proposed questions presented matters of great public importance, this Court is without authority to do such, as the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure do not grant a District Court of Appeal jurisdiction to review matters of great public importance as certified by a circuit court. Rather, such jurisdiction is provided only for matters of great public importance as certified by a county court. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(4).
In view of the above, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing, Clarification, and Certification is hereby DENIED.
