16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 954b
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 1610PERL
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Standing — Assignment — Medical provider has standing pursuant to assignment of benefits in which “Inc.” was omitted from provider’s name where there was no dispute or confusion as to proper identity of provider and no dispute that insured intended to assign benefits to provider
HEALTH SOURCE CHIROPRACTIC, INC., as assignee of Susanne Perla, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. County Court, 6th Judicial Circuit in and for Pinellas County. Case No. 08-10834 CO 54. July 20, 2009. Kathleen T. Hessinger, Judge. Counsel: Kimberly A. Driggers, Brooks LeBoeuf Bennett Foster & Gwartney, P.A., Tallahassee, for Plaintiff. Jennifer Mandelbaum.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (assignment of benefits)
THIS CAUSE came on for hearing on May 26, 2009, on Defendant’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment, and the Court having heard argument of counsel, having reviewed the pleadings and evidence submitted, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, ORDERS AND ADJUDGES as follows:
This lawsuit arises out of USAA’s complete denial of Personal Injury Protection (“PIP”) benefits to Plaintiff, Health Source Chiropractic, Inc., as assignee of Susanne Perla, based upon USAA’s claim that Box 1 of the Standard Disclosure & Acknowledgement Form failed to list all the treatment performed on the first date of service, and, therefore, payment for all services are forfeited.
USAA filed this motion for summary judgment where the sole issue before this Court is whether or not the Plaintiff loses standing because the assignment of benefits was between the patient and Health Source Chiropractic rather than the patient and Health Source Chiropractic, “Inc.”
USAA argues that the Plaintiff, Health Source Chiropractic, Inc., is not the proper party in interest since the assignment of benefits was in the name of Health Source Chiropractic, which is not the registered corporate name of the facility. The Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that any scrivener’s error which may have occurred in the assignment, was cured by the registering of a fictitious name of Health Source Chiropractic, even though it was registered after the filing of the Complaint. Plaintiff also points to the Affidavits of both Health Source Chiropractic, Inc. and the patient, Susanne Perla, which both state it was the intent of each of them to transfer or assign the PIP benefits so that the Plaintiff could collect from the Defendant directly. In addition, Ms. Perla asserts there was no confusion as to the facility she was assigning benefits.
This Court agrees with Plaintiff and hereby denies Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. In so ruling, this Court recognizes there was never any dispute as to the proper identity of the Plaintiff until after the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit to recover the PIP benefits. USAA never issued an Explanation of Benefits asserting a contest to the assignment of benefits and the adjuster acknowledged during her deposition that there was not a dispute with the assignment of benefits. In addition, a Department of Financial Services, Division of Corporations, check shows there is no other entity that has the same or similar name to the Plaintiff. Therefore, there was no way for USAA to confuse the identity of the proper entity. USAA never did, and, at this point, is not contesting, the doctors who treated the patient, the address of the Plaintiff, or the denial of the Plaintiff’s bills.
This Court finds the Defendant’s cited case law is distinguishable, since those cases include different entities that were named in the assignment of benefits versus that named as the party plaintiff. In other words, the cases cited by USAA involve two separate entities listed with the Department of Financial Services, whereas in this case, the Plaintiff and Health Source Chiropractic, are the same corporate entities, for which no confusion lies. See, e.g., Partners in Health Palm Beach, Inc. (a/a/o Roosevelt Labastille) v. Progressive American Insurance Company, 14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 984a (Fla. I7th Jud. Cir. Broward County, 07-27-07) (case involved three distinct corporate entities with different officers and directors).
There is no dispute that there was an intent by the patient/insured to transfer or assign the PIP benefits to the Plaintiff. See Giles v. SunBank, NA, 450 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (no particular words or form of instrument is necessary to effect an equitable assignment, and any language, however informal, which shows an intention on one side to assign a right and an intention on the other side to receive it, if there is valuable consideration, will operate as an effective equitable assignment).
This Court is persuaded by the recent case of Gables Ins. Recovery, Inc. a/a/o Maria Carmen Ovalle v. Seminole Casualty Ins. Co., 2009 WL 838252 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) [34 Fla. L. Weekly D672b]. In Gables, also a case involving PIP benefits, the assignment of benefits didn’t specifically list the medical provider, although it purported to assign benefits to Atlantic Medical Specialty, Inc. In denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the court stated that any ambiguity regarding the identity of the initial assignee was easily rectified in the affidavit confirming who the provider was and that there was an intent to assign.
This Court must note Senior Judge Schwartz’s specially concurring opinion,
I concur because the subject of the so-called “ambiguity” — whether the name of the assignor-provider, whose actual identity was never in doubt, was on the right place on the form-was utterly meaningless, so that, however resolved, it could not conceivably justify a denial of liability (citations omitted). The affirmance of the directly contrary conclusion of the country court granting summary judgment for the insurer on that ground was thus a genuine, even outrageous, miscarriage of justice.
Id. at 3.
There is also strong presumption in favor of having cases decided on their merits rather than on technicalities. Colby Materials, Inc. v. Caldwell Constr., Inc., 926 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 2006); Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2005).
Based upon all of the foregoing, USAA’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.
