16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 469a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 165DISCO
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Reimbursement by insurer of commercial vehicle — Where insured of PIP carrier was injured in accident while driving sedan owned by his employer and insured through commercial motor vehicle policy, PIP carrier was not entitled to reimbursement of PIP benefits pursuant to section 627.7405, which allows for reimbursement to PIP carriers of private passenger vehicles by insurer of commercial vehicles involved in accident — Under statutory definition, sedan is private passenger vehicle regardless of use
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, vs. DISCOVER PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County. Case No. 08-2121 COCE 53. March 13, 2009. Robert W. Lee, Judge. Counsel: Amber N. Cornwell, Tampa, for Plaintiff. Christopher J. Lynch, Coral Gables, for Defendant.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on March 12, 2009 for hearing of Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Court’s having reviewed the Motion and entire Court file; heard argument; reviewed the relevant legal authorities; and been sufficiently advised in the premises, the Court finds as follows:
Background and Undisputed Facts.
1. Plaintiff, State Farm, filed this suit alleging Defendant is required to reimburse Plaintiff pursuant to Florida Statute §627.7405.
2. The State Farm insured, Marc Gruskin, occupied a motor vehicle on or about May 31, 2006. The vehicle, a 1991 Chevrolet Impala, was owned by Genuine Parts Company at all relevant times.
3. The vehicle owned by Genuine Parts Company was insured by Defendant on the identified date.
4. Marc Gruskin was injured in the above motor vehicle due to said vehicle being involved in an automobile accident on the identified date.
5.At the time, date and place of the accident, Marc Gruskin was acting within the course and scope of his employment, as he was delivering auto parts to a customer, and returning to a store operated by Genuine Parts Company.
6. At the time, date and place of the accident, Marc Gruskin was personally insured under an automobile policy with Plaintiff that provided no-fault insurance in compliance with Fla. Stat. §§627.732 – 627.7405. No-fault benefits are also known as personal injury protection (P.I.P.).
7. It is not disputed that the State Farm insured was either employed by Genuine Parts Company or acting as an independent contractor of Genuine Parts Company at the time of the accident.
8. The insured obtained medical care and treatment for the injuries sustained in the accident. As a result, the insured incurred medical bills and expenses related to the injuries sustained in the above accident.
9. Plaintiff made payments on behalf of Marc Gruskin for medical services and/or treatment that were reasonable, medically necessary and causally related to injuries sustained in the motor vehicle accident.
10. Payments by State Farm totaled $10,000.00. The charges and bills that resulted in the payment were necessary and reasonable.
11. Florida Statute §627.7405 provides as follows:
Insurers’ right of reimbursement. — Notwithstanding any other provisions of ss. 627.730–627.7405, any insurer providing personal injury protection benefits on a private passenger motor vehicle shall have, to the extent of any personal injury protection benefits paid to any person as a benefit arising out of such private passenger motor vehicle insurance, a right of reimbursement against the owner or the insurer of the owner of a commercial motor vehicle, if the benefits paid result from such person having been an occupant of the commercial motor vehicle or having been struck by the commercial motor vehicle while not an occupant of any self-propelled vehicle.
12. It is undisputed the Plaintiff, State Farm, is an insurer who provided personal injury protection benefits to Marc Gruskin as this individual owned a private passenger motor vehicle insured by State Farm. (The insured was not occupying the personal vehicle at the time of the accident).
13. It is undisputed the personal injury protection benefits were paid as a result of the insured having been the occupant of a motor vehicle owned by Genuine Parts Company.
14. Marc Gruskin operated the vehicle at the time of the loss. Marc Gruskin generally and primarily operated the vehicle for the business purposes of Genuine Parts Company.
15. The policy of insurance covering the motor vehicle at issue was maintained and paid for by Genuine Parts Company.
16. Genuine Parts Company was solely responsible for all maintenance, including tune-ups, of the motor vehicle at issue.
17. On February 6, 2009, the Plaintiff served its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that the subject vehicle is a “commercial vehicle” under Fla. Stat. §627.7405, and therefore State Farm is entitled to reimbursement from Discover. The matter was set for hearing for March 12, 2009.
18. At the hearing, the Defendant did not dispute the underlying facts, but argued that under the statute, the vehicle was not a “commercial vehicle” and therefore primary coverage remained with State Farm.
Conclusions of Law. The definitions applicable to the issue before the Court appear in Florida Statute §627.732:
As used in ss. 627.730-627.7405, the term:
(3) “Motor vehicle” means any self-propelled vehicle with four or more wheels which is of a type both designed and required to be licensed for use on the highways of this state and any trailer or semitrailer designed for use with such vehicle and includes:
(a) A “private passenger motor vehicle,” which is any motor vehicle which is a sedan, station wagon, or jeep-type vehicle and, if not used primarily for occupational, professional, or business purposes, a motor vehicle of the pickup, panel, van, camper, or motor home type.
(b) A “commercial motor vehicle,” which is any motor vehicle which is not a private passenger motor vehicle.
The term “motor vehicle” does not include a mobile home or any motor vehicle which is used in mass transit, other than public school transportation, and designed to transport more than five passengers exclusive of the operator of the motor vehicle and which is owned by a municipality, a transit authority, or a political subdivision of the state.
The Plaintiff has provided several County Court cases in which the judges have ruled that the language above is not clear, and that it would be unreasonable to construe this language as meaning that a sedan, such as a Chevrolet Impala, can never be a commercial vehicle even if used for business purposes. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. v. Florida Highway Patrol, 15 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 912 (Volusia Cty. Ct. 2008); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 15 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 263 (Duval Cty. Ct. 2008); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Barotruck Corp., 13 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 614 (Miami-Dade Cty. Ct. 2006); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Village Car Service, Inc., 13 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 639 (Broward Cty. Ct. 2006); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Village Car Service, Inc., 13 Fla. L. Weekly 508 (Broward Cty. Ct. 2006); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Yellow Cab of Tampa Bay, Inc., Final Judgment, Case No. 00-465-CO-39 (Pinellas Cty. Ct. Apr. 4, 2000); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., Order of Summary Judgment, Case No. 99-4555-CI-08 (Pinellas Cty. Ct. Feb. 1, 2000); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Rice, Amended Final Order, Case No. 97-6990 SCNPC (Pinellas Cty. Ct. June 18, 1998).
Notwithstanding these decisions of this Court’s esteemed colleagues, the Court believes the language of the statute to be clear. See City of New Port Richey v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 13 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 521 (6th Cir. Ct. 2006) (appellate capacity) (finding the language of Fla. Stat. §627.732 to be “clear”). This Court has located one circuit appellate ruling which this Court believes correctly analyzes the issue, State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 477, 2003 WL 21638297 (13th Cir. Ct. 2003) (appellate capacity). The facts in Clarendon are similar to those in the instant case. The three-judge panel concluded that the statute is “clear and unambiguous” that the Florida Legislature defined a “commercial vehicle” as focusing on its type rather than its use. Accordingly, once it is determined that the vehicle is a sedan, as in the instant case, it is not a “commercial vehicle” even if used for business purposes. Id. The court acknowledged that in doing so, it had to “cast off common notions of what constitutes a commercial vehicle.” Id. As in Clarendon, it is not for this Court to rewrite a statute that is otherwise clear and unambiguous. Accordingly it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
