17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 472a

Online Reference: FLWSUPP 1706GARR

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Notice of loss — Disclosure and acknowledgment form — Failure of medical clinic to provide D&A form satisfactory to insurer does not bar claim for initial visit or subsequent visits of insured for treatment related to same accident — Because PIP policy and PIP statute incorporated therein do not make provision of sufficient D&A form necessary condition precedent to PIP claims, failure to provide form cannot constitute material breach of PIP contract — No merit to argument that requirement for D&A form applies to initial visit to each medical professional employed by medical clinic who is licensed under different chapter; statute only requires one form from clinic or medical institution

PHYSICIANS GROUP, L.L.C., as assignee of JOSHUA GARRETT, Plaintiff, vs. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. County Court, 13th Judicial Circuit in and for Hillsborough County. Case No. 09-CC-026368, Civil Division. Division M. March 22, 2010. Paul L. Huey, Judge. Counsel: Antony B. Barak, Barak & Zitani, L.L.C., Sarasota, for Plaintiff. David B. Kampf, Ramey & Kampf, P.A., for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTAND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s motions for summary judgment having come before the Court for hearing on February 10, 2010, and the Court having heard the argument of the parties for two and one-half hours, given the parties additional time to provide legal support for their respective positions, reviewed the record and researched applicable law, FINDS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:

1. That the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Case Management Conference and Consolidation and its own accord in furtherance of Rule 1.010, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, consolidated all pending cases in the Hillsborough County Courts involving Physicians Group, L.L.C. as Plaintiff and USAA Casualty Insurance Company as a Defendant, that contained the following defense:

Whether Plaintiff was required to send a separate §627.736(5)(e), Florida Statutes, Disclosure and Acknowledgement Form for each medical professional employed by Plaintiff’s practice who was licensed under a different chapter of medicine (see Chapters 456-468, 478, 480, 483, 484, 486, 490 and 491, Florida Statutes) and rendered care to the same insured/patient for injuries arising out of the same automobile accident? See, Order Denying Motion to Strike Affidavit of David Balot and Order Granting Motion to Consolidate for Purposes of Determining Issue Under §627.736(5)(e), Florida Statutes, dated January 15, 2010 (the “Order”).¹

2. That following entry of the Order, both sides argued their dueling motions for summary judgment on the issues addressed here. The Court is grateful for their work to consolidate and address these issues in a timely, cost-efficient manner.

3. That the parties are to be commended for their thorough efforts in this case. This judge is well aware of the axiom that in Florida one can find a court decision on any side of any PIP issue. Thus, every effort was made to scour the case law on this oft repeated issue. The judge is especially grateful that both sides brought their very able appellate counsel to the hearing, which counsel have been active in providing further materials to fully illuminate the issue. In preparing this decision, the Court has not only reviewed what it understands to be all applicable case law, but also the briefs and motions filed in the very recent District Court of Appeal decisions addressing the matters at issues here. As hopefully will be made plain below, once the context and language of the pertinent statutory provisions are brought into focus, the resolution is clear.

4. That §627.736(5)(e)1, Florida Statutes, provides, in part:

At the initial treatment or service provided, each physician, other licensed professional, clinic, or other medical institution providing medical services upon which a claim for personal injury protection benefits is based shall require an injured person, or his guardian, to execute a disclosure and acknowledgement form, which reflects at minimum. . . .

5. That §627.736(5)(e)9, Florida Statutes, provides, in part:

The requirements of this paragraph apply only with respect to the initial treatment or service of the insured by the provider. For subsequent dates of service, the provider must maintain a patient log signed by the patient, in chronological order by date of service that is consistent with the services being rendered to the patient as claimed . . . .

6. That, essentially, the issue is whether the failure by a medical clinic or institution to provide the PIP insurer a Disclosure and Acknowledgement Form satisfactory to the insurer bars the provider from collecting anything for services rendered at any time (not just the initial visit) related to the treatment of the patient/insured arising from the same automobile accident. Several issues subsumed within this will be addressed below. Note that for purposes of this analysis the Plaintiff does not stipulate that the Disclosure and Acknowledgement Forms at issue in the hundreds of consolidated cases are defective or insufficient. Rather, it believes they are compliant. As the following legal analysis manifests, the specific facts are generally irrelevant to the narrow issue addressed here. It is understood that the resolution of the motions will not necessarily end the case; however, it will end litigation regarding the objective issue as to whether a defective Disclosure and Acknowledgement Form is a death knell to all claims filed by a medical clinic or institution relating to the treatment of a patient/insured for injuries arising out of the same automobile accident.

7. That while these matters were pending, the Fifth District Court of Appeals decided the Consolidated Appeals of Florida Medical andInjury Center v. Progressive Express Insurance Company and Progressive American Insurance Company v. Preziosi West/East Chiropractic Clinic, P.A., 2010 WL 198459 (January 22, 2010) [35 Fla. L. Weekly D215b]. A motion for rehearing has been filed but not yet ruled upon. This Court has reviewed that motion and the response to it. Also during that time, the Third District Court of Appeals ruled in the Consolidated Appeals of United Automobile Insurance Company v. Professional Medical Group, Inc., 2009 WL 4281277 [34 Fla. L. Weekly D2500a] (Dec. 2, 2009, motion for rehearing en banc and/or motion for certification denied March 10, 2010). As the Fifth noted in the Florida Medical case: “The issue is one that has similarly generated conflicting opinions across the state by more than two dozen county and circuit courts (footnote omitted), and is in need of resolution.” Two of those conflicting decisions form the basis of the appeal there. The issue was framed there as follows:

The cosmos that the insurers have constructed around the D&A form depends on the notion that a properly completed D&A form is an integral and indispensable element of the “notice of the fact of a covered loss and of the amount of same” referenced in 627.736(4)(b). Therefore if a defective D&A form is submitted to an insurer, the insurer has not been given notice of the loss. If there is no notice, benefits can never be due.

That the Fifth then carefully analyzed the insurer’s theory, concluding: “There is no language in paragraph 5(e) that even suggests that failure to provide the properly completed form to the insurer is failure to provide “notice of the covered loss” to the insurer, or that such failure will render the provider’s bills not payable. If the Legislature had intended this result, it would have said so. We are not at liberty to rewrite the statute (citation omitted).” The Fifth also noted that the Third DCA had recently made “short work” of the insurer’s contentions by finding its arguments regarding the lack of notice of a covered loss to lack merit. United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Professional Medical Group, Inc., 34 Fla. L. Weekly 2500 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 2, 2009).

8. That all the arguments made to the Third and Fifth DCAs were made here. Rather than restate what those courts held, this court adopts their reasoning here.

9. That it is plain that the more narrow issue here, as quoted in paragraph 1 above, was not directly addressed by the 5th or 3rd DCA. Nevertheless, the reasoning there still applies. The Court does find two additional reasons for granting Physician Group’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and denying USAA’s dueling Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

10. That one is founded in fundamental contract law. Notwithstanding that litigants give lip service to the reality that PIP cases are breach of contract cases, the principles of contract law are often overlooked in PIP litigation. This Court has written thoroughly on the subject in Ana Cardoso v. State Farm, Case No. 07-CC-15461; 15 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1211a (Hills. Cty. Ct. Sept 2008). For USAA to prevail, it must be able to allege and prove that Physicians Group or its assignor breached a material contractual duty. The insurance policy, along with the PIP statute incorporated into that policy, as a matter of law form all the terms of the PIP contract at issue. Some provisions are material and some are not. To be material, the failure to perform must cause legally cognizable damages to the allegedly offended party. At times, a contract will contain a term requiring a party to perform an action known in the law as a necessary condition precedent, such as the statutory demand letter requirements at §627.736(11). As a matter of law, the failure to comply with such a provision bars a lawsuit. The record here is undisputed that the contractual provisions regarding the Disclosure and Acknowledgement Form do not make the provision of that form, defective or not, a necessary condition precedent at all, and certainly not for any date of service after the initial date of service. Thus, as a matter of law, the failure to comply with the Disclosure and Acknowledgement Form provisions cannot constitute a material breach. Moreover, it is undisputed that USAA has not been legally “damaged” by any alleged defects in the Disclosure and Acknowledgement Form. The alleged defective form did not cause USAA to spend money it was not otherwise required to spend or deprive it of monies it was otherwise entitled to collect. Also, at all times after the form was received, USAA had the right to not pay the claim or otherwise defend itself, which rights it fully retains even now. Because the PIP insurer receives the initial bill and then, substantially later, the §627.736(11) statutory demand letter, it cannot credibly argue that it is legally prejudiced by not receiving a Disclosure and Acknowledgement Form at all. As is clear from this analysis, the alleged defects in the form are not even legally material to the “initial” claim. In this light, any arguments that allowing a case to proceed after the delivery of a “defective” Disclosure and Acknowledgement Form mocks the PIP statutory scheme or ignores the language of the statute are without legal basis. To the contrary, USAA’s position requires a judge to ignore the unambiguous legislative intent. It is also clear when looking through the lens of contract law that there is no need for consideration of issues like waiver, estoppel, substantial compliance and superfluous language.

11. That, two, USAA’s argument that “initial” applies to the patient’s/insured’s first visit to each medical professional employed by Physicians Group who is licensed under a different chapter of medicine is also without merit. The Court will not here go into a long dissertation of the law regarding statutory construction. The parties’ motions, memoranda and ancillary filings, as well as the recent DCA opinions, adequately address the varying rules. Basically, USAA argues that if a clinic has an osteopathic doctor and an orthopedic surgeon, each must complete and send to insurer a separate Disclosure and Acknowledge Form when the insured first sees him or her. Thus, for purposes of the Disclosure and Acknowledgement Form provisions, each medical professional who sees a PIP insured would be treated as if a sole practitioner. There is no legal support for that argument. Rather, it requires the Court to ignore the clear, unambiguous language of §627.736(e) that allows an authorized representative of a clinic or medical institution to sign the form. Instead of creating the cosmos for which USAA contends, the Florida Legislature employed clear and exhaustive language in requiring only one Disclosure and Acknowledgement Form from a “clinic or other medical institution providing medical services upon which a claim for personal injury protection benefits is based.” There is no definition of clinic or medical institution in the PIP statute that would allow the Court to read them other than as the unambiguous words that they are. Likewise, the terms “initial” and “services.” The Court simply cannot disregard the certain legislative intent expressed in the statute. Also, USAA’s argument that Physicians Group’s Disclosure and Acknowledgement Form is fatally defective because it is not signed by a physician or doctor fails in light of the clear statutory language. The PIP statute permits any “licensed medical professional rendering treatment” to sign the form. Prior to the legislature amending the PIP statute to include the Disclosure and Acknowledgement Form, Chapters 456 et seq. defining health professions and health care practitioner were in existence. Thus, the Florida Legislature knew that any medical professional licensed by those chapters, such as nurses, electrologists, physical therapists, massage therapists and acupuncturists, among others, could sign the form. Furthermore, by using the terms “clinic” and “medical institution,” the legislature intended that one licensed person could sign on behalf of others as is standard operating procedure for all corporations. As USAA wrote at page 11 of its Response to Physicians Group’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the use of the term medical institution was intended to be a “catch-all.” The Court agrees and thus refuses to rewrite the statute to delete the term “medical institution” and replace it with something like: “For purposes of PIP law all licensed health care professionals are deemed to be sole practitioners.” As an aside, USAA’s position would drive up the cost of health care. That would be an anathema to the purpose of PIP.

12. That USAA’s position that denying its motion would render two portions of the statute useless and superfluous misconstrues the plain language of the statute. All contracts allocate risks. The risks in a PIP contract are essentially negotiated by the legislature, rather than the parties. As is often the case, for some misdeeds the legislature provides for damages, for others it does not. When it chooses “not,” it is not for the courts to usurp legislative power by judicial fiat. See, e.g., Fla. Jur. (2d), Actions §§36-38.

The primary, if not the only, issue pertinent to the question of whether a private cause of action may be based upon the breach of a statute is whether the Legislature intended that to be case. See, e.g., Baumstein v. Sunrise Community, Inc., 738 So.2d 420, 87 A.L.R. 5th 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1999); City of Sarasota v. Windom, 736 So.2d 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1999).

Absent an expression of legislative intent to create a private right of action to enforce regulatory statutes, a private right of action to do so is not implied. Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So.2d 842 (Fla. 2003). For example, the Health Maintenance Organization Act does not specifically provide a private right of action for damages based upon an alleged violation of its requirements, and, absent such a provision, a private right of action is not implied. Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So.2d 842 (Fla. 2003). Similarly, a provision of the Act prohibiting unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including the systematic down coding of medical providers’ claims with the intent to deny reimbursement, did not create a private right of action for a provider of medical services against an HMO, as the general scheme of the statute was to empower the Department of Insurance to enforce the statute’s requirements and determine whether the provisions were being complied with or violated, and no provision in the statute expressly or impliedly authorized a private suit brought for the purposes of enforcing or declaring violations of the statute. The Florida Physicians Union, Inc. v. United Healthcare of Florida, Inc., 837 So.2d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2003).

Fla. Jur. (2d), Actions §38.

Also, for example, §559.715, Florida Statutes, requires a buyer of debt to give notice to the debtor of the sale but provides for no negative consequences for noncompliance.

As is evident from the remedy provisions of §627.736(11)(d), the legislature knows how to create a remedy when it intends to do so. Because the legislature did not include a remedy for the alleged §627.736(5) violation at issue here, the Court is barred from implying one. Obviously, neither the legislature’s §627.736(5) language nor this decision is a license for Physicians Group to disregard its duties under §627.736(5). Failure to comply could be argued as evidence that the services were not performed or overbilled. Also, USAA is not without a remedy because its other defenses remain intact.

13. That for all the reasons stated above, and because there are no issues of material fact and the law is settled, Physician Group’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED and USAA’ s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.

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¹The Court consolidated all cases pending in the Hillsborough County courts between the parties and the same counsel for both parties into this case solely with regard to the issues raised by USAA’s defense as quoted above. Attached as Exhibit “A” is a list of all those cases and this Order shall apply to all those cases.

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EXHIBIT “A”

[Editor’s note: List has been reformatted.]

PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Dina Alcin, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 016698, Division H.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Victoria Arnold, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 020006, Division I.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Trinity Bullard, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 026327, Division H.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Gary Chavis, Plaintiff, v. GARRISON PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 026427, Division K.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Karen Corkery, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 024621, Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of George Davis, Plaintiff, v. USAA GENERAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 037890, Division I.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of April Doscher, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 026425, Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Brenda Ferris, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 026337, Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Colin Fitzgerald, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 004447 SC, Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Kimberly Gant, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009-CC-020035, Division I.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Fernando Garcia, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 031580, Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Tasha Garraway, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 026351, Division H.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Joshua Garrett, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 026368, Division M.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of James Gloede, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 026401, Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Johnny Hernandez, Plaintiff, v. USAA INDEMNITY COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 026397, Division H.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of David Hicks, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 020060, Division H.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Amanda Hood-Young, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 037907, Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Radford Hyde, Jr., Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 026405, Division I.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Brittany Jackson, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 037885, Division K.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Marie Johnson, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 024705, Division L.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Samantha Johnson, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 020095, Division H.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Katrina Jones, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009-CC-031469, Division I.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Richard Jones, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 030173, Division H.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Mary Kenny, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 026417, Division L.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Yalily Lastra, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 004365, Division H.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Christopher Lee, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 026395, Division I.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Annabel Litman-Lowenhaupt, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 037894, Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Doleza Lockridge, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 026343, Division I.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Kenyetta Mallory, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 026373 Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Joseph Manarite, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 024715, Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Jane Mason-Davis, Plaintiff, v. USAA GENERAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 037928, Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Derrick Mayo, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 026357, Division L.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Andrew McCluskey, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 037891, Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Gloria McCluskey, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 037884, Division M.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Richard Mortellaro, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 037893, Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Joseph O’Neill, Jr., Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 024655, Division H.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Giavanna Ong, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 026348, Division H.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Christopher Prater, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 0024717, Division I.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Diane Ross, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 024719, Division I.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Selina Saavedra, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 017859, Division H.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of James Schori, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 024721, Division L.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Derek Scott, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 024714, Division K.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Scott Shannon, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 SC 037922, Division I.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Michael Smith, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 020025, Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Deborah Smolenski, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 024566, Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Lauren Smolenski, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 020109, Division L.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Michael Tew, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 037906, Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Daniel Vega, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 024718, Division J.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Dudley Watson, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 021489, Division I.; PHYSICIANS GROUP, LLC, As assignee of Christopher Williams, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant. Case No. 2009 CC 031591, Division I.