17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 12b
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 1701MOHAInsurance — Personal injury protection — Attorney’s fees — Award of fees is supported by competent substantial evidence where trial court stated that hours expended by medical provider’s attorneys were reasonable based on conduct of insurer in denying claim for PIP benefits, manner in which case was defended, amount of time attorneys needed to bring case to conclusion, amount recovered, and specific factors discussed in case law and Rules of Professional Responsibility
UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Florida corporation, Appellant, vs. NDNC NEUROLOGICAL TREATMENT CENTERS, INC., a/a/o ISMAEL MOHAMED, Appellee. Circuit Court, 17th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Broward County. Case No. 08-21369 CACE (19). L.T. Case No. 06-10153 COCE (50). October 15, 2009. Counsel: Thomas L. Hunker, Nathan J. Avrunin.
OPINION
(JEFFREY E. STREITFELD, J.) THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Appellant, United Automobile Insurance Company’s appeal of the trial court’s Order awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to Appellee, Plaintiff below. The court having reviewed the briefs, the record, the applicable case law, and being otherwise fully advised in premises, hereby finds and concludes as follows:
Appellant challenges the Order awarding attorney’s fees, arguing that the award is fundamentally erroneous on its face because the trial judge failed to set forth specific factual findings as to the reasonableness of the hourly rate or the reasonableness of the amount of hours expended according to the factors of Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). According to Rowe, in determining a reasonable attorney’s fee, a trial court should consider the following factors: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the issues, and the legal skill required; (2) the likelihood that the representation will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the customary fee; (4) the result obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyers; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. Id. at 1150.
The Order awarding fees below states as follows:
Emilio R. Stillo, Esq., is entitled to 149.50 hours for reasonable time spent expended in this case based on the conduct of the Defendant in denying the claim for PIP benefits, the manner in which the case was defended, the amount of time this attorney needs to bring this case to a conclusion, the amount recovered, and the specific factors discussed in Rowe, Bell, and the rules of Professional Responsibility 4.1-5. An hourly rate of $350.00 dollars is reasonable for Emilio R. Stillo, Esq., in light of his background, education, and experience as a personal injury attorney concentrating in PIP litigation since 2002 which was testified to in detail at the time of the fee hearing as well as jury trial experience. The court considered the appropriate factors as set forth in Rule of Professional Conduct 4.1-5(b) which was testified to at the time of the hearing.
The Order contained the exact findings with regard to co-counsel Nathan Avrunin, Esq. The Order went on to find that the expert Joseph Dawson, Esq., was necessary to render an opinion relating to the reasonable number of hours and a reasonable hourly rate and found that 6 hours was reasonable time spent on the case and that $400.00 per hour was a reasonable hourly fee for the expert for essentially the same reasons noted for the attorneys. The Order also stated that the right to a multiplier had been waived.
Appellant cites to the case of United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Burton, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 633a, in which Judge Ronald Rothschild of this Court found that the order awarding attorney’s fees in that case did not contain competent substantial evidence of the reasonableness of the hourly rate or the reasonableness of the amount of hours expended, because it did not contain an analysis of the Rowe factors. This Court having carefully reviewed Baratta v. Valley Oak Homeowners’ Ass’n at the Vineyards, Inc., 928 So.2d 495, 497-98 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), Judge Rothschild’s decision in Burton, and the Order on appeal, finds that the trial court sufficiently set forth findings pursuant to a Rowe analysis. The trial court specifically stated that the hours spent were reasonable “based on the conduct of the Defendant in denying the claim for PIP benefits, the manner in which the case was defended, the amount of time this attorneys needs to bring this case to a conclusion, the amount recovered, and the specific factors discussed in Rowe, Bell, and the rules of Professional Responsibility 4.1-5.” As such, this Court finds that the trial court’s Order awarding attorney’s fees is supported by competent substantial evidence.
This Court finds Appellant’s remaining arguments on appeal to be without merit.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the trial court’s Order awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to Appellee, Plaintiff below, is AFFIRMED.
