17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 984a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 1710ABRE
Jurisdiction — County court — Insurance — Torts — Count asserting claim against insurer for failure to pay personal injury protection benefits was within jurisdiction of county court — However, second count seeking damages for bodily injury resulting from automobile accident alleged damages in excess of jurisdictional limits of county court — Trial court should have entered order on defendant’s motion to sever and motion to transfer before entering order on plaintiff’s motion for final judgment and motion for entitlement to fees and costs — Remand for further proceedings
UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Florida Corporation, Appellant(s), v. GLADYS ABREU and NIDIA M. FERRERA, individually, Appellee(s). Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 08-249 AP. L.T. No. 04-1089 CC 05 (08). July 8, 2010. On Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Wendell M. Graham, Judge. Counsel: Juan C. Montes, Lidsky, Vaccaro, Montes, & Martinez Attorneys at Law, PA, for Appellant. Stuart B. Yanofsky, for Appellee.
(Before LOPEZ, WARD, and EIG, JJ.)
(WARD, Judge.) The Defendant/Appellant, United Automobile Insurance Company (“Insurer”) appeals a final judgment in favor of Plaintiffs/Appellees, Gladys Abreu and Nidia M. Ferrera (“Insureds”).
In the underlying action, Insureds filed a two-count complaint against Insurer for failure to pay Personal Injury Protection (“PIP”) benefits and against Jose A. Devoto (“Devoto”) for alleged bodily injury resulting from the same automobile accident. The claims were brought in the same lawsuit as Count 1 and Count II, respectively.
In Count I of their amended complaint, Insureds allege that Insurer breached the insurance policy by failing or refusing to pay benefits available to them for their accident-related medical care. This first count alleges that the action is within the jurisdiction of the county court.
In Count II of their Amended Complaint, Insureds alleged that Devoto, the adverse driver, was liable to them for the damages resulting from the auto accident. Within this Count, the Insureds allege “that this is an action for damages in excess of the jurisdictional limits of this Court.” (Emphasis added).
During the course of litigation, the Insureds filed a Motion to Transfer and Motion to Sever. The Insured’s Motion to Transfer admitted that because of the bodily injury claim against Devoto (“Count II”), the case should be transferred to Miami-Dade Circuit Court “because the potential recover[y] far exceeds the jurisdiction limits of Miami-Dade County Court.” The Insured’s Motion to Sever requested that the PIP action (“Count I”) be tried first at the county level as Count I is within the jurisdiction of the county court. At first, the trial court was inclined to withhold ruling on the Motion to Transfer the personal injury claim to the Circuit Court until the conclusion of the PIP action. However, the trial court announced in open court that it had decided to deny the Motion to Transfer, but never entered a written order to that effect.
Thereafter, Insurer voluntarily paid PIP benefits to the Insureds. Based on this payment of benefits, Insureds, acting on a confession of judgment, filed “Plaintiff’s Motion to Enter Final Judgment and Motion for Entitlement to Fees and Cost.” The trial court granted this motion and entered the“Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Enter Final Judgment and Motion for Entitlement to Fees and Cost.”Insured appeals the entry of the Order claiming that they made payment “knowing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case.”
This Court finds that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction regarding Count I of the action as Count I was a PIP claim well within the jurisdiction of the county court. However, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Count II as damages being sought under that count exceeded the jurisdictional limits of the county court. Therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Enter Final Judgment and Motion for Entitlement to Fees and Cost”because at the time it entered the judgment, it had not yet entered an order on the Motion to Sever and the Motion to Transfer.
The trial court should have entered written orders granting the Motion to Sever and the Motion to Transfer and in so doing, the trial court should enter a written order regarding Count I of the action. Alternatively, the trial court should transfer Counts I and II to the circuit court.
As such, this matter is REVERSED and REMANDED to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion so that Count I and Count II can be properly administered.
Appellee’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, pursuant to § 627.428(1) is DENIED. (LOPEZ, concurs. EIG, J., dissents.)
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(EIG, J., dissenting.) The case was properly resolved at trial.
