18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 580a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 1807PATI
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Standing — Error to dismiss action for PIP benefits brought in name of medical provider’s billing entity, rather than in name of entity which was utilized by provider to provide medical services and to which insured assigned PIP benefits, where there was no possibility that insurer would be required to pay twice for claim
A. CARLO GUADAGNO, D.C., P.A., d/b/a WEST KENDALL CHIROPRACTIC, (a/o/a Ines Patino), Appellant, v. UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 09-420 AP. L.C. Case No. 07-00598 CC 23. Hearing on March 10, 2011. April 12, 2011. On Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Caryn Schwartz, Judge. Counsel: Marlene S. Reiss, for Appellant. Lara J. Edelstein, for Appellee.
Denial of attorney’s fees QUASHED at 36 Fla. L. Weekly D2323b]
(Before FIRTEL, JIMENEZ, and HIRSCH, JJ.)
(HIRSCH, Judge.) That Ines Patino was injured in a car accident on December 17, 2004, is undisputed. That she was, at all times and for all purposes material hereto, an insured of United Automobile Insurance Company is likewise undisputed. She sought and received treatment from Dr. Carlo Guadagno, in consideration of which she assigned her benefits as United’s insured; this, too, is undisputed. In due course Dr. Guadagno was obliged to sue United for payment. Claiming that Dr. Guadagno inadvertently erred by bringing suit in one of his practice names rather than another (an error — if it was one — that Dr. Guadagno acted promptly to clarify before the court below), United obtained summary judgment. All of this is undisputed.
If we affirm the trial court’s judgment, Dr. Guadagno will never be paid for services that, so far as appears from the limited record before us, he rendered; and United will never pay a debt that, so far as appears from the limited record before us, it insured. Because the Third District has consistently and emphatically repudiated the “Victory by ‘Gotcha’ ” paradigm of civil litigation,1 Cent. Motor Co. v. Shaw, 3 So.3d 367, 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) [34 Fla. L. Weekly D160a]; Busman v. State, Dept of Revenue, 905 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly D1575a] (“Our decision today is consistent with all those cases that have expressed an aversion to . . . ‘gotcha’ practices.”); Pascual v. Dozier, 771 So.2d 552, 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly D1921b] (“Plaintiff’s trial strategy a week before trial in limiting her claim for damages from the time of the accident to June 1996 and then using the abandonment of her claim of permanency as grounds to strike all of defendant’s expert witnesses exemplifies ‘gotcha’ practices which we will not condone”); M-5 Commc’ns, Inc. v. ITA Telecomm., Inc., 708 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) [23 Fla. L. Weekly D1076a] (Schwartz, C.J.); Insua v. Chantres, 665 So.2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) [21 Fla. L. Weekly D173d] (Schwartz, C.J.); Green ex rel. Swan v. Ricke, 584 So.2d 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Chatmon v. Woodard, 492 So.2d 1115, 1116 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (“We cannot accept a ‘gotcha’ type stratagem like this one”) (Schwartz, C.J.); Salcedo v. Asociacion Cubana, Inc., 368 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); we reverse the county court’s entry of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
It appears from the record before us that Dr. Guadagno does business as West Kendall Chiropractic Center. (Br. of Appellant 5, citing R. at 1-23.) It was to the latter entity that United’s insured, Ms. Patino, assigned the benefits under her policy. (Br. of Appellant 5, citing R. at 1-23, 224-8, A-1.) Suit for those benefits was promptly brought in the name of “Carlo Guadagno, D.C., P.A., d/b/a West Kendall Chiropractic Center (as assignee of Ines Patino)” in January of 2007. (Br. of Appellant 5, citing R. at 1-23.)
Like many doctors, Dr. Guadagno utilizes one business entity to perform medical services (in this case, West Kendall Chiropractic Center) and another to perform billing and collection services (in this case, Atrium Chiropractic Center). Appellant notes the obvious: “Atrium is simply the billing entity, as the HCFA forms demonstrate.” (Br. of Appellant 6, citing R. at 245-98.)2 Nevertheless, in a pleading captioned “Third Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses” filed by United on March 7, 2008, United set up as an affirmative defense that, “the assignment of benefits is made [by Ms. Patino] to West Kendall Chiropractic Center, however, the bills submitted to defendant for payment are all for services rendered by Atrium Chiropractic Center.”3 (Br. of Appellant 6, citing R. at 90-3; ¶ 13, R. at 112-5; ¶ 13.)
Five months later, United moved for summary judgment, again asserting that the suit was brought in the name of the wrong party-plaintiff. In its summary judgment motion, however, United’s position was not — as it had been less than half a year earlier — that benefits had been assigned to West Kendall Chiropractic while services were rendered by Atrium Chiropractic; instead, in its motion for summary judgment United claimed that services had indeed been rendered by West Kendall Chiropractic, but that suit had been brought by, “A. Carlo Guadagno, D.C., P.A., d/b/a West Kendall Chiropractic Center a/a/o Ines Patino.” (Br. of Appellant 7-8, citing R. at 212, 209-223.) This defect of pleading punctilio, United now claimed, was fatal.
In response, Dr. Guadagno filed an affidavit which became part of the record below. (Br. of Appellant 8, citing R. at 224-8, A-1.) In his affidavit, Dr. Guadagno depones that he is the sole owner of West Kendall Chiropractic Center and Atrium Chiropractic Center, and makes it clear that he is seeking to bill no more than once for the services rendered to Ms. Patino. (Br. of Appellant 8-9, citing A-1; see also Br. of Appellee 4.) United has never gone so far as to suggest that Dr. Guadagno has sought, or is seeking, to bill more than once for the medical services he rendered; nor that anyone but Dr. Guadagno rendered those services. Nonetheless, the county court granted United’s motion for summary judgment, on the ground, “that A. Carlo Guadagno is the improper party-plaintiff.” (Br. of Appellant 10, citing TI at 16-17; see also Br. of Appellee 5.) As noted supra, Dr. Guadagno was not the party plaintiff. Dr. Guadagno doing business as West Kendall Chiropractic Center, the assignee of Ines Patino, was.
In this appeal, United argues that the named plaintiff below had no “standing” to bring a claim. Dr. Guadagno counters that he has “standing,” and that United has no “standing” to question his “standing.”
Although the doctrine of standing is an important one in the law, it is too often the case that insistence on the use of the term “standing” generates more heat than light.4 This is such a case. No one denies that as a matter of general principle, “one has standing when he has a sufficient interest at stake in the controversy which will be affected by the outcome of the litigation,” Geiger v. Sun First Nat. Bank of Orlando, 427 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); or that, as a matter of general principle, “an entity has standing to sue when it has such a legitimate interest in a matter as to warrant asking a court to entertain it.” Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 380 So.2d 1066, 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); or that, as a matter of general principle, standing, “involves a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy” and that it “requires sufficient personal interest in the outcome of litigation by way of injury or potential injury to warrant consideration by the court.” In the Matter of a Petition for Declaration of Abandonment of Various Water Rights in Lake DeSmet Reservoir v. Texaco, Inc., 623 P.2d 764, 767 (Wyo. 1981) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) and Gen. Dev. Corp. v. Kirk, 251 So.2d 284 (Fla.2d DCA 1971)).5 “But there’s a saying, very old and true,”6 that general principles do not resolve specific cases.
United, like every litigant, is entitled to know who its adversary is and to know whether that adversary is the proper party to bring the cause of action giving rise to the lawsuit. The reasons for this are many and obvious, but certainly they include United’s (and every litigant’s) entitlement to benefit, when appropriate, from claim preclusion (res judicata), issue preclusion (collateral estoppel), the “law of the case” doctrine, the doctrine of finality, and the like. Whether anything is achieved by referring to these self-evident interests as “standing” is a nice question, although courts do it all the time. See, e.g., Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. McGrath Cmty Chiropractic, 913 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly D2622b]. The court likewise has an interest in seeing that meritorious causes of action are litigated only once, and meritless causes of action not at all; but no one refers to the court as having “standing” to assure itself of these things.
Thus United was entirely within its rights in demanding a showing that if it settled with, or lost at trial to, the plaintiff in this case it would not be met next week, next month, or next year with a claim for payment for the very same services, this time made by another Guadagno entity. On this record, however, such a showing was made. There exists no prospect whatever that United will be called upon to pay Dr. Guadagno (or any of his corporations or registered fictitious names) more than once. In his initial brief before this court, Dr. Guadagno asserts as much: “It is undisputed in this case that United never faced the prospect of having to pay twice on the same claim.” (Br. of Appellant 19.) Although United met itself coming and going — asserting at one point that it could not pay West Kendall Chiropractic Center because services had been rendered by Atrium Chiropractic Center, see supra p. 3, and at another point that it could not pay “A. Carlo Guadagno, D.C., P.A., d/b/a West Kendall Chiropractic Center a/a/o Ines Patino” because services had been rendered by West Kendall Chiropractic Center, see supra p. 3 — Dr. Guadagno has been entirely consistent in asserting that he and his business entities are one, and that he and his business entities desire to be paid but once. United is doubly protected from double-billing: first because Dr. Guadagno has bound himself, personally through his affidavit and vicariously through his legal counsel, to seek only one payment, see IV John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2588-2595, at 3619-3624 (1st ed. 1905)7; and again because the statute of limitations for any claim arising out of Miss Patino’s injuries or Dr. Guadagno’s treatment for those injuries has long since run.
The purposes for which the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, Fla. Stat. §§627.730-.7405 (under which this claim was brought) was enacted were:
[A] lessening of the congestion of the court system, a reduction in concomitant delays in court calendars, a reduction of automobile insurance premiums and an assurance that persons injured in vehicular accidents would receive some economic aid in meeting medical expenses and the like, in order not to drive them into dire financial circumstances with the possibility of swelling the public relief rolls.
Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So.2d 9, 16 (Fla. 1974). The record of the present proceedings discloses the gratuitous congestion of the court system, the unnecessary protraction of calendars, and the general frustration of the purposes of the No-Fault Law. What the record does not disclose is a failure of “standing” on the part of the plaintiff sufficient to justify that congestion, that protraction, or that frustration.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Appellant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, pursuant to section 627.428(1) is DENIED. (FIRTEL and JIMENEZ, JJ., concur.)
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1And of criminal litigation. State v. Belien, 379 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), (Schwartz, J.) (“In other words, ‘gotcha!’ maneuvers will not be permitted to succeed in criminal, any more than in civil, litigation”).
2Appellant assumes, rather cavalierly, that readers of its brief will understand the reference to “HCFA forms.” For the uninitiated: “HCFA” stands for the Health Care Financing Administration. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, formerly known as the Health Care Financing Administration, constitute a federal agency within the United States Department of Health and Human Services. That agency propounds the forms used in this case by Dr. Guadagno’s billing entity, and by other healthcare providers similarly situated. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centers_for Medicare_and_Medicaid Services.
3United refers to its Third Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses as being “deemed filed as of April 15, 2008,” rather than on March 7, 2008, as alleged by Dr. Guadagno. (Br. of Appellee 2.) The dispute is inconsequential for our purposes, and we make no attempt to resolve it.
4In what was admittedly a very different context, Chief Justice Rehnquist took essentially the same position. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
5And in certain specialized settings, “standing” can take on specialized meanings. For example, in the administrative-law context, standing requires a showing of injury in fact plus a “zone of interest.” See, e.g., Fla. Med. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 426 So.2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. lst DCA 1983) (citing Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)). See also Peace River/Manasota Regional Water Supply v. IMC Phosphates Co., 18 So.3d 1079 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) [34 Fla. L. Weekly D348b]. Regarding the criminal-law context, see supra note 4.
6William Shakespeare, King Henry V, act I sc. 2.
7In the cited sections of his magisterial treatise, Wigmore discusses what he refers to as “judicial admissions,” i.e., statements or admissions “made in court or preparatory to trial, by the party or his attorney, conceding . . . the truth of some alleged fact.” Such statements or admissions have “the effect of a confessory pleading, in that the fact is thereafter to be taken for granted; so that the one party need offer no evidence to prove it, and the other is not allowed to disprove it.” Id. §2588 at 3619. Dr. Guadagno’s acknowledgments, both in his affidavit and through his attorney in her pleadings before this court, that he and his various entities seek to be paid once and only once for medical services rendered in this matter, constitute such “judicial admissions.”
