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AXCESS DIAGNOSTICS POINT WEST LLC, d/b/a BOWES IMAGING CENTER, as assignee of Carlos Aviles, Plaintiff, vs. NEW HAMPSHIRE INDEMINTY COMPANY, INC., Defendant.

18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 94a

Online Reference: FLWSUPP 1801CAVI

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Demand letter is not condition precedent to suit for interest only

AXCESS DIAGNOSTICS POINT WEST LLC, d/b/a BOWES IMAGING CENTER, as assignee of Carlos Aviles, Plaintiff, vs. NEW HAMPSHIRE INDEMINTY COMPANY, INC., Defendant. County Court, 12th Judicial Circuit in and for Manatee County, Civil Division. Case No. 2009-SC-002264. August 8, 2010. Honorable George K. Brown, Jr., Judge. Counsel: Marc B. Nussbaum, Reeder & Nussbaum, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Plaintiff. Sunia Marsh, Law Offices of Gregory S. Stark, Tampa, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This Cause, having come on for hearing on Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment, on July 26, 2010, with the court having reviewed the file, having heard argument from counsel and other being advised in the premises, the court rules as follows:

UNDISPUTED FACTS

1. Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit seeking the payment of interest.

2. Plaintiff submitted a bill to Defendant for service date 9/23/08.

3. The bill was received on or about 9/29/08 but not paid until 1/20/09.

4. The bill was not paid within thirty (30) days of receipt, by Defendant.

5. No interest was paid on the subject bill.

6. This is not a lawsuit for benefits, but rather, for interest.

7. Plaintiff does not believe they are required to file a demand letter for interest only.

8. Defendant believes a demand letter is required for a claim for interest only.

THE LAW

This case involves one of statutory interpretation. In addressing the interpretation of a statute, this court must look first to the plain language of the statute. Hawkins v. Ford Motor Co., 748 So.2d 993, 997 (Fla. 1999) [24 Fla. L. Weekly S480a]; Overstreet v. State, 629 So.2d 125, 126 (Fla. 1993); St. Petersburg Bank & Trust v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1982). “While legislative intent controls construction of statutes in Florida, that intent is determined primarily from the language of the statute. The plain meaning of the statutory language is the first consideration.” Dep’t of Revenue v. Cent. Dade Malpractice Trust Fund673 So.2d 899, 900 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) [21 Fla. L. Weekly D1119a] (citing St. Petersburg Bank & Trust v. Hamm, 414 So.2d at 1073 (Fla. 1982).

The Legislature is assumed to have expressed its intent through the words found in the statute. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the legislative intent must be derived from the words used without involving construction or speculating as to what the legislature intended. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Southeast Diagnostics, Inc766 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly D316a].

The relevant statutory provision applicable to this matter is:

F.S. 627.736(10) DEMAND LETTER. —

(a) As a condition precedent to filing any action for benefits under this section, the insurer must be provided with written notice of an intent to initiate litigation. Such notice may not be sent until the claim is overdue, including any additional time the insurer has to pay the claim pursuant to paragraph (4)(b).

(b) The notice required shall state that it is a “demand letter under s. 627.736(10)” and shall state with specificity:

1. The name of the insured upon which such benefits are being sought, including a copy of the assignment giving rights to the claimant if the claimant is not the insured. . . .

The plain language of Florida Statutes s. 627.736 does not require the service of a demand letter for the payment of interest where PIP benefits are not being sought. Defendant’s argument that the legislative amendment to the Demand Letter provision of F.S. 627.736 (2001) expanded those situations in which a demand letter is required to be served, is without merit in this case. While it is true that a demand letter, under the current version of F.S. 627.736, must now be served regardless of whether a claim for benefits was previously denied or reduced, no such demand letter is required for interest. The legislature explicitly took out any requirement that a demand letter be served for interest not paid or interest that was miscalculated. By removing the statutory language relied upon by Defendant, the legislature actually clarified that no demand letter is required under the subject circumstances. That being said, the rules of statutory construction require the court look solely to the plain language of the current statute as the statute is clear and unambiguous.

WHEREFORE, it is Ordered and Adjudged as follows:

1. Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment is hereby Denied.

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