20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1101b
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2011BECKInsurance — Personal injury protection — Standing — Assignment — Issues of standing and validity of assignment are matters to be raised as affirmative defenses, not in motion to dismiss
ROCKLEDGE HMA, LLC., D/B/A WUESTHOFF MEDICAL CENTER-ROCKLEDGE, a Florida Corporation (assignee of Beck, Tandy), Plaintiff, vs. PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 18th Judicial Circuit in and for Brevard County. Case No. 05-2013-SC-024671-XX. August 19, 2013. Honorable Benjamin B. Garagozlo, Judge. Counsel: James D. Underwood, Florida Advocates, Dania Beach, for Plaintiff. Marci Matonis, for Defendant.
ORDER
THIS CAUSE, having come before the Court for a hearing on July 26, 2013, pursuant to motions filed by the respective parties. At said hearing each side was represented by counsel, and the Court having reviewed the pleadings, heard argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the premise, the Court finds as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
A) Before commencing the analysis herein, the Court would like to pause in an attempt to recognize the level of advocacy and professionalism displayed by the attorneys at said hearing.
B) Rockledge HMA, LLC., d/b/a Wuesthoff Medical Center-Rockeldge, a Florida Corporation hereinafter is referred to as “Plaintiff” or “Hospital”; and Progressive American Insurance Company hereinafter is referred to as the “Defendant” or “Insurer”.
C) The Court has ratified the parties’ stipulation whereby the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are invoked in this cause.SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS
1. This is an action for damages for an amount in controversy less than $500.00.
2. Based on the Complaint filed in this action, Tandy Beck who is insured by the Defendant equitably assigned her personal injury protection benefits (hereinafter referred to as “PIP benefits”) to the Plaintiff by executing a written assignment of benefits — a copy of said assignment is attached as an exhibit to the Complaint.
3. According to the Complaint, Tandy Beck was insured by the Defendant at the time of the automobile accident, and had PIP benefits coverage pursuant to an automobile insurance agreement entered into with the Defendant.
4. Per the Hospital, certain medical bills for payment were submitted to the Defendant in reference to the treatment rendered, and the Defendant “. . .partially paid and/or did not pay Plaintiff”. See: Plaintiff’s Complaint for breach of contract.
5. The Hospital — as the assignee — has now filed this action in order to recover monies owed for medical treatment rendered on behalf of Tandy Beck.
6. Defendant in turn has filed a motion to dismiss this cause of action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction — arguing the Hospital’s lack of standing to bring a claim for PIP benefits since said medical provider does not have a valid assignment from the insured — Tandy Beck1.
7. Defendant alleges the assignment attached to the Complaint is “. . .nothing more than a direction of payment”, and that said attached document does not indicate Tandy Beck’s intent to give up “. . .her rights and/or causes of action”. See: Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
8. Plaintiff has presented several arguments in opposition to the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, one of which is based on a procedural ground, namely; a defense motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not the appropriate vehicle to challenge the validity of the assignment because the Complaint on its face is legally sufficient, therefore, any issue regarding the validity of the assignment “. . .requires an evidentiary hearing” to determine the intent of the parties, since “. . . at a minimum, the facts of this case demonstrate [an] equitable assignment”. See: Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
9. Additionally, Plaintiff questions the Defendant right to even contest the validity of the subject given the fact that the Defendant “. . . was not a party to the assignment”. See: Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
10. Lastly, Plaintiff points out that the Defendant had previously agreed to submit a responsive pleading in this cause2, yet in lieu of filing a responsive pleading has filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint.
11. As a result, the Plaintiff believes not only seeks an Order denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, but is also asking the Court to impose sanctions, including but not limited to, the entry of a default due to Defendant’s failure to file a responsive pleading herein.ISSUES
12. Even though several legal issues were presented at the hearing, for reasons explained infra, the Court will limited the analysis to the issue of whether Defendant has filed the appropriate motion at this stage of the proceeding challenging the Hospital’s standing to sue.ANALYSIS
13. The Defendant seeks to dismiss this action based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming the assignment which is attached to the Plaintiff’s Complaint does not convey to the Hospital “. . .the right to bring suit to enforce any right under the insurance policy”, and as such the “. . .Plaintiff does not have standing to sue on behalf of Tandy Beck”. See: Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
14. The Defendant cites to the case of Askew v. Hold the Bulkhead Save Our Bays, Inc., 269 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); overruled by Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 281 So. 2d 572, 577 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973) for the proposition that “[s]tanding has been equated with jurisdiction of the subject matter of litigation”. Askew at 698. Hence, if a plaintiff does not have standing to sue, the action should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
15. The Florida Supreme Court has ruled “. . .subject-matter jurisdiction concerns the power of the trial court to deal with a class of cases to which a particular case belongs”. Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 179, 181 (Fla. 1994).
16. Surely then, a court “. . .that otherwise [has] jurisdiction over the subject matter, i.e., ‘the general power of the court over the case,’ would [not] lose such jurisdiction because the plaintiff may lack standing”. See: Godfrey v. Reliance Wholesale Inc., 68 So. 3d 930, 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) [36 Fla. L. Weekly D1734a].
17. On the other hand, ‘standing to sue’ requires one to have “. . . a sufficient interest at stake in the controversy which will be affected by the outcome of litigation”. See: Wheeler v. Powers, 972 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly D262b]; citing: Gieger v. Sun First Nat’l Bank of Orlando, 427 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
18. Applying the above rationale herein, clearly this Court does have subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy given the assertions outlined in the Complaint, to-wit: a claim for a breach of contract with damages not exceeding $500.003.
19. As a general rule of procedure, a plaintiffs lack of standing to bring a suit should be raised as an “. . .affirmative defense. . .[which] must be asserted in the responsive pleading and the issue is then determined upon evidence presented or the party’s inability to produce sufficient evidence of its standing”. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Reeves, 92 So. 3d 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) [37 Fla. L. Weekly D1381a].
20. This procedural rule is due to the notion that “[a] motion to dismiss is designed to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint, and not to determine issues of fact”. Bolz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 679 So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) [21 Fla. L. Weekly D2010c].
21. A complaint would be legally sufficient if the pleading “. . . [contains] (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends,. . . (2) a short and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader deems appropriate. Rule 1.110 (b) Fla. R. Civ. P. (2013).
22. However, a named defendant may raise an affirmative defense as part of a motion to dismiss a complaint “. . . if the allegations of the complaint demonstrate [its] existence”. Bolz at 837.
23. Hence, “[i]n determining whether to dismiss a complaint for lack of standing, [one] must confine [the] review to the four corners of the complaint, [drawing] all inferences in favor of the pleader, and [accepting] all well-pled allegations in the complaint as true”. Payne v. City of Miami, 927 So.2d 904, 906 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly D2601a].
24. Assuming arguendo, the Defendant has standing to challenge the validity of the assignment itself which is attached to the Complaint, the question for the Court then becomes whether the attached assignment is the type of instrument contemplated by the procedural rules needing to be incorporated by reference or attached to a complaint in order to render said complaint legally sufficient on its face to state a cause of action4.
25. A document purporting to establish “. . . [e]lements of a cause of action, for example, a capacity to sue, standing, pre-litigation demand (if substantively required) or other substantive elements of a claim for relief, [which] are likely to be evidenced by [said] document . . . that would be offered at trial to prove entitlement to relief” need not be attached to a complaint. See: Berman’s, Florida Civil Procedure, Sec. 130.3 [2] (2013).
26. As such, the language within the “four corners” of the Plaintiff’s Complaint is controlling, rather than the document attached to the Complaint purporting to reflect an assignment.
27. The Complaint alleges an assignment of PIP benefits, therefore the Complaint on its face has sufficiently pled a viable cause of action, especially when the Complaint alleges an equitable assignment.5
28. In Giles v. Sun Bank, N.A., 450 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), Sun Bank contested the existence of a valid assignment regarding a document titled “employment agreement”. The Giles Court held that the agreement constituted “. . . an equitable assignment for which no particular words of art are necessary”, further ruling that “. . .courts of equity can recognize certain kinds of instruments as valid equitable assignments, where it is necessary to effectuate the plain intent of the parties or where to hold otherwise would be unjust.” Id. at 259-260.
29. The Fifth District Court of Appeal additionally explained “[n]o particular words or form of instrument is necessary to effect an equitable assignment and any language, however informal, which shows an intention on one side to assign a right or chose in action and an intention on the other side to receive, if there is a valuable consideration, will operate as an effective equitable assignment”. Giles at 260.
30. Citing the decision in McClure v. Century Estates, 96 Fla. 568 (1928), the Fifth District Court of Appeal stated that “. . . the true test of an equitable assignment is whether the debtor would be justified in paying the debt to the person claiming as assignee”. Giles at 260.
31. This Court is cognizant of the decision in the case of Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. McGrath Community Chiropractic, 913 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly D2622b] cited by the Defendant in support of the motion to dismiss. However, the McGrath case is procedurally distinguishable.
32. In McGrath, the medical provider had obtained an assignment of benefits subsequent to the filing of a small claims action, and the trial court pursuant to a motion for summary disposition under Florida’s Small Claims Rules of Procedure had ruled in favor of the defendant/Insurance Company by dismissing the action. Id. at 1283.
33. On the other hand in the case of Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest v. O’Connor, 855 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) [28 Fla. L. Weekly D2140a], the Fifth District Court of Appeal found error when the trial court went beyond the four corners of the complaint in granting the defendant / Insurance Company’s motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff — insured “. . .lacked standing to bring the lawsuit because she had assigned her rights to receive payment” to the medical provider. Id. at 190.
34. As Judge Palmer noted the motion to dismiss “. . . should not have been granted by the county court. In granting the motion to dismiss, [defendant] relied upon the assignment, a document which was beyond the four corners of the complaint. The issue of standing and the effect of the assignment were matters to be raised by [defendant] as affirmative defenses, not in a motion to dismiss the complaint”. O’Connor, 855 So. 2d 189, 190 FN1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) [28 Fla. L. Weekly D2140a]; see also: Schuster v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, 843 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) [28 Fla. L. Weekly D505a]. see also: Temples v. Florida Industrial Construction Co., 310 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action and dismissal of the complaint in reliance upon the affirmative defenses raised in motion to dismiss constituted reversible error. An affirmative defense must be raised by pleading rather than by motion to dismiss).
35. Given above rationale, the Plaintiff’s legal position is well founded, in that the issue with respect to Plaintiff’s standing to sue or the validity of the assignment at a “pre-answer stage of the litigation” is not appropriate, and should be decided after affording the opportunity to present parol evidence or other exhibits establishing the assignment of PIP benefits from the insured to the Hospital.
36. To reiterate, the Court does have subject matter jurisdiction, and the Complaint has sufficiently set forth a cause of action. Accordingly, the Court need not address the other issues raised at this time, namely: whether the Defendant has standing to challenge the medical provider’s assignment, or the validity of the assignment itself. Whereupon it is hereby;
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that;
37. The Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is respectfully denied.
38. The Defendant’s motion for a protective Order is also denied. It is further;
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that;
39. The Plaintiff’s motion to enforce court order is granted in part, and Defendant shall submit a responsive pleading within twenty-five (25) days from the date of this Order.
40. The Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default by the Court and sanctions is respectfully denied.
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1Pursuant to rule 1.280 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the Defendant has also asked for a “Protective Order”.
2See: Joint Stipulation signed April 11, 2013.
3Subject matter jurisdiction is tested by the good faith allegations of the initial pleading.
4“All bonds, notes, bills of exchange, contracts, accounts, or documents upon which action may be brought or defense made . . . shall be incorporated in or attached to the pleading”. Rule 1.130 (a) Fla. R. Civ. P. (2013).
5Basically, any order, writing, or act which plainly makes an appropriation of a fund or debt, or a part of a fund or debt, may constitute an equitable assignment. An equitable assignment may be parol, or partly in writing and partly oral. See: McClure v. Century Estates, 96 Fla. 568, 120 So. 4 (1928).
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