Case Search

Please select a category.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. MILLENNIUM DIAGNOSTIC & IMAGING CENTER, INC., a/a/o JOSEFA ALVAREZ, Appellee.

20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 322a

Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2004JALVInsurance — Personal injury protection — Trial court erred in entering final summary judgment in favor of provider who sought payment for treatment provided to insured’s mother for injuries sustained when she was a passenger in insured’s vehicle where at time of accident mother was registrant of operable leased vehicle — Trial court erred in finding that, because mother signed lease papers for her daughter because of her daughter’s bad credit, the daughter was the beneficial owner of the leased vehicle — Subjective intent of mother to gift leased vehicle to her daughter was not sufficient to contradict mother’s legal interest in the vehicle

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. MILLENNIUM DIAGNOSTIC & IMAGING CENTER, INC., a/a/o JOSEFA ALVAREZ, Appellee. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 11-102 AP. L.T. Case No. 06-17189 SP 25. Opinion filed January 15, 2013. On Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Lawrence King, Judge. Counsel: Jeffrey B. Tutan and Abbi S. Freifeld, Roig, Tutan, Rosenberg & Zlotnick, P.A., and Nancy W. Gregoire, Kirschbaum, Birnbaum, Lipman, & Gregoire, PLLC, for Appellant. Marlene S. Reiss, Law Offices of Marlene S. Reiss, Esq., P.A., and Kenneth B. Schurr, Law Offices of Kenneth B. Schurr, for Appellee.

[Editor’s Note: Cert. Denied 12/5/13.]

(Before COHEN, PRESCOTT, and FIGAROLA, JJ.)

(PER CURIAM.) State Farm Casualty Company (“State Farm”) is appealing the Final Summary Judgment rendered by the lower tribunal in favor of Millennium Diagnostic Imaging Center (“Millennium Diagnostic”).

State Farm issued an automotive insurance policy to Hery Alvarez. On September 29, 2004, Josefa Alvarez, the mother of Hery Alvarez, was involved in an automobile accident while a passenger in her son’s vehicle. She sought treatment for injuries sustained in the automobile accident from Millennium Diagnostic. She assigned her benefits stemming from her son’s PIP insurance policy to Millennium Diagnostic. She lived in the same household as her son and sought treatment under her son’s PIP insurance policy because she did not have vehicle insurance. She did not have her own PIP insurance policy as she did not have a driver’s license and did not drive.

Millennium Diagnostic submitted bills to State Farm for the treatment and care rendered injuries sustained from the accident. State Farm denied the benefits. Thereafter, Millennium Diagnostic filed suit for the non-payment of PIP benefits. State Farm raised the affirmative defense “that at the time of the alleged loss, Josefa Alvarez was the registered owner of an operable 2004 Ford Expedition. Pursuant to the policy of insurance at issue and section 627.739 F.S. Ms. Alvarez was required to file for [PIP] through her own personal auto policy. Therefore, Ms. Alvarez failed to maintain coverage on said operable, registered vehicle, there is no coverage available under the policy at issue.” The leased vehicle was not the vehicle involved in the accident. Josefa Alvarez signed the lease papers for her daughter, Ana Alvarez, because of her daughter’s bad credit. Millennium Diagnostic argued that Ana Alvarez was the beneficial owner of the leased 2004 Ford Expedition. The trial court entered Final Summary Judgment in favor of Millennium Diagnostic finding Aria Alvarez was the beneficial owner of the 2004 Ford Expedition.

The standard of review governing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P.760 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly S390a]; Sierra v. Shevin767 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly D1605a].

The statute in effect at the time of the execution of the insurance contract governs any issues arising from the contract. Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996) [21 Fla. L. Weekly S102c]; Lumbermans Mutual Cas. Co. v. Ceballos, 440 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The effective date of the insurance policy contract between State Farm and the insured is September 29, 2004. Therefore, the PIP statute in effect from June 29, 2004 to July 4, 2005 governs the insurance contract at issue in this case.

The purpose of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, Florida Statutes sections 627.730 through 627.7405, “is to is to provide for medical, surgical, funeral, and disability insurance benefits without regard to fault, and to require motor vehicle insurance securing such benefits, for motor vehicles required to be registered in this state and, with respect to motor vehicle accidents, a limitation on the right to claim damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience.” § 627.731, Fla. Stat. (2004). Personal Injury Protection is designed to “provide swift and virtually automatic payment so that the injured insured may get on with his life without undue financial interruption.” Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co.774 So. 2d 679, 684 (Fla. 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly S1103a]; United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez808 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 2001) [26 Fla. L. Weekly S747a]. PIP benefits are triggered if the treatment is reasonable, necessary, and related to a motor vehicle accident. Warren v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.899 So. 2d 1090, 1094 (Fla. 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly S197b].

“In statutory construction, statutes must be given their plain and obvious meaning and it must be assumed that the legislative body knew the plain and ordinary meaning of the words.” Rinker Material Corp. v. City of North Miami, 286 So. 2d 552, 553 (Fla. 1973). When possible, all parts of a statute are to be read together in order to achieve consistency. Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control District, 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992); Unruh v. State669 So. 2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1996) [21 Fla. L. Weekly S104a]; Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc.898 So. 2d 1, 6, 8 (Fla. 2005) [29 Fla. L. Weekly S788a]. A statute “must be construed in its entirety and as a whole.” Koile v. State934 So. 2d 1226, 1233 (Fla. 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly S501a] (quoting St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe769 So. 2d 961, 967 (Fla. 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly S980a]). Furthermore, the doctrine of in pari materia requires that statutes relating to the same subject are to be construed harmoniously. Zold v. Zold911 So. 2d 1222, 1229-30 (Fla. 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly S626a].

The Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, PIP Statute, section 627.736 provides that:

Every insurance policy complying with the security requirements of s. 627.733 shall provide personal injury protection to the named insured, relatives residing in the same household, persons operating the insured motor vehicle, passengers in such motor vehicle, and other persons struck by such motor vehicle and suffering bodily injury while not an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle, subject to the provisions of subsection (2) and paragraph (4)(e), to a limit of $10,000 for loss sustained by any such person as a result of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle . . .

627.736(1), Fla. Stat. (2004).

Florida Statute section 627.733 provides that “[e]very owner or registrant of a motor vehicle . . . required to be registered and licensed in this state shall maintain security as required by subsection (3) in effect continuously throughout the registration or licensing period.” § 627.733(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). A owner is defined as “a person who holds legal title to a motor vehicle; or in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of a security agreement or lease with an option to purchase with the debtor or lessee having the right to possession, then the debtor or lessee shall be deemed the owner for the purposes of ss. 627.730-627.7405.”§ 627.732(5), Fla. Stat. (2004). The Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law does not define registrant. Black’s Law Dictionary defines registrant as “[o]ne who registers; esp., one who registers something for the purpose of securing a right or privilege granted by law upon official registration.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). A registrant of a motor vehicle may reasonably be defined a person who registers a motor vehicle for the purpose of securing the right or privilege of using the motor vehicle upon official registration.

However, section 627.733(4) provides that “[a]n owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is required by this section who fails to have such security in effect at the time of an accident shall have no immunity from tort liability, but shall be personally liable for the payment of benefits under s. 627.736. With respect to such benefits, such an owner shall have all of the rights and obligations of an insurer under ss. 627.730-627.7405.” § 627.733(4), Fla. Stat. (2004). It is reasonable to conclude that section 627.733(4) is also applicable to the registrant of a motor vehicle when construing section 627.733(1)(a) in pari materia with section 627.733(4).

The trial court found that Ana Alvarez was the beneficial owner of the 2004 Ford Expedition and that “the law is clear that the name on the title is not the litmus test for determining who owns a vehicle for insurance purposes.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hartzog917 So. 2d 363, 364-65 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) [31 Fla. L. Weekly D129a]. In the Hartzog case Barbara Hartzog agreed to purchase a vehicle from Donnie Welch. Id. Mr. Welch kept the title in his name and maintained the vehicle insurance policy also in his name. Id. Barbara Hartzog was involved in an accident totaling the vehicle within a few months of their purchase agreement and she continued to make payments to him after the accident pursuant to the purchase agreement. Id. The First District Appellate Court reversed and remanded the case and directed the lower court to enter summary judgment in favor of the insurer finding that Barbara Hartzog was the beneficial owner of the vehicle and that the insurer was “not obligated to pay personal injury protection benefits to Hartzog on the theory that she used the truck with Welch’s consent, because Welch was no longer the owner of the truck. Nor was Hartzog covered as the owner, because under both Florida law and Welch’s policy, no fault benefits are not available to a person who owns a vehicle but chooses not to obtain no-fault benefits for that vehicle.” Id. at 365. Beneficial ownership “is determined by the overt acts of the buyer and seller at the time of the agreement and thereafter.” Id. at 364. Overt acts, such as, the exclusive possession and control of the vehicle, “taken at the time of the [purchase] agreement, is a key facto in determining beneficial ownership of a vehicle, regardless of whether legal title remains in the seller’s name.” Id The subjective intent of gifting a vehicle by the legal title owner without the owner divesting the property interest in the vehicle will not contradict the owner’s legal interest in or title to the vehicle. Bowen v. Taylor-Christensen98 So. 3d 136, 142 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) [37 Fla. L. Weekly D2094a] (citing Metzel v. Robinson, 102 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1985)).

The facts of this appeal are distinguishable from Hartzog. First, there was not a purchase agreement between Josefa Alvarez and Ana Alvarez. Second, there could not be a purchase agreement since the lessor, not Josefa Alvarez, owned the 2004 Ford Expedition; therefore she did not have the right to transfer the title. Beneficial ownership of a vehicle follows the transfer of the legal title by the owner to the seller by a purchase agreement. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hartzog, 917 So. 2d at 363. Further, the subjective intent of Josefa Alvarez to gift the 2004 Ford Expedition to Ana Alvarez is insufficient to contradict Josefa Alvarez’s legal interest in the vehicle. Bowen v. Taylor-Christensen, 98 So. 3d at 136.

The final summary judgment entered by the trial court is hereby reversed. Appellate attorneys’ fees may be granted conditioned on that party prevailing on the merits on remand in an amount to be determined by the trial court. This case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED.

* * *

Skip to content