20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 346a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2004ALFOInsurance — Attorney’s fees — No abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss claims for attorney’s fees for fraud on court based, in part, on attorney’s submission of timesheets which included work performed by less experienced attorneys
UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. GENERAL HEALTH MEDICAL, INC., a/a/o Antonio Alfonso and GENERAL HEALTH MEDICAL, INC., a/a/o Marelys Jure, Appellee. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Miami-Dade County. Case Nos. 10-400 AP & 10-401 AP. L.T. Case Nos. 07-20585 SP 05 & 07-20584 SP 05. Opinion filed December 7, 2012. An appeal from the County Court in and for Miami-Dade County, Bronwyn C. Miller, Judge. Counsel: Thomas L. Hunker of United Automobile Insurance Company, Office of General Counsel, for appellant. Marlene S. Reiss of Marlene S. Reiss, Esq., P.A., for appellee.
(Before FIGAROLA, COHEN, and PRESCOTT, JJ.)
(PER CURIAM.) In these consolidated proceedings, Appellant United Automobile Insurance Company (“United Auto”) sought review of the trial court’s Final Judgments Taxing Attorney’s Fees & Costs, arguing that opposing counsel’s entire claim for attorney’s fees should have been dismissed because she committed “fraud upon the court” in the Alfonso matter and sought to remedy her alleged fraud in the Jure matter by belatedly submitting amended timesheets.
In support of her motion for attorneys’ fees in the trial court, counsel for Appellee General Health Medical, Inc., Rita Baez, initially submitted timesheets and proffered testimony suggesting that she had performed all of the legal work in both of the cases in the court below. However, during the proceedings in the trial court, it was revealed that other attorneys performed several of the tasks Ms. Baez claimed on her timesheets. Ms. Baez subsequently withdrew the improperly attributed hours in the Alfonso matter and submitted amended timesheets in the Jure matter indicating which attorneys performed each task. Nonetheless, Ms. Baez maintained her contention that she was entitled to bill for the time that other, less experienced attorneys spent attending an event or drafting documents simply by virtue of her role as supervisor.
Ms. Baez’s position in this respect wholly contradicts the intent of the lodestar approach for computing reasonable attorneys’ fees as adopted by the Florida Supreme Court. See Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). In applying the lodestar method, the court must first determine the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by the attorney. Id. Second, considering the factors enumerated in Rule 4-1.5(b) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, a reasonable hourly rate for the services of the attorney must be determined. Id. at 1151. The party claiming fees bears the burden of establishing a “market rate” for the attorney’s services — that is, “the rate charged in that community by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation, for similar services.” Id. (emphasis supplied). The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer performing the services are inherent in the court’s determination of the reasonableness of the fee award. Therefore, allowing an attorney whose experience, reputation, and ability commands a higher rate to claim the time of a less experienced attorney at an inflated rate would subvert the court’s determination. See e.g., Rodriguez v. Campbell, 720 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) [23 Fla. L. Weekly D2227c] (holding that award of attorney’s fees must be supported by expert evidence, including the testimony of the attorney who performed the services). Ms. Baez’s assertions to the contrary are untenable.
United successfully impeached Ms. Baez’s testimony and the trial court, as the finder of fact, appropriately resolved any inconsistencies by reducing the improperly claimed attorney’s fees in the Alfonso matter. In the Jure, matter Ms. Baez submitted amended timesheets which correctly attributed the time spent on the case to the attorneys who actually performed the tasks and ultimately, United was not prejudiced. The trial court’s final judgments as to the reasonable amount of fees were based upon competent, substantial evidence. Therefore, we find that there was no abuse of discretion and the trial court’s rulings as to the remaining issues on appeal are likewise affirmed.
Although this Court affirms the judgments on appeal, this ruling should not be construed as an approval of Ms. Baez’s actions and misguided rationale in the court below. We caution attorneys who may attempt to pad their billing with misleading time records. The practice is an affront to the solemn oath of attorney and will result in dire consequences for the practitioner. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5(a)(2).
AFFIRMED.
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