21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 430a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2105VEGAInsurance — Post-judgment interest — Checks for full amount of final judgment on motion for attorney’s fees and costs, which checks contained notation that checks were full and final payment of fees, costs, and interest, per judgment, and were unaccompanied by letter or conditions, were effective to stop accrual of interest on judgment — Checks did not constitute conditional tender
BAY IMAGING GROUP, INC., (Felipe Vega), Plaintiff, vs. UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 06-18172 SP 23. January 29, 2014. Honorable Jason E. Dimitris, Judge.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONFOR ENTITLEMENT TO AND AWARDOF POST JUDGMENT INTEREST
This cause having come before the Court on September 12, 2013 on Plaintiff’s Motion for Entitlement to and Award of Post-Judgment Interest, and the Court having reviewed the matter, relevant case law, having heard argument, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, makes the following finding of facts and conclusions of law:
FACTUAL FINDINGS
1. On February 14, 2011, a Final Judgment on Plaintiff’s Motion for Fees and Costs was entered bearing post-judgment interest at the rate of 6% from the date of the Judgment.
2. On February 28, 2011, Defendant tendered two checks to Plaintiff totaling $18,816.51. The checks stated on their face: “Full / Final pymt of att’s & exp witness fees, costs and int per jdmt ent 2/14/11” and “Full/ Final pymt of interest owed per jdmt entered 2/14/11.”
3. Plaintiff did not accept Defendant’s February 28, 2011 tender and appealed the February 14, 2011 Final Judgment on Plaintiff’s Motion for Fees and Costs.
4. Following the appeal, on March 19, 2013, Defendant tendered a second draft to Plaintiff totaling $18,816.51. This check also stated on its face: “Full / Final pymt of att’s & exp witness fees, costs and int per jdmt ent 2/14/11.” This second draft was for the exact same amount tendered by Defendant on February 28, 2011.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
5. Florida law is well settled that the judgment debtor has two options available to stop the accrual of interest on a judgment. First, the debtor can make an unconditional tender for the full amount due on the judgment. Second, the judgment debtor can place the funds in the court registry. Devolder v. Sandage, 575 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1991) citing Koinigsburg v. Grand, 529 So.2d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Fla. Stat. §55.141 and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.600.
6. In the instant matter, Plaintiff argues in their Motion for Entitlement to and Award of Post-Judgment Interest that the Defendant did not exercise either of its options to stop the accrual of interest on the judgment. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Defendant issued a conditional tender in that Defendant intended to effectuate an accord and satisfaction as to the entire fee and interest claimed by Plaintiff. Defendant’s intent, Plaintiff argues, is evidenced by the language on the face of the checks which stated that it was a “Full / Final pymt of att’s & exp witness fees, costs and int per jdmt ent 2/14/11.” As a result, Plaintiff could not accept the payments as they would have precluded Plaintiff from appealing the Final Judgment.
7. Our Courts have held that “[a]n accord and satisfaction results as a matter of law when an offeree accepts a payment which is tendered only on the express condition that its receipt is to be deemed a complete satisfaction of a disputed claim.” Hannah v. James A. Ryder Corporation, 380 So.2d 507, 509-10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). When a tender is accompanied with a full and/or final satisfaction, the tender is rendered conditional which does not stop the running of interest on the judgment. Easkold v. Rhodes, 632 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) and Devolder v. Sandage, 575 So.2d 312 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1991).
8. In the instant case, this Court does not find that the language on the checks was a conditional tender or offer of settlement to Plaintiff that would result in an accord and satisfaction and preclude Plaintiff from appeal. Plaintiff, in their Motion for Entitlement to and Award of Post-Judgment Interest relies on both Easkold and Devolder in support of their argument that the checks issued by Defendant constituted a conditional tender and therefore, they are entitled to post-judgment interest. This Court finds that the cases relied on by Plaintiff are clearly distinguishable. In Easkold, the defendant, prior to the entry of final judgment, tendered a draft for $37,000.00 which was accompanied by a letter requesting a complete satisfaction of judgment. 632 So.2d at 147. The Easkold Court found that the proposed satisfaction of judgment rendered the tender conditional. Id. In Devolder, while the case was on appeal, the defendant tendered the full amount of the original judgment accompanied by a letter which stated that the check was in full satisfaction of the judgment and as well as a satisfaction of judgment which was to be signed. 575 So.2d at 314. The Court found that this was a conditional tender because it required the plaintiff to execute the satisfaction of judgment, thereby accepting the benefits of the original judgment while awaiting the resolution of the appeal. Id. In the case at issue, the checks were issued to Plaintiff with no accompanying letter or conditions and therefore, unlike the cases cited by the Plaintiff, there is not an adequate showing that the checks were tendered with an intent to effectuate an accord and satisfaction. As a result, this Court finds that that the checks issued did not constitute a conditional tender and therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of post-judgment interest, attorney’s fees and costs.
9. Accordingly, based on this Court’s analysis as set forth above, it is:
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Entitlement to and Award of Post Judgment Interest is HEREBY DENIED.
* * *
