21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 66a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2101GOLDInsurance — Stacking — Uninsured/underinsured motorist — Where insureds’ policy clearly and unambiguously excludes stacking of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, and statute provides that limitations accepted by insureds will continue unless insureds request deletion of limitation and pay appropriate premium for additional coverage. insurer was not obligated to provide stacking coverage at non-stacking rate when insureds notified insurer that they wanted to revoke written election against stacked coverage and insurer failed to provide premium statement showing increased charge for increased coverage
HOWARD GOLDING and BETH GOLDING, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants and Third-Party Defendants, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant/Counter-Claimant and Third-Party Plaintiff. Circuit Court, 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Circuit Civil Division. Case No. 50 2008 CA 6652 MB, Division AB. October 3, 2013. Jeffrey Dana Gillen, Judge.
ORDERGRANTING STATE FARM’S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION
THIS MATTER came before the Court on August 12, 2013, for oral argument on opposing written motions for summary judgment. Before the Court were three motions; two by STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY [hereinafter, “State Farm”] and one by HOWARD and BETH GOLDING [hereinafter, “the Goldings”]. The Court’s oral ruling on State Farm’s June 10, 2013 motion disposed of the Goldings’ motion.1 The Court reviewed the transcript of the August 12, 2013 hearing and the two alternative proposed orders, all three of which the Court received on September 25. The Court also did its own research. Based on that review and research and for the reasons set forth below, the Court grants State Farm’s summary-judgment motion.
Florida law governing determination of summary-judgment motions is clear. As the Fourth District instructed in Ara Yardum v. Andrew Scalese, et al., 799 So. 2d 382, 383 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) [26 Fla. L. Weekly D2713a], under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510:
Summary judgment is proper only if there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly S390a]. Where no genuine issue of material fact is shown to exist, the only question for the appellate court is whether the summary judgment was properly granted under the law. See Wesley Constr. Co. v. Lane, 323 So. 2d 649, 650 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). If even the slightest doubt exists as to any issue of material fact, a summary judgment must be reversed. See Beary v. Gay, 732 So. 2d 478, 480 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) [24 Fla. L. Weekly D1237a].
Furthermore, as expressly mandated by Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c), “[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings and summary judgment evidence on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
In this case, determination of this motion turns on pure questions of law involving insurance-policy language and statute language.
In the majority opinion in a recent 4-3 decision authored by Justice Labarga in Washington National Insurance Corporation v. Sydelle Ruderman, et al., 117 So. 3d 943 (Fla. 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly S511a], the Supreme Court reminded that:
Where the language in an insurance contract is plain and unambiguous, a court must interpret the policy in accordance with the plain meaning so as to give effect to the policy as written. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Menendez, 70 So. 3d 566, 569-70 (Fla. 2011) [36 Fla. L. Weekly S469a]. In construing insurance contracts, “courts should read each policy as a whole, endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect.” U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 877 (Fla. 2007) [32 Fla. L. Weekly S811a] (quoting Anderson, 756 So. 2d at 34); see also Swire Pac. Holdings v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So. 2d 161, 166 (Fla. 2003) [28 Fla. L. Weekly S307d] (same). Courts should “avoid simply concentrating on certain limited provisions to the exclusion of the totality of others.” Id. at 165. However, “[p]olicy language is considered to be ambiguous . . . if the language ‘is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one providing coverage and the other limiting coverage.’ ” Menendez, 70 So. 3d at 570 (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. PCR Inc., 889 So. 2d 779, 785 (Fla. 2004) [29 Fla. L. Weekly S774a] (quoting Swire, 845 So. 2d at 165)).
The Supreme Court in Ruderman instructed further:
As we stated in Berkshire Life Insurance Co. v. Adelberg, 698 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1997) [22 Fla. L. Weekly S513a], “[i]t has long been a tenet of Florida insurance law that an insurer, as the writer of an insurance policy, is bound by the language of the policy, which is to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer.” Id. at 830. Thus where, as here, one reasonable interpretation of the policy provisions would provide coverage, that is the construction which must be adopted. We reiterated this special rule for construction of insurance contracts in Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly S633a], where we stated:
Under Florida law, insurance contracts are construed according to their plain meaning. Ambiguities are construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage. As we recently said:
[W]e must follow the guiding principle that this Court has consistently applied that insurance contracts must be construed in accordance with the plain language of the policy. Further, we consider that “[i]f the relevant policy language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one providing coverage and the [other] limiting coverage, the insurance policy is considered ambiguous.” An ambiguous provision is construed in favor of the insured and strictly against the drafter. Taurus Holdings, 913 So. 2d at 532 (quoting Swire, 845 So. 2d at 165 (citations omitted) (quoting Anderson, 756 So. 2d at 34.)).
Applying the foregoing insurance-policy-interpretation instructions, this Court concludes that the policies’ language, particularly the declarations page, makes it clear that all three of the automobile policies the Goldings had with State Farm, including the one covering and in force for the vehicle involved in the January 12, 2007 accident, clearly and unambiguously excluded stacking of uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage.2
However, even if one were to determine that the policy language was ambiguous and susceptible to more than one interpretation, the language of the applicable statute is not.
In Florida Department of Children and Families v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228 (Fla. 2009) [34 Fla. L. Weekly S449a] the Supreme Court reminded:
This issue is one of statutory interpretation; accordingly, our review is de novo. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 194 (Fla. 2007) [32 Fla. L. Weekly S455a]. Legislative intent guides statutory analysis, and to discern that intent we must look first to the language of the statute and its plain meaning. Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 2004) [29 Fla. L. Weekly S788a]. Where the statute’s language is clear or unambiguous, courts need not employ principles of statutory construction to determine and effectuate legislative intent. See Polite v. State, 973 So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 2007) [33 Fla. L. Weekly S69a]; Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984). Further, “[i]t is axiomatic that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole.” Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992).
Id. at 234.
In pertinent part, § 627.727(9), Fla. Stat. provides:
In connection with the offer authorized by this subsection, insurers shall inform the named insured, applicant, or lessee, on a form approved by the office, of the limitations imposed under this subsection and that such coverage is an alternative to coverage without such limitations. If this form is signed by a named insured, applicant, or lessee, it shall be conclusively presumed that there was an informed, knowing acceptance of such limitations on behalf of all insureds. When the named insured, applicant, or lessee has initially accepted such limitations, such acceptance shall apply to any policy which renews, extends, changes, supersedes, or replaces an existing policy unless the named insured requests deletion of such limitations and pays the appropriate premium for such coverage.
[emphasis added]
In opposition to State Farm’s motion, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to them, the Goldings argued that once Mr. Golding orally notified State Farm that he wanted to revoke his written election against stacked coverage, especially where State Farm did not provide the Goldings with a premium statement showing an increased charge for the increased coverage, State Farm was “stuck with giving stacking coverage at the non-stacking rate.” [T 73-74]3 That argument, however, flies in the face of the unambiguous language of § 627.727(9) to which this Court must ascribe its plain meaning.
Therefore, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that State Farm’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the Golding’s competing motion for summary judgment is denied.
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1The Court did not and does not now rule on State Farm’s July 22, 2013 motion.
2It is significant that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Goldings, even though the Goldings claim to have orally revoked their previous election against stacking, that change preceded the accident by approximately two-and-a-half years and it is undisputed that the Goldings received policy renewal notices clearly showing that the coverage was not stacked.
3Although the Goldings suggested to the Court that there is case law supporting this theory, [T 67] they provided none and the Court’s research disclosed none.
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