21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 576a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2106CITYInsurance — Personal injury protection — Reimbursement by insurer of commercial vehicle — Sedan-style police cruiser owned and operated by city qualifies as commercial vehicle under statute — Literal application of definition of private passenger motor vehicle in PIP statute would result in absurd result of excluding police cruiser from definition of commercial vehicle
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, vs. CITY OF WINTER HAVEN, Defendant. County Court, 10th Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County, Civil Division. Case No. 2012-CC-001833. February 10, 2014. J. Kevin Abdoney, Judge. Counsel: David B. Kampf, Ramey & Kampf, P.A., Tampa, for Plaintiff. Patricia M. Rego-Chapman, Dean, Ringers, Morgan & Lawton, Orlando, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONFOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on February 3, 2014, for hearing upon the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter “Motion”), filed pursuant to rule 1.510 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Present were counsel for the Plaintiff, David B. Kampf, Esquire; and counsel for the Defendant, Patricia M. Rego Chapman, Esquire. The Court has considered the Motion, the pleadings, the summary judgment evidence on file, the arguments of the parties, and applicable law. The Court enters its Order herein:
1. The parties have stipulated that there are no material facts in dispute in this matter. The parties agreed that the only issue before the Court for resolution is the legal issue of whether the sedan-style police cruiser owned and operated by the Defendant in this case qualifies as a commercial motor vehicle under section 627.732(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), such that the Defendant is obligated to reimburse the Plaintiff to the extent it paid benefits to its insured pursuant to section 627.7405, Florida Statutes (2010).
2. Section 627.732(3)(a) defines a “private passenger motor vehicle” as “any motor vehicle which is a sedan, station wagon, or jeep-type vehicle and, if not used primarily for occupational, professional, or business purposes, a motor vehicle of the pickup, panel, van, camper, or motor home type.” A “commercial motor vehicle” is defined as “any motor vehicle which is not a private passenger motor vehicle.” § 627.732(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010).
3. The Plaintiff argues that the phrase, “and, if not used primarily for occupational, professional, or business purposes” renders the definition of a “private passenger motor vehicle” ambiguous. Specifically, the Plaintiff argues that the aforementioned phrase could modify the language which precedes it, the language which follows it, or both.
4. Further, the Plaintiff argues that to give literal effect to section 627.732(3) would work an absurd result in that many sedan-style vehicles that are clearly and exclusively operated for commercial purposes would be excluded from the reimbursement provisions of section 627.7405. Such a construction, it is argued, would undermine the purpose and intent of section 627.7405, which is to shift the risk of loss from insurers of private vehicles to insurers of commercial vehicles, thereby reducing premium rates for private vehicle owners. See Amerisure Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 897 So. 2d 1287, 1289 (Fla. 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly S153a].
5. The Defendant argues that section 627.732(3) is clear and unambiguous and that the Court should not second-guess the Legislature’s classification of private motor vehicles and commercial motor vehicles. To be sure, the Defendant’s argument is compelling and the Court agrees that the definitional provisions are certainly clear and unambiguous. The Court is likewise cognizant of its duty not to resort to judicial interpretation or “speculate on constructions more or less reasonable, when the language itself conveys an unequivocal meaning.” Heredia v. Allstate Insur. Co., 358 So. 2d 1353, 1355 (Fla. 1978). “When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984).
6. However, as the Florida Supreme Court announced in Holly:
It is also true that a literal interpretation of the language of a statute need not be given when to do so would lead to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion. Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Florida, Inc., 239 So.2d 256 (Fla.1970). Such a departure from the letter of the statute, however, “is sanctioned by the courts only when there are cogent reasons for believing that the letter [of the law] does not accurately disclose the [legislative] intent.” State ex rel. Hanbury v. Tunnicliffe, 98 Fla. 731, 735, 124 So. 279, 281 (1929).
450 So. 2d at 219.
7. In the present case, while the language of section 627.732(3) is clear and unambiguous, a literal application of its terms that excludes all sedans, such as the police cruiser in this case, from the definition of “commercial motor vehicle” would work an absurd result in light of the purpose and intent of section 627.7405.
8. The Court therefore concludes that the vehicle owned and operated by the Defendant qualifies as a “commercial motor vehicle” under section 627.732(3), Florida Statutes 2010).
It is therefore:
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
1. The Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
2. The Plaintiff shall submit a proposed Final Judgment package within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order.
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